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PART A 
I   Introduction 
1   Background 
This dissertation has been inspired by a discussion that I had with my supervisor Thomas Ehrmann 
back in 2002 when we talked about the book “Franchise Organizations” by Jeffrey Bradach. Having 
studied Bradach’s writing on a phenomenon which he called the plural form, I criticized his study 
as being too anecdotal and too heavily reliant on qualitative data of five case studies. The reply I 
received was both short and encouraging: “Go ahead, improve the issue.” Consequently, this thesis 
contains my written work that has been undertaken since this conversation. 
Borrowing an analogy from this world’s wild life serves well to introduce the plural form phe-
nomenon and thereby the topic of this book: Out in the world’s oceans, tunas and dolphins initially 
compete for food. As they hunt for smaller fish, tunas encircle their targets and then attack right 
towards the center. Breaks in the circle though regularly allow many prey to escape. Because of 
their ability to communicate, dolphins on the other hand are more efficient hunters, though smaller 
group sizes permit to attack only smaller swarms of fish. Stunningly now, tunas and dolphins fre-
quently join each other for hunting, thereby combining their individual strengths and alleviating 
initially existent weaknesses. While the mass of tunas does the ground work, the fewer dolphins 
coordinate the armada and close the breaks in the circle. Necessarily though, the groups have to 
handle additional complexity of a dual structure and they have to agree on sharing the common sur-
plus in food. 
Taking a closer look at today’s franchise chains, their organizational setting and hence their inher-
ent operational challenges to be successful are very similar as for the case of dolphins and tunas. As 
typical hybrid forms, franchise chains combine organizational methods like “price” and “hierarchy” 
with organizational institutions like “markets” and “firms”, making a broad spectrum of organiza-
tional constellations available (Ouchi 1980, Williamson 1991). For plural forms specifically, those 
running a “firm” have decided to use both “prices” and “hierarchy” separately for carrying out iden-
tical task. Others in contrast may run one organizational form being a mixture of both prices and 
hierarchy. While both approaches resemble hybrid organizational settings – neither running a pure 
method –, only the first is clearly plural. 
One example of plural structure is firms having a sales force as part of their sales department and 
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cooperating with independent salesmen as freelancers at the same time (Dutta et al. 1995). Others, 
like in automobile manufacturing, produce a pre- or final-product by themselves and buy the same 
parts from external suppliers (Walker/Weber 1984). The central objects of this research are fran-
chise chains, hiring fixed-paid managers to run company-owned units and simultaneously contract-
ing with almost independent franchises to operate franchise stores. According to the above frame-
work of organizational forms, the first are controlled by the powers of hierarchy, but the latter are 
motivated by the power of the price system. Whatever the initial motivation, just like in the case of 
tunas and dolphins, mixing organizational methods within one network will only be beneficial to its 
members if the chances and risks of forming a hybrid structure are well understood both by the 
franchisor and the franchisees prior to the arrangement, if workflows are well coordinated i.e. op-
erational complexity is kept low during the arrangement; and if surpluses created are distributed 
fairly among the participating members after (each period of) the cooperation. 
 
2   Plural form research questions 
In the world of franchise systems, a full spectrum of alternatives is common for organizing a decen-
trally located production and distribution of goods. Depending on its share of company ownership, 
pure franchising and plurally structured systems as the extreme poles of the range are used in this 
survey. Actually, only a minority of all chains operates free of any company operation – the vast 
majority of “franchise” chains is actually plurally structured. Looking at such highly heterogeneous 
profiles, my initial motivation of this dissertation was to explain why so many franchisors use plural 
forms instead of pure franchising, approaching this task both from a theoretical and a practical posi-
tion. According to existing research work, plural structures theoretically grant the principal the 
freedom to reduce organizing cost (Rubin 1978, Brickley/Dark 1987, Norton 1988, Minkler 1990, 
1992, Brickley et al. 1991, Lafontaine 1992, Thompson 1992), to increase system growth (Ox-
enfeldt/Kelly 1969, Ozeanne/Hunt 1971, Hunt 1973, Caves/Murphy 1976, Lillis et al. 1976, Hunt 
1977, Lafontaine 1991, Thompson 1994) and to avoid location specific risks (Martin 1988, Chaud-
huri et al. 2001), though all of these strategies, at the end of the day, are highly opportunistic, ex-
ploiting the principal-agent dependency to the disadvantage of franchisees. A very different reason 
for plural forms in contrast is presented by researchers like Gallini/Lutz (1992), Bradach (1998), 
Lewin-Solomons (1997, 1998, 1999), Lafontaine/Shaw (1999) or Sorenson/Sørensen (2001), stating 
that the parallel use of at least two distinct organizational forms under one common trademark and 
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management may realize beneficial synergies, making the sum of the distributional arms more valu-
able than their added individual values. Resulting from his extensive qualitative research on major 
restaurant chains like KFC, Pizza Hut, Hardee’s and Jack in the Box, Bradach (1998) finds plural 
structures to provide a uniquely effective way to leverage the strengths and mend the weaknesses of 
franchise systems, enhancing an organization’s capacity for self-correction and renewal. Why, 
someone could ask then, are there still pure franchise and wholly company-owned chains around? 
In other words, it has remained unexplained why competing chains of the same industry are still 
managed under sharply distinct organizational doctrines. To name just two examples, McDonald’s, 
the mother of all franchise systems, has been plurally organized since long ago, while heavily grow-
ing sandwich maker Subway is so clearly a full franchise organization that it promotes its fully 
franchised structure literally everywhere – even on each of their napkins. Furthermore, numerous 
systems again have fully integrated structures (i.e. are company-owned), like for instance many 
chains in the food retailing industry. Thus the answer towards the existence of plural forms has to 
be a more complex one than that presented by Bradach, taking not only the advantages but also the 
disadvantages of plural forms into account. With a large data base of almost 1.000 US chains, this 
thesis presents empirical evidence on hypotheses that have been tested before by qualitative re-
search only. To explain the full organizational spectrum – and plural forms are just one part of it - I 
will therefore combine the benefits and costs encountered in hybrid forms with the synergies and 
complexities generated through plural forms, thereby presenting for the first time those aspects 
leading to fully franchised, plurally organized and fully company-owned chains. 
 
3   Content overview 
Split into four papers, this thesis merges the theoretical work of many researchers determined to 
franchising with extensive empirical data of franchise chains whose track records reach back as far 
as 24 years in their individual firm history. A general outcome of this thesis, insights into the plural 
form and the structuring of chains have been gained that are and should be of interest to franchisors, 
franchisees and scientific researchers. Mainly by researching a wide range of secondary empirical 
data, the propositions of Bradach and others towards the existence, the benefits and the detriments 
of plural forms have been clarified. In so far, this dissertation intends to pass on current research 
knowledge to franchising practitioners so that they may use it to form a more competitive, success-
ful and lasting enterprise. 
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Section B-I 
The starting paper “Why do franchisors combine franchises and company-owned units?” explores 
the strategic motivation of franchisors to combine franchised and company-owned stores when 
structuring their distribution networks. In the United States, such plurally organized chains have 
already outnumbered purely franchised competitors. Based on a review of existing research work, I 
explain how plural franchise chains theoretically outperform purely franchised or wholly company-
owned systems through realizing cost reduction, quality enhancement, growth stimulation and op-
timized control of business risk. I then challenge these theoretical explanations with longitudinal 
data of 925 US-franchise systems surveyed by the Entrepreneur Magazine. While there is little or 
no support for those strategies – cost, growth and risk improvement – that tend to benefit the fran-
chisor at the expense of franchisees, the data reveal strong support for the quality arguments. By 
combining a plural form structure with high franchise fees and low royalty rates, franchisors signal 
outsiders to be a reliable and cooperative principal. By simultaneously operating company-owned 
stores and independent franchise outlets, chains successfully force themselves into cooperational 
and less opportunistic behavior towards their franchisees and (thus) manage to attract more and bet-
ter members to join the system. 
 
Section B-II 
The second paper “Franchisee versus Company Ownership – An Empirical Analysis of Franchisor 
Profit” proceeds in examining ownership structures of franchise chains and in evaluating their im-
pact on franchisor profit. Specifically I compare pure forms of franchising with those that use both 
company-owned and franchised outlets within one chain – i.e. the plural form. As explained in the 
previous paper, such plural arrangements are supposed to provide franchisors with lower costs, 
higher growth, greater total-quality, and reduced business risk. Empirical results of this study indi-
cate the superiority of company-owned businesses over franchised units in generating franchisor 
profits. Moreover plurally organized systems compensate for losses from franchising with profits 
from company units and outperform purely franchised competitors in overall profitability. Stun-
ningly, despite a financial inferiority of franchise outlets, franchisors of our sample do not convert 
plural structures into wholly-owned chains. Much more when organizing the chain, franchisors face 
an (skewed) inverse u-shaped profitability curve with both pure franchising and pure company-
ownership lying at the (undesirable) extremes and with a performance peak somewhere in between. 
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Section B-III 
Analyzing the frictions inherent in a franchisor-franchisee relationship, the third paper “Beneficially 
constraining franchisor’s power” analyzes various forms of power and explains their asymmetrical 
allocation in the franchising mode. Since typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive 
means of power to the principal’s side, agents are left with a comparably small range of countervail-
ing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will 
rationally anticipate this threat upon signing a contract. In this paper I demonstrate how franchisors 
restore those shifts in power that seem to disorder the desired balance by performing contractual, 
financial and organizational adjustments. The nature of these measures suggests that franchisors 
should cooperate with agents despite their freedom to behave opportunistically. According to em-
pirical data, the better a franchisor is able to credibly alleviate a franchisee’s fear of being exploited 
by principal opportunism, the stronger the growth generated in the entire franchise system that em-
braces both the company-owned and the franchise arms. 
 
Section B-IV 
Finally, in “A franchisor fecision matrix for structuring the chain” a dynamic life-cycle model ex-
plains the development of franchise chains and the existence of pure franchise and wholly com-
pany-owned chains next to plural forms. Research of more than three decades theorized franchising 
to exist because of its Hybridal Form Benefits (HFB). Compared to full hierarchy, these benefits are 
thought to result from reduced agency costs, surpassed resource scarcity and enabled risk sharing. 
Lately, the focus has shifted to an enquiry into the parallel use of franchise and company-owned 
outlets – the plural form – to provide the chain with Plural Form Synergies (PFS). More so than 
wholly franchised or entirely integrated systems, plural forms may align the interests of diverse 
actors, signal profitability, enhance innovation speed and increase inter-firm competition. Due to 
costs specific to each form, net HFB (HFBnet) and net PFS (PFSnet) evolve as organizational deci-
sion variables! For the first time, I therefore analyze both HFB and PFS, I review their influence on 
the process of structuring the chain and develop a decision matrix to aid franchisors improve their 
distributional setting. Accordingly, if neither positive HFBnet nor PFSnet are realized, full ownership 
is efficient. In a state of positive HFBnet only, the chain should be fully franchised. If only PFSnet are 
positive, the chain will be structured either plurally or fully company-owned depending on the im-
pact of possibly negative HFBnet. For a positive HFBnet and PFSnet lastly, plural forms prevail. 
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PART B 
I   Why do franchisors combine franchises and company-owned units? 
 
Overview 
 
? This empirical work explores the strategic motivation of franchisors to combine franchised and 
company-owned stores when structuring their distribution networks. In the United States, such 
plurally organized chains have already outnumbered purely franchised competitors. 
 
? Based on a review of existing research work, we explain how plural franchise chains theoreti-
cally outperform purely franchised or wholly company-owned systems through realizing cost 
reduction, quality enhancement, growth stimulation and optimized control of business risk.. 
 
? We then challenge these theoretical explanations with the historic data of 925 US-franchise sys-
tems, covering almost twenty years of franchise development. 
 
? While we find little or no support for those strategies – cost, growth and risk improvement – that 
tend to benefit the franchisor at the expense of franchisees, our data reveal strong support for the 
quality arguments. By combining a plural form structure with high franchise fees and low roy-
alty rates, franchisors signal outsiders to be a reliable and cooperative principal. By simultane-
ously operating company-owned stores and independent franchise outlets, chains successfully 
force themselves into cooperational and less opportunistic behavior towards their franchisees 
and (thus) manage to attract more and better members to join the system.1 
                                                 
1 Earlier drafts of this paper have been published in the proceedings of EMNet 2003 (Ehrmann/Spranger 2004), in the 
Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft (Ehrmann/Spranger 2005a), in the proceedings of ISOF 2006 and in the SSRN 
Working Paper Series: http://ssrn.com/abstract=807346. 
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1   Introduction 
Concerning the organization of distribution networks, there is a wide variety of possible solutions to 
choose from for those selling a product or a service. The extreme positions of this spectrum are 
marked by a fully company-owned distribution system on the one hand, for instance via an em-
ployed sales force, and distribution through external, independent subjects on the other hand. Fran-
chising, being a cooperative venture between the owner of a business concept and its decentralized 
franchisees, takes up a middle position in so far as franchisees are independent business entities but 
are bound to the franchisor on a fixed contract basis. Moreover franchisors commonly operate com-
pany-owned stores side by side with these franchised locations. In contrast to the extreme forms of 
distribution outlined above, franchising is therefore characterized as a hybrid form of distribution.2 
From a principal-agent perspective, the choice, between company-owned and franchised stores and 
thus the character of the entire distribution system, depends on the contractual appropriateness of 
the specific solution (from the spectrum of possibilities) as well as on the franchisor’s ability to 
monitor distinct in- and output variables. 
Three scenarios exist, depending on whether the franchisee’s input does in fact significantly influ-
ence the store’s output and whether the factors determining the input can be controlled accurately. 
As long as the agent’s additional input (like personal work effort) is without major influence on an 
outlet’s extra output (like in supermarkets), principals will refrain from using franchising and em-
ploy company managers instead (Maness 1986). Even when the agent gains influence on the out-
let’s output by increasing personal input, principals will continue to prefer company-owned stores 
as long as the agent’s input factors remain transparent and observable. The franchisor may simply 
manage such agents by demanding the desired input-output ratio. At the point when it becomes im-
possible or inefficient to monitor and thus to control the agent’s input, the franchisor will use fran-
chising instead and assess the agent’s quality by measuring output variables like outlet revenue (La-
fontaine/Slade 1996).3 However the setting, if we assume homogeneity among the areas and loca-
tions of distribution, we should observe that such networks are concentrating on either one of the 
                                                 
2 In other words, franchising is a “hybrid” arrangement because most franchisors use a rather independent channel 
(franchisees) and a rather dependent arm (company-owned stores) for distribution. Even if the system was fully fran-
chised, it is still somewhat “hybrid” because, other than fully independent operating distributors, each franchisee’s 
freedom is limited by the guidelines of the franchise contract. 
3 A full framework including a combined hybrid form benefits and plural form synergies is presented in Ehr-
mann/Spranger (2005d). 
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contractual modes in the long run. Hence researchers like Shelton (1967) expect plural chains to 
change into fully franchised systems during maturity, while for instance Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1968) 
again assume the dominance of wholly company-owned mode.4 
As we will demonstrate at the beginning of this paper, a vast majority of existing chains still oper-
ates both franchise and company-owned stores even when their business model has matured. Ever 
since the work of Bradach (1997) a coexistence of diverse distribution modes has been called the 
plural form.5 Tellingly, the plural forms observed in this paper’s database of 925 US-franchise sys-
tems are stable over time and do not reveal tendencies to switch towards a one-mode-only setting.  
Thus the purpose of this paper is to theoretically and empirically explore the strategic motivation of 
franchisors to combine franchised and company-owned stores when structuring their distribution 
networks. In the following we therefore present the status-quo situation on theories explaining the 
favorability of plural forms. In short, these arguments include aspects of costs, quality, growth, and 
risk management. Having operationalized the various arguments we continue with checking the 
practical validity of each aspect along extensive empirical data. The paper concludes with an inter-
pretation of our empirical results and an outlook to further research required. 
 
2   The plural structure of franchise chains 
2.1   The origin of the plural form 
Hybrid firm structures are a combination of distinct parameters of firm organization. Today, the 
hybrid phenomenon is widespread in the area of business science. By combining organizational 
methods like “price” and “hierarchy” with organizational institutions like “markets” and “firms”, 
the results form a broad spectrum of organizational constellations (Ouchi 1980, Williamson 1991). 
For plural forms specifically, those running a “firm” have decided to use both “prices” and “hierar-
chy” separately for carrying out identical task. Others in contrast may run one organizational form 
being a mixture of both prices and hierarchy. While both approaches resemble hybrid organizational 
settings – neither running a pure method –, only the earlier is also plural. 
One example of plural structure is firms having a sales force as part of their sales department and 
cooperating with independent salesmen as freelancers at the same time (Dutta 1995). Others, like in 
                                                 
4 See Ehrmann/Spranger (2005d) for an in-depth discussion on life cycles of franchise chains. 
5 A synonym is “dual form”, a term used for instance by Gallini/Lutz (1992), Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002) and 
Windsperger (2003). 
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automobile manufacturing, produce a pre- or final-product by themselves and buy the same parts 
from external suppliers (Walker/Weber 1984). What attracted our research interest are franchise 
chains hiring fixed-paid managers to run company-owned units and simultaneously contracting with 
almost independent franchises to operate franchise stores. According to the above framework of 
organizational forms, the first are controlled by the powers of hierarchy, but the latter are motivated 
by the power of the price system. 
The arguments that are brought forth to explain the parallel use of prices and hierarchy within one 
institutions are threefold. Firstly Hennart (1993) and Ehrmann/Spranger (2005b) argue that mixing 
the two methods will minimize the cost for organizing the system as each form’s costs increases 
progressively when moving towards the pure modes. Secondly Brickley/Dark (1987) and others6 
portray the plural form to be the outcome of many case-by-case decisions, each attempting to find 
the perfect organizational solution for very individual environmental settings. Bradach (1997) and 
Lewin-Solomons (1998) finally argue that operating the plural form will enable the principal to re-
alize synergies and thus to generate savings that exceed the plural form’s costs arising from addi-
tional organizational complexity. Hence they suppose a plurally organized system to outperform 
any purely structured forms like wholly franchised or entirely company-owned arrangements as 
long as the managing principals know how to exploit the full synergetic potential of plurality. 
From a more global perspective, these three approaches only differ in their diverse understanding of 
the important parameters that franchisors have to take into account when judging over organiza-
tional strategy. Hennart and researchers around Brickley/Dark apply aspects of costs, growth and 
risk to determine the efficiency of plural forms. Bradach and Lewin-Solomons on the other hand 
find the plural form to improve trust and cooperation among all system members, which conse-
quently increases the system’s total quality. 
 
2.2   The design of the plural form 
Empirically, this paper is based on a sample covering more than 20 years of organizational devel-
opment for 925 US-franchise systems. Since 1979, the Entrepreneur Magazine has published a 
yearly survey called the Franchise500, listing the 500 most successful franchise systems each year. 
Our dataset contains those 500 chains ranked among the Franchise500 in the 2003’s statistic, of 
                                                 
6 These are Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991), Caves/Murphy (1976), Lafontaine/Slade (1996) and Walker/Weber (1984). 
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which 88 have been already listed since the first issue back in 1979. Additionally, we include 425 
chains that were evaluated in 2003 but were not listed among the best 500 for that year. In their 
yearly industry overview, the International Franchise Association7 (IFA) refers to roughly 1500 
franchisors and to about 320 000 chain outlets in the USA in 2003. Thus the data used for this 
analysis represents approximately 62% of all franchisors and 86% of all franchised and company-
owned outlets.  
Moreover the proportions of branches compiled in our dataset correspond to the numbers of the 
IFA’s most recent Profile-of-franchising that examined 1316 US-franchise systems to the end of 
2000.8 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of the dataset 
Parameter N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Total outlets 925 430 1.854 1 30.220 
Number of franchise units 925 380 1.617 0 22.043 
Number of company units 800 58 403 0 8.262 
Percent franchised 781 84 26,1 0 100 
Royalty rate in % 822 5,4 2,6 0 23 
Franchise fee in T$ 905 27 26 0 500 
Minimum investment in T$ 923 273 936 1 10.000 
Maximum investment in T$ 923 560 1.385 2 10.000 
Years in business 925 23,1 16,6 1 139 
Years of franchise experience 925 15,5 12,1 1 79 
 
The organizational setting of our dataset, summarized in table 1 above, corresponds to results of 
other studies in revealing a high degree of heterogeneity among the sample chains: In a survey ana-
lyzing 581 French franchise systems, Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002) report the following means 
(and standard deviations): number of all outlets 74 (158), percentage franchised: 67 (68), royalty 
rate in percent: 4,4 (3,9), franchise fee in T$: approx. 15 (13), years in business: 24 (29) and years 
of franchise experience: 14 (12). For a sample of 4842 chains of the USA and of Canada9, Lafon-
taine/Shaw (2001) present the following statistics: number of all outlets: 207 (788), percentage 
franchised: 78 (71), years in business: 17 (15), years of franchise experience: 11 (10). 
                                                 
7  See www.franchise.org (04/15/2004). 
8  International Franchise Association (2000). 
9 The data Lafontaine/Shaw (2001, p. 50) use for their extremely large sample includes chains that have started and/or 
ceased operation during the period covered (1980 to 1997). While 1461 firms represent single observations for one 
year, only 41 systems have been in business during the entire period researched. 
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With a primary focus on diverse strategic approaches to structure the chain, combining the studies 
of Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002) and Lafontaine/Shaw (2001) with our data, chains franchise 
approximately 84% to 67% of their outlets, while they retain about 16% to 33% under direct com-
pany ownership. 
In order to gain insights on the dynamics of franchise development, in a second step we looked at 
those 362 chains in our dataset more closely, of that complete data is available for a ten-year period 
from 1992 to 2002. Depending on whether the franchisor increased/decreased the share of franchi-
sees by more than 3% or not over this time, we obtained three groups with distinct organizational 
developments for a defined number of years. The results are as follows: 32% of all systems raised 
their share of franchising from 69% to 86% on average, while only about 15% dropped it from 90% 
to 76%. 53% of all systems though kept structures stable and settled with approximately 97% of all 
stores under franchise agreements. 
Both this static and the dynamic view of the franchise industry demonstrate the presence and the 
stability of plural form arrangements for the applied data as well as the organizational heterogeneity 
that exists in the franchisor community. These results match with findings of other studies10 con-
cerned with the organizational structuring of franchise chains. Hence we feel motivated to bring 
some light to this rather diffuse matter first by analyzing the theoretically based motivations for 
franchisors to use the plural form. In a second step we will then charge these theories with the fig-
ures of our dataset in order to end up with a more sound approach to reason the existence of plural 
forms. 
 
3   Franchisor motivations to apply the plural form 
3.1   Cost aspects 
Agency costs 
Whenever information is distributed asymmetrically between a principal (a franchisor) and his 
agents (franchisees and outlet managers) both face agency costs upon entering into a contractual 
relationship. Depending on whether such asymmetry has occurred before, occurs while or after the 
signing of the contract, organization science defines the uncertainty to concern either the quality of 
                                                 
10  Compare the studies of the IFA, Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier and Lafontaine/Shaw mentioned above. 
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the project and the partner, the behavior of the parties, or the results of the partnership.11 While a 
franchisor may review the agent’s qualification ex-ante through intense selection processes and the 
outcome of the contract ex-post for instance by checking the agent’s revenues, it is often difficult to 
efficiently monitor and to direct the agent’s behavior ex-interim of the partnership. In order to guar-
antee a specified level of uniformity and system quality to customers and other agents though, it is 
absolutely vital to win each agent’s compliance with the rules of the system. Choosing the appropri-
ate organizational structure, i.e. actively mixing company-owned outlets with franchise units, is one 
approach for the franchisor to reduce such costly behavior uncertainty. 
Plural form arrangements theoretically lower the franchisor’s monitoring costs, the losses suffered 
from agent free-riding and the costs of inefficient investments. The first aspect is concerned with 
the different mentalities and motivations of managers of company-owned stores and franchisees. 
Managers are generally employed on a fixed-wage basis and thus have little or no opportunity to 
maximize their monetary output (i.e. their salary) by increasing input factors such as their work 
effort. If unmonitored by the principal, the manager will therefore tend to optimize his personal 
input-output-ratio by working less than agreed upon while he would still wish to receive the full 
salary. Therefore the franchisor will have to engage himself in costly monitoring, in actions to keep 
agents from shirking, and even in reducing their salaries or, as an extreme measure, in terminating 
the work contract. 
Franchisees on the other hand accept a significant personal risk when investing in a franchise unit. 
By joining the chain, they knowingly accept the option to improve their earnings by influencing 
both revenues and costs through increasing their personal work effort. Franchisees therefore have 
no rational incentive to shirk on their personal input factors and thus will not have to be monitored 
as intensely as managers of company units. For maximizing their personal input-output-ratio 
though, they may cheat on factors like service or product quality. By investing less in products or 
services and thus offering a quality below the standards of the chain, they will generate additional 
rents simply by free-riding on the reputation of the entire chain and to the detriment of every com-
pliant chain member. Franchisors therefore will have to keep franchisees from cheating on quality 
standards as such behavior is beneficial for the agent (lower cost) in the short term – but highly det-
rimental to other system members, to the extent that it may ultimately damage the chain’s good 
                                                 
11 For this analysis we concentrate on the uncertainty of the franchisor towards his agents and not vice versa. 
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reputation.12 
With an equally unfavorable result, franchisees may tend to oppose franchisor initiatives that aim to 
increase the value of the brand but do little to improve the single franchisee input-output-ratio. For 
instance, national marketing serves the franchisor to create brand value. For the single franchise 
member though, the benefits received are marginal and delayed, making expenditures for general 
chain actions partly inefficient (from his narrower perspective). Thus whenever the franchisor initi-
ates actions with spillover effects, he would at the very least probably face costly negotiations with 
the franchise community. At the worst, the latter may even turn down the franchisor’s proposal be-
cause it diminishes each franchisee’s entrepreneurial freedom so that such action causes opportunity 
costs for the franchisor. 
As proposed by Brickley/Dark (1987), franchisors being free to choose the organizational form, that 
suits the location specifics best for every individual case, will reduce these costs of monitoring, 
free-riding and of inefficient investment. It is therefore possible (and even rational) for franchisors 
to apply plural structures to minimize principal-agent-costs that are higher for pure forms like 
wholly franchised or entirely company-owned systems. 
 
Information costs 
With their decentrally located production and distribution of goods and services, franchisors need to 
collect knowledge about consumer preferences for each local market. As argued by Minkler (1992, 
p. 243), the need and costs to acquire such local knowledge will grow with increasing “unfamiliar-
ity, heterogeneity and volatility of local markets” and with a decreasing half-life of the information 
collected. Receiving the residual income, franchisees reveal a much stronger motivation to collect, 
report and use such local information than fixed-paid managers of company-owned units. By con-
verting local market information into business opportunities, franchisees are able to increase their 
input-output-ratio and their profits. A popular example of using such insights is the offering of fish 
burgers. A McDonald’s franchisee simply noticed that most of his customers (in a catholic 
neighborhood) would regularly prefer fish over meat on Fridays. In the absence of franchisees, 
principals would have to pay for market research as well as for supervising its successful applica-
                                                 
12 Franchisee free-riding for instance commonly works by purposely reducing a unit’s individual quality below the re-
quired standards of the chain. While revenues are, at least in the short term, secured by the common trademark, the 
franchisee’s costs will decline and hence profits will increase immediately. 
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tion by company-units. However, much of such knowledge will originate from daily business and 
therefore be implicit to the franchisee. In this case, paid-for information will be of lower quality and 
take more time to implement via the company-owned arm of distribution. 
With this in mind, Minkler (1992) has demonstrated that plurally organized franchise chains may 
optimize their effort to search and use local knowledge by installing franchisees where the gathering 
of information is necessary, costly and important for the unit’s success. At the same time, principals 
should subsequently set up company-owned stores adjacent to these franchise units in order to 
transfer the collected information and to profit from it. According to Minkler (1992), franchisors 
should therefore explore new markets via franchising. Then, as the system expands and local head-
quarters emerge, monitoring the stores and supervising the process of information transfer within 
one area becomes less expensive for the franchisor. At this point, the franchisor should exploit the 
same market by increasing the number of company stores to efficiently use the information col-
lected by the franchisees in order to promote the chain’s revenue and profit.13 It is therefore possible 
that franchisors apply plural structures to reduce the costs of gathering and exploiting local market 
knowledge – a process that becomes increasingly important as the chain expands into new and di-
verse markets. 
 
Making cost aspects operational 
Both approaches discussed above emphasize the increasing importance of plural forms as chains get 
larger and become more matured (Posselt 1998). These aspects are measurable by the number of all 
outlets (SIZE) and the years of business experience (BUSEXP) of each chain. SIZE and BUSEXP 
will hence be related to the organizational structure of the system, indicating whether savings on 
organization costs motivate franchisors to use plural structures.  
It is plausible that costs for organizing the franchise arm of the system remain rather stable over the 
lifecycle of the chain. Running company-owned units though should become less expensive per 
outlet during maturity as local headquarters are established and thus monitoring distances and costs 
decrease. Consequently, franchisors focusing on agency costs should begin to substitute franchise 
outlets for company-owned ones as the number of all outlets and the years of business experience 
                                                 
13 Of course, this is only a winning strategy as company-owned units are more profitable to the franchisor in terms of 
return on investment than franchised units. See Ehrmann/Spranger (2005b) for a more detailed discussion on the dis-
tinct profit profiles of both arms of distribution in a franchise chain. 
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increase.14 The same is true from the information-cost perspective. In order to exploit the potential 
of local information, franchisors should open more and more company-owned units adjacent to each 
franchise store as the chain expands. 
Therefore we suppose both variables BUSEXP and SIZE to be negatively correlated to the share of 
franchise units of the chain. In hypotheses, these aspects read as follows: 
 
H1a “BUSEXP”:  The older the franchise system, the larger (smaller) should be the share of com-
pany-owned (franchise) units. 
 
H1b “SIZE”:  The larger the number of all outlets, the larger (smaller) should be the share of 
company-owned (franchise) units. 
 
3.2   Growth aspects 
Overcoming resource constraints and increasing strategic flexibility 
One important factor for the success of franchise chains is their capability to grow quickly, in terms 
of outlet multiplication, and thus establishing a widely visible and valuable brand name in a rela-
tively short time. Due to their expansion strategies, franchise chains like McDonalds’s (ranked 7), 
Kentucky Fried Chicken (54), Pizza Hut (55) and Starbucks (98) belong to the 100 most valuable 
brands worldwide.15 Generally, the two most common factors limiting fast growth are financial and 
human capital resource shortages. Differing from fully integrated firms, franchise chains alleviate 
these constraints by contracting with franchisees that, per definition, provide the necessary funds 
(Caves/Murphy 1976, Mathewson/Winter 1985) as well as the required management talent 
(Thompson 1994) upon joining the chain. 
Another important aspect when building a strong brand name is to be present at as many locations 
as possible. This may force the franchisor to open stores at highly exposed places such as train sta-
tions or airports that prove beneficial for increasing consumer recognition but undesirable from an 
economical standpoint, for instance because of way above average rents or high operating costs. As 
such locations will hardly be sold to a rational franchisee, the plural franchisor could still decide to 
                                                 
14  Again, a prerequisite for this strategic move is the soundness of the logic explained in footnote 14. 
15  See www.interbrand.com 2004 Survey, (06/22/05). 
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operate them as company stores. Additionally, identifying and employing managers for company 
units is easier than finding and contracting with franchisees. 
By running part of the business by himself, the plural franchisor gains an extra amount of flexibil-
ity. Therefore it is plausible to franchisors to use the franchising alternative to increase a system’s 
growth by overcoming resource shortages such as those of financial and human nature. Simultane-
ously the principal may want to control the chain’s expansion by keeping an acceptable amount of 
strategic flexibility through the operation of company-owned units. 
 
Making growth aspects operational 
Alleviating resource constraints and increasing strategic flexibility at the same time are meant to 
fuel the expansion especially of rather young franchise systems. We therefore relate growth in terms 
of added units across a ten-year-period (GROWTH) to the organizational structure of the chain. As 
both the need for resources and a quick rollout are reduced as the chain matures – resources become 
more readily available – one would expect the incentives to structure plurally to decrease, too. 
Hence we suppose the variable GROWTH to be negatively correlated to the share of franchise units 
of the chain. As a hypothesis, this aspect reads as follows: 
 
H2 “GROWTH”:  The stronger the ten-year growth of the franchise system, the larger (smaller) 
should be the share of company-owned (franchise) units. 
 
The arguments presented so far, concerning the cost and growth of a franchise system, primarily 
favor the position of the franchisor. Generally, the plural form seems to be a helpful instrument for 
solving typical principal-agent problems as described above. Even opportunistic behavior, which at 
the extremes is to the disadvantage of the franchisee, is acceptable in terms of these arguments. 
Taking a turn towards a more cooperational view of the plural form, the following aspect accepts 
the organizational structure to improve the total quality of a franchise chain to benefit both the fran-
chisor and the franchisees. 
 
3.3   Quality aspects 
In contrast to the reasoning of those who apply cost and growth arguments, others focus on the abil-
ity of the plural form to ease and improve the rather difficult franchisor-franchisee relationship. In 
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general terms, they propose that plural forms are a key instrument to overcome detrimental princi-
pal-agent inefficiencies – and that plural forms will ultimately lead to an improved level of total 
chain quality. 
The aspects discussed below in greater detail assume the plural form to overcome unfavorable in-
formation asymmetries by signaling internal franchisor information to the franchisee (Gallini/Lutz 
1992); to align and therefore harmonize the interests of initially divergent actors (Lewin-Solomons 
1999); to promote innovation processes and to speed up internal change (Sorensen/Sørensen 2001); 
and finally to create a more competitive inter-firm climate where benchmarking each distribution 
arm results in higher performances for both (Bradach 1997). 
 
Signaling 
Franchisors of young and small chains may find it difficult to convince potential franchisees about 
the profitability and the chances of a business idea because the firm lacks decent financial track and 
thus success records. Being a rational investor, any franchisee will consequently be reluctant to in-
vest in a project whose true quality is difficult (or impossible) to observe up-front. According to 
findings of Gallini/Lutz (1992), franchisors can overcome this deficiency by owning some of their 
outlets themselves. In a similar way, a venture capitalist will require entrepreneurs to put a decent 
share of their money at risk before seeking third-party equity. Thus by owning and operating stores, 
a franchisor increases his stake in the processes of production and distribution. Winning more and 
better franchisees by eliminating a franchisee’s uncertainty on the franchise project’s quality there-
fore could be an important motivation to engage in company ownership. Vice versa, a franchisor 
who is not confident about the prospects of his business idea would abstain from running stores 
himself and hence from risking equity. According to this reasoning, principals of fully franchised 
chains transfer the entire risk of suffering financial loss on to their franchisees. 
Logically, the higher the uncertainty and the more financial resources the franchisees are asked to 
invest, the more the franchisor needs to emphasize company-ownership in order to overcome any 
invisible psychological barriers. Referring to a franchisor’s dependence on royalty rates does not 
compensate for the risk of operating company stores, just like fully depending on a venture’s finan-
cial returns does not make up for an entrepreneurial hostage in the project. It is therefore possible 
that franchisors, especially those with little business experience and/or high risk exposure, may try 
to overcome potentially detrimental quality uncertainty by applying plural form structures, thereby 
 23
assuring franchisees, banks, venture capitalist and other outsiders of the profitability of the fran-
chise idea. 
 
Leveling principal-agent interests 
A second problem the plural form is supposed to solve is borne by initially diverse interests of the 
system members: the different return structures required by the franchisor and his franchisees. The 
franchisee on the one hand receives the residual of revenues minus costs, which motivates to in-
crease sales while keeping costs as low as possible. The franchisor on the other hand demands roy-
alties for granting the right to use the chain’s trademark from all of his franchisees. Generally these 
royalty rates are a fixed percentage of the franchisee’s revenue. 
In the absence of company ownership therefore, a rational franchisor pursues a strategy that maxi-
mizes outlet revenue first, while the objective of keeping costs low is only secondary. Rational 
franchisees though will find such a strategy personally inefficient, since the agent enjoys only part 
of the added revenue (paying royalties), but has to bear all additional costs. 
As a solution to this dilemma, the franchisor could include the outlet’s costs when calculating the 
royalty payments. Despite its theoretical attractiveness, deriving royalties out of franchisee profits is 
difficult because of two aspects: First, the franchisee would need to provide fully transparent finan-
cials and accounting to the franchisor. According to Lewin-Solomons (1999), franchisees reject 
such transparency due to the operational autonomy granted to the individual franchisee. And sec-
ond, even if agents provide the necessary information, they would then feel motivated to cheat on 
higher than actual cost for the purpose of reducing royalty payments to the franchisor. Thus altering 
the computation of royalty rates will not bury franchisor opportunism initially set in motion by in-
congruent principal-agent interests. 
 
The plural form, as Lewin-Solomons (1999) proposes, may be a much more efficient instrument to 
solve this problem. The more franchisors engage in company operations, the more they will align 
interests of the chain management with those of their franchisees. Thus a plurally structured fran-
chisor should voluntary abstain from exercising measures inefficient to franchisees. Otherwise he 
would come to share a part of that inefficiency (the inside effect). Simultaneously, franchisees of 
plurally structured chains understand company-ownership as a pledge to reduce behavior uncer-
tainty and to harmonize the interest between the principal and his agents (the outside effect). It is 
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therefore likely that principals are motivated to run units themselves in order to level originally di-
verse interests, to eliminate the potential for opportunistic action and thus to increase the franchi-
see’s trust in a cooperative franchisor management. 
 
Promoting innovation 
Thirdly, organizational structure is supposed to increase system quality by improving the innovation 
potential of the chain. As market competition increases and cycles of innovation spin even faster, 
identifying and exploiting innovation opportunities becomes one important success factor. Accord-
ing to March (1989), successful innovation requires combining the improvement and the efficient 
use of existing resources and technologies (“Exploitation”) with the search and development of new 
and promising ones (“Exploration”). Firms that fail to match these processes will operate either 
below maximum efficiency (“doing things wrong”) or below maximum effectiveness (“doing the 
wrong things”). March (1989, p.71) therefore concludes that “maintaining an appropriate balance 
between exploration and exploitation is a primary factor in system survival and prosperity”. 
Moreover, franchise systems having decentralized production and distribution of goods or services, 
will need to keep a balance of centralized standardization and adaptation to local market specifics 
when introducing new products to its customers. 
 
As demonstrated by Sorenson/Sørensen (2001), the characteristics of plural structures greatly sup-
port the franchisor for establishing, running and benefiting from the right mix of exploration and 
exploitation. Managers of company-owned units receive their income mainly for monitoring opera-
tions and for incrementally improving existing routines. Thus company managers have little moti-
vation to initiate new products or services or to improve business processes. Their remuneration 
does just not vary with generating extra-revenue for the outlet. Hence employed store managers will 
mainly serve to exploit the system status quo. 
Franchisees, on the other hand, are supposed to contribute their entrepreneurial skills and their 
knowledge of the local market to the chain. As their residual income is highly dependent on extra 
revenue, they are much more encouraged to research and to test product or process innovations. 
Franchisees thus will add the aspect of exploration, i.e. testing new opportunities within the limits 
of a standardized franchise concept. 
In addition, the franchisor, being personally engaged to research and development functions, may 
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introduce new products via the corporate channel. Doing this, he will greatly benefit from the criti-
cal judgment of his franchisees (Ehrmann 2002). The latter may again, with permission of the fran-
chisor, test new products in their units. Thus innovation in plural franchise chains becomes a con-
tinuous process of action and counteraction between the franchisor, the corporate and the franchise 
channel. 
This complementary interplay, which stimulates both exploration and exploitation as described by 
March (1989), has first been identified as a major benefit of the plural form by Bradach (1997). Just 
like automobile manufacturers who preserve their innovational competence and realize outsourcing 
profits by buying and producing (“Make-and-buy”) identical pre-products (Walker/Weber 1984, 
p.389), franchisors may optimize both exploration/exploitation-streams for the benefit of system 
quality by running franchise and company-owned stores in one chain. Advanced research by Lewin-
Solomons (1997, p.43) finds those franchise chains to turn out to be the innovation champions 
whose share of franchisees “is high enough to make franchisees feel important, but low enough that 
the chain [still] has a significant stake in the innovation process”. Sorenson/Sørensen (2001) even 
empirically support a positive correlation of franchisor/franchisee success and the mixing of corpo-
rate- and franchisee-owned distribution facilities. It is therefore possible that franchisors operate 
plural structures to balance exploration and exploitation within one system in order to improve its 
innovational performance. 
 
Benchmarking 
A fourth positive aspect of a plural structure finally lies in its potential to benchmark franchisee 
performance against that of company-managers, a process supposed to increase positive intra-firm 
competition of rival distribution channels. 
Principals of purely franchised chains lack appropriate instruments to generate detailed performance 
data due to the franchisee’s autonomy which allows it to conceal a unit’s financial details. Hence 
franchisors are unable to check performance against an unbiased third party, making it more com-
plex to detect and to solve strategic performance barriers impacting on the franchised arm of the 
system. As Bradach (1997) explains, company-owned stores may serve well as data source and thus 
as a partner to benchmark the performance of the franchisees. 
For example, the franchisor can use the financial results of company units in order to define the 
contractual performance goals for its franchisees. Both Bradach (1997, p. 290) and Kauf-
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mann/Lafontaine (1994, p. 447) report that franchisees easily meet such benchmarks. Boecken-
holt/Wiens (2001) even claim that franchisees regularly manage to outperform company-owned 
stores in reported revenue by as much as 20%. The ambitious franchisor then takes results of the 
franchisees and makes them the newly defined benchmark for improving the company units’ per-
formance. From a customer focus, non-financial goals like unit cleanliness, customer friendliness, 
and employee turnover should also be part of the benchmark process. In addition to the principal’s 
authority, a group identity either with the franchise or the corporate channel of the system should 
empower both franchisees and managers of company-owned units to beat both performance and 
quality benchmarks of the rivaling channel. It is therefore possible that franchisors apply plural 
structures to gain valuable data on operating the system and that they use this information initiating 
a beneficial interfirm competition for excellence in system quality. 
 
Making quality aspects operational 
As has been discussed in these paragraphs, the plural form may feature the signaling of franchisor 
trust about a franchise opportunity, the harmonizing of originally diverse principal-agent-interests, 
promoting innovational powers, and the raising of performance potentials through inner-firm com-
petition. All of these aspects characterize cooperative behavior in a franchisor-franchisee-
relationship and generally benefit all contracting parties. Thus they stand in sharp contrast to the 
previously listed arguments of optimizing a franchisor’s costs and growth structures which open the 
door for franchisor opportunism in opposition to the dependent franchise partners. In total, these 
quality aspects identify a franchise system that is to be governed in a cooperative manner; this in-
formation is important to outsider investors or potential franchisees. Hence ambitious franchisors, 
competing for the best franchisees on the job market (Ehrmann 2002), may gain a comparative ad-
vantage over competitors by using the plural form and thus by signaling superior total quality. 
In the absence of company-owned units, principals may also want to signal their willingness to ab-
stain from single-sided opportunism. The means and effects of such measures differ greatly accord-
ing to the ability of particular plurally structured chains. Such purely franchised systems will ease 
its agent’s way into the network by keeping one time franchise fees relatively low. Simultaneously 
they will demonstrate dependence on the success of the business concept by demanding relatively 
high ongoing royalty fees from the agents. Franchisors of plurally organized chains will achieve 
identical signaling results simply by engaging in company ownership. Thus the latter will demand 
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comparatively high franchise fees to meet the cost of setting up each franchise unit. Thereafter 
though they will be able to keep royalty rates low, thus passing on higher returns to their franchisees 
over the time span of the contract. 
For the upcoming analyses we therefore use the parameters FFAVG (average franchise fee) and 
RRAVG (average royalty rate) to determine indirectly whether quality aspects are correlated to or-
ganizational structure, i.e. the share of franchise units. Additionally we suppose those franchisors 
forced to demand a large investment for setting up a unit will rely more on signaling superior qual-
ity than those chains requiring mere small investments. Hence by using INVAVG (average invest-
ment for setting up one unit), we will test whether so-called high-investment systems following the 
described fee-structures are significantly more plurally organized than low-investment systems. As 
hypotheses, these aspects read as follows: 
 
H3 “Franchise Fee”: The higher the one-time franchise fee, the larger (smaller) should be the share 
of company-owned (franchise) units. 
 
H4 “Royalty Rate”:  The lower the ongoing royalty rates, the larger (smaller) should be the share of 
company-owned (franchise) units. 
 
H5 “Investment Volume”: The larger the investment volume, the larger (smaller) should be the 
share of company-owned (franchise) units. 
 
Furthermore we are interested in the effect that plural structures exert on the success of franchise 
chains. Every serious debate on plural structures would certainly suffer, should there be no signifi-
cant positive or even a significant negative correlation between company ownership and a system’s 
success. 
The best instrument available16 to measure success in franchising is to apply the Franchise500-
evaluation of the Entrepreneur Magazine. Since 1981, this survey has determined the 500 most suc-
                                                 
16  Note that only a minority of chains included in our survey are public companies for which financial data or stock 
prices are freely accessible. Thus to the moment the Franchise500 ranking is the best alternative indicating the suc-
cess of a large number of franchise chains. 
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cessful US-franchises each year.17 Thus by including RANK (ranking of the chain in the year of 
2003) in our analysis we intend to determine an influence of organizational form on a chain’s suc-
cess. Should the plural form serve to promote the success of a chain, we will define RANK as posi-
tively correlated to the share of franchising applied.18 We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H6 “Ranking”:  The better the ranking within the Franchise500, the larger (smaller) should be the 
share of company-owned (franchise) units. 
 
3.4   Risk aspect 
The forth and final approach to explain the benefits of plural forms has been developed by Martin 
(1988) and Chaudhuri/Ghosh/Spell (2001). It is based on the assumption that, according to its site 
characteristics, every location bears specific risks concerning its expected profitability profile. Most 
important, local factors like the geography of a site, the size of its catchment area or the income 
structure of the people living in it greatly determine the risk profile of each unit. Thus when assum-
ing heterogeneity for the risk profiles of all units, a franchisor may activate a program of company-
wide risk management by individually deciding which units to integrate and which to outsource, i.e. 
to pass on to franchisees. Consequently a risk-conscious principal will operate only those stores 
with an acceptable risk-return-structure. All units that fail to meet this criterion but that are still in-
teresting locations for the portfolio will logically be franchised. Other than a system operating under 
growth maxims (see part 3.2), unprofitable (for the franchisor) but strategically promising locations 
would then be operated under franchise management instead of being integrated. Hence even a risk 
neutral franchisor is motivated to proceed as described since the costs for monitoring a location are 
positively correlated with its specific profitability risk (Martin 1988). 
Just like asset managers adjust their portfolio’s total risk by exchanging one asset for another less 
risky one (or vice versa), a franchisor may use both channels to optimize the entrepreneurial risk of 
the chain by constantly adjusting the mix of franchise and company-owned units. Upon joining such 
                                                 
17  According to the Entrepreneur Magazine, the evaluation process accounts for: “... financial strength and stability, 
growth rate and size of the system. We also consider the number of years in business and length of time franchising, 
start-up costs, litigation, percentage of terminations and whether the company provides financing. … Every company 
with verifiable data receives a cumulative score. The franchises with the highest ‘cumes’ become the Franchise500.” 
See www.entrepreneur.com (03/20/2004). 
18  Larger numbers of the ranking indicate lower positions in the evaluated sample. Therefore we suppose the rank num-
ber to increase, i.e. to become worse, as the share of company-owned units (more franchising) is reduced. 
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a system, any rational franchisee though would have to demand extra rents in order to receive a fair 
compensation for the additional profitability risk. It is a fact that one of the largest, most successful 
and truly plurally organized franchise systems in the world, McDonald’s, grants its franchisees such 
extra rents via its franchise fees and royalty rates (Ehrmann 2002, p. 1137; Kaufmann/Lafontaine 
1994, p. 419) – an instance possibly indicating the plausibility of a risk optimizing strategy. There-
fore plural structures may likely be applied to exercise a chain-wide risk management system to the 
benefit of the franchisor. 
 
Making the risk aspect operational 
When operating a chain under a strategy of active risk management, the franchisor automatically 
incorporates a very high degree of principal opportunism towards his agent. Integrating the good 
units, i.e. those with favorable risk-return profiles, while outsourcing the bad ones, i.e. all other, 
more risky sites, reduces the chances of any potential franchisee to realize fair returns on his in-
vestment. Having to decide between a franchisor operating under risk management and one rather 
(more) cooperative principal, the risk conscious franchisee would have to go for the second. Thus if 
a franchisor uses the plural form for risk management, he has no incentive to signal this instance to 
his agents up front. It is therefore impossible to assess the extent of the risk aspect directly. As the 
best alternative indicator available we account for the fact that the risk strategy with its clear oppor-
tunistic focus stands in diametric opposition to the cooperativeness expressed in the quality aspects 
above. Therefore we may overcome the problem of direct visibility by formulating the existence of 
the risk aspect as antithetical to the above quality arguments: 
 
H7 “Risk”:  The larger the support for the above quality aspects, the less is the importance of the 
risk aspect.  
 
Consequently the less a potential franchisee is able to acknowledge clear signals for a franchisor’s 
motivation to act cooperational, the more he will have to anticipate underlying franchisor opportun-
ism as exercised in the risk strategy. 
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4   Empirical testing of the plural form aspects 
4.1   Characteristics of the data  
Out of the 925 franchise systems in our dataset, 781 offer exploitable figures on their organizational 
setting to the end of 2002. We define organizational structure as the share of franchise units related 
to all units of the chain. Thus a λ=1 (LAMBDA) marks a purely franchised chain without company 
units, whereas λ=0.85 indicates a plural form consisting of 85% of franchise units and 15% of com-
pany-owned outlets. In order to clearly separate plurally structured chains from purely franchise 
ones, the sample is divided into three groups according to each firm’s LAMBDA. Group one in-
cludes all chains with a λ ≤ 0.85, group two those with 0.85 < λ < 1 and group three finally contains 
all purely franchise chains with λ = 1. The one-way ANOVA analysis of table 2 below demon-
strates the effect of this separation on the means and standard deviations of each single parameter: 
they disclose significant differences across all parameters, thus obviously isolating group three from 
group one chains. 
Table 2.  Oneway ANOVA on LAMBDA 
 Group* N Mean Stand. 
Dev. 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
Business experi-
ence (years) 
λ ≤ 85% 147 25.52 18.46 Between groups 1 1113 4.214 0.041 
(BUSEXP) λ=100% 193 21.87 14.36 Within groups 338 264   
      Total 339    
Total outlets λ ≤ 85% 147 520.50 1659.68 Between groups 1 2041887 1.232 0.268 
(SIZE) λ=100% 193 364.07 907.38 Within groups 338 1657524   
     Total 339    
Investment 
volume (T$) 
λ ≤ 85% 147 853.91 1656.23 Between groups 1 19799297 11.692 0.001 
(INVAVG) λ=100% 193 366.80 946.10 Within groups 338 1693350   
      Total 339    
Franchise fee 
(T$) 
λ ≤ 85% 144 32.31 15.93 Between groups 1 8027 51.381 0.000 
(FFAVG) λ=100% 183 22.33 8.92 Within groups 325 156   
      Total 326    
Royalty rate λ ≤ 85% 140 5.13 1.74 Between groups 1 49 22.683 0.000 
(RRAVG) λ=100% 160 5.93 1.18 Within groups 298 2.15   
      Total 299    
Share of fran-
chise 
λ ≤ 85% 147 0.58 0.22 Between groups 1 14.92 716.128 0.000 
(LAMBDA) λ=100% 193 1.00 0.00 Within groups 338 0.02   
      Total 339    
10-year growth  λ ≤ 85% 147 359.20 1426.06 Between groups 1 3361393 3.271 0.071 
(GROWTH) λ=100% 193 158.50 512.40 Within groups 338 1027578   
      Total 339    
Rank 2003  λ ≤ 85% 114 153.39 171.02 Between groups 1 120629 4.152 0.043 
(RANK) λ=100% 175 195.19 170.10 Within groups 287 29057   
     Total 288    
* Group 1: λ ≤ 85%, Group 3: λ = 100%, Group 2 is excluded.
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Having computed the correlations between all parameters (see appendix), the variables SIZE and 
GROWTH display a highly significant coefficient of 0.88. In order to avoid a detrimental colinear-
ity between these parameters, SIZE is excluded from further analysis.19 Due to the equally strong 
correlation of BUSEXP and SIZE (explicitly demonstrated in figure 1), eliminating the factor SIZE 
will not impair the results for testing H1.20 
 
4.2   Regression model and empirical results 
For testing the potential influences of costs, growth, quality, and risk aspects on the organizational 
structure of franchise chains, the following equation is applied: 
 
LAMBDA = α0 + α1BUSEXP + α2GROWTH + α3INVAVG +  
α4FFAVG + α5RRAVG + α6RANK 
 
Before performing a linear regression process, the dependent variable generally needs to be trans-
formed to a metric scale with the consequence that it may, theoretically, take up any value ranging 
from -∞ to +∞. With our LAMBDA’s ability of displaying either purely franchised or plurally 
structured companies (i.e. dichotomy), a binary-logic model is needed in turn for testing the above 
equation. Different from linear regression models, binary-logic models assume a non-linear rela-
tionship between the dependent and at least one independent variable and thus create an S-curve 
shaped distribution of the cases included. Commonly used to map life-cycles of products or indus-
tries, such S-shapes assume changes of the independent variables occurring at the extreme parts 
(highs and lows) of the curve not to significantly increase or decrease the expected probability. Us-
ing the coefficients of the logistic regression will then serve to aptly estimate the values of each 
independent variable of the model.21 The regression results of the above equation are summarized in 
table 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 This procedure is owed to a helpful remark by J. Windsperger. 
20 Hence H1b is tested indirectly via the factor BUSEXP. 
21 See Backhaus et al. (2003) and Diaz-Bone (2000) for details on logistic regression models. 
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Table 3.  Logistic regression variables in the equation 
Step 1* Coefficient B Standard error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
BUSEXP -.006 .010 .404 1 .525 .994 
INVAVG -.001 .000 4.295 1 .038 .999 
FFAVG -.122 .023 28.103 1 .000 .885 
RRAVG .375 .115 10.622 1 .001 1.455 
GROWTH .000 .000 .484 1 .486 1.000 
RANK .003 .001 9.797 1 .002 1.003 
Constant 1.303 .818 2.534 1 .111 3.679 
* Variables included in step 1: BUSEXP, INVAVG, FFAVG, RRAVG, GROWTH, RANK. 
Cox & Snell R² = 0.306. McFadden R²= 0.266. 
 
4.3   Interpreting the empirical results 
The regression results do not reveal significant support for a negative correlation of BUSEXP and 
LAMBDA as supposed in H1a. Consequently (see above), H1b, which hypothesized a negative link 
of SIZE and LAMBDA, cannot be accepted either. 
The rejection of both cost aspects as arguments for the existence of the plural form is very plausible 
when taking a dynamic viewpoint of a chain’s organizational development. In what is known as 
ownership-redirection, Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1969) have questioned the chances of franchising to be a 
lasting organizational form. From their standpoint, franchising is only beneficial during the infancy 
of a system and subsequently becomes inferior to company ownership as the chain matures. Under-
going major scientific debate, their global research question has been well formulated by 
Dant/Paswan/Kaufmann (1996, p. 429): “Do franchisors use franchisees to open markets, develop 
consumer acceptance and preference for the franchisors’ trademarks and then appropriate that brand 
equity by terminating or otherwise ending the franchisees’ rights to continue to operate the busi-
ness?” 
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Figure 1.  Dynamic franchise development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently one should observe significant trends of franchises being integrated across the mature 
phases of a chain. Company ownership is thus supposed to gain importance as chains grow in size 
and age. In their studies neither Lafontaine/Kaufmann (1994), Lafontaine/Shaw (1999), nor Pé-
nard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002) were able to support such developments empirically. Neither of them 
found the share of company-ownership to increase significantly during the late stages of a chain’s 
life cycle.22 As we can demonstrate for the sample used for the present analysis, franchise systems 
rather start as a fully integrated structure and do not begin to adopt franchising before 7 ½ years of 
business experience have passed. According to figure 1 above, the share of franchises (company-
ownership) increases (decreases) continuously during the first years of business development. Start-
ing at an age of about 11, the systems, having an average number of 50 outlets in total, stabilize 
their structural mix at 80-95% of franchises or at 5-20% of company units. These results clearly 
reject propositions of other researchers to go for pure franchising after an initial phase of plural 
structure.23 
 
                                                 
22 See Lafontaine/Kaufmann (1994), p. 110; Lafontaine/Shaw (1999), p. 1073 f. and Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002), 
p. 21 f. See also the overview of studies researching the thesis of ownership redirection at Dant/Paswan/Kaufmann 
(1996), p. 431 f. 
23  Shane/Foo (1999, p.157) for instance state that “ Franchisors typically establish company-owned outlets before they 
start to franchise [Yes] and then expand almost exclusively through franchised outlets when they start to franchise 
[No!].” As a result of this research and, much more, Ehrmann/Spranger (2005c), strong growth is clearly fueled by 
both arms – the franchise and the company-owned – and not just by one. 
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Regarding these findings, neither regression results nor figure 1 data allow us to accept the costs 
aspects formulated in H1. Despite their enthusiasm towards a straightforward approach explaining 
the characteristics of franchising, even Oxenfeldt/Kelly express their misgivings at the beginning of 
their analysis: “Frankly, we are not fully convinced that the hypothesis we propound is valid. Cer-
tainly the arguments by advocates of franchising have force, but we are not persuaded by them.”24 
The results depicted in figure 1 are equally important to support the testing of the hypothesized cor-
relation of GROWTH and LAMBDA in H2. Similarly the regression fails to reveal a significant 
negative influence of system growth on the share of franchise units. Much more, the organizational 
structure adopted up to about 11 years of business experience is largely stable during further matur-
ity and growth. Neither figure 1 nor those studies of other researchers, concerning the thesis of 
ownership redirection, are able to support the link. At the same time though, pure franchising nei-
ther is the key for strongest growth. It is of importance for further research that the factor 
GROWTH as used in this analysis covers the development in terms of added/closed units across a 
ten-year-period. With the standard duration of a franchise contract for this sample being 11.5 years 
however, the rejection of H2 may have to be adjusted once a period of growth exceeding the aver-
age term is available to researchers.25 
The regression results most clearly support hypotheses H3 and H4 concerning the correlation be-
tween the plural form and a system’s overall quality. As proposed, the chains demanding compara-
tively high franchise fees and low royalty rates are significantly more plurally organized than are 
those purely franchised systems. This adds empirical validation to the analytic approach of Gal-
lini/Lutz (1992), who have argued that: “ … a sufficiently large number of company-owned stores 
gives the high-demand franchisor enough stake in the product’s success to deter the low-demand 
franchisor from misleading franchisees; the franchisor does not need to claim an additional stake 
through a royalty to convince them of the product’s demand. The high-demand franchisor can offer 
the efficient contract, [theoretically] charging a [almost] zero royalty on sales and using the fixed 
fee to extract all profits from the franchisee.”26 
                                                 
24  See Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1969), p. 69.  
25 Using longitudinal data, Ehrmann/Spranger (2005c) find that plurally organized chains grow stronger than purely 
franchised competitors. As they do not observe ownership redirection trends, in Ehrmann/Spranger (2005d) they re-
late this apparent paradox to changing out- and inside conditions that franchise chains face during the different stages 
of their corporate life cycle. 
26  See Gallini/Lutz (1992), p. 482-483. 
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Other than the principals of purely franchised systems, those operating a plural structure are able to 
offer a fee structure that minimizes ex-ante uncertainties concerning the quality of the project qual-
ity or the behavior of the franchisor. In addition, the results of table 3 strongly support a link be-
tween the chain’s investment volume and its organizational structure as proposed in H5. It is plausi-
ble that high-volume franchisors, demanding large investments from potential franchisees, are more 
strongly affected by ex-ante uncertainties than low-volume chains. In other words, the higher the 
investment risk, the more the principal is urged to demonstrate abstinence from opportunistic be-
havior. 
Results clearly reveal that high-volume franchise chains rely significantly more on company-
ownership than low-volume systems. This aspect is especially noteworthy as the high-volume prin-
cipal raises (and thus risks) more financial resources when increasing the share of company-owned 
units compared to a low-volume franchisor. Thus the signal sent out by plural forms increases in 
strength as investment volumes rise. We may therefore conclude that the power of plural structures 
exceeds that of an appropriate fee structure (low franchise fee and high royalty rates) of purely fran-
chised systems. While the latter may signal a principal’s dependence on future franchise profitabil-
ity, only the plural form is able to convey additional quality characteristics such as the leveling of 
diverse interests, the promotion of innovation or transparency through benchmarking. The fact that 
high-volume franchisors operate a larger share of company units – simultaneously being forced to 
raise even greater financial resources – supports the plural form’s effect of signaling overall system 
quality. 
In addition, the regression results indicate a significant correlation between a chain’s success – 
which is assessed by the ranking of the Entrepreneur Magazine27 – and its organizational structure 
as formulated in H6. Chains with a higher share of company ownership are awarded significantly 
lower, i.e. better, ranks than pure franchise systems. Combined with the support of hypotheses H3, 
H4 and H5, we therefore conclude that plural franchisors with an appropriate fee structure do much 
better in signaling above-average total system quality – furthermore they are ultimately more suc-
cessful at doing so than purely organized chains. 
As we learn from the acceptance of the quality aspects, franchisors win by offering (or credibly 
signaling at least) a cooperative principal-agent relationship to (potential) franchisees. Franchisors 
                                                 
27 See footnote 17 for the evaluation process used by the Entrepreneur Magazine. 
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on the other hand, who use the plural form for risk management, thereby exploiting their freedom of 
opportunistic action, clearly disrupt such forms of cooperation. A strategy which aims at integrating 
the good units while passing on all risky ones to franchisees jeopardizes the commercial success of 
each franchisee and finally the survival of the entire chain. With the restrictions that apply to indi-
rect testing, we therefore propose to reject H7 due to the clear support of the quality aspects. The 
risk management approach as formulated by Martin (1988) portrays the franchisor as being an op-
portunistic principal. The results of our research though have clearly emphasized the benefits of a 
cooperative principal-agent relationship. According to this analysis, franchisors apply organiza-
tional structure in general and the plural form in particular to support franchisees instead of harming 
and exploiting them; cooperative principal behavior as described above seems to be an important 
factor for creating a system of high quality and thus for generating long-term success for all parties 
of the chain. 
 
5   The plural form chosen for cooperative management 
In the world of franchise systems, a full spectrum of alternatives is common for organizing the de-
centrally located production and distribution of goods. Depending on the share of company owner-
ship, we identified pure franchising and plurally structured systems as the extreme poles of the 
range.28 Only a minority of the chains researched operates free of any company operation – the vast 
majority of “franchise” chains are actually plurally structured, i.e. they use both company-owned 
and franchise units. It is this heterogeneous profile that motivated us to search for theories that ex-
plain why franchisors use plural forms instead of pure franchising, both from a theoretical and a 
practical position. According to existing research work, plural structures theoretically grant the 
principal the freedom to reduce organizing cost, to increase system growth and to avoid location 
specific risks. The subsequent empirical tests (though) did not reveal practical support for opportun-
istic strategies that use principal-agent dependency for the exploitation of the franchisee. Many 
more plural structures work in a way to credibly signal a franchisor’s willingness to cooperate with 
franchisees, thus benefiting all parties of the chain. By running both company-owned and franchise 
units, franchisors are able to initiate positive effects – e.g. signaling trust, leveling diverse interests, 
accelerating innovation and establishing performance benchmarks – that serve to increase a sys-
                                                 
28 We used data on franchise systems; hence fully integrated chains were not included in our analysis. 
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tem’s overall quality. 
Due to the extended duration of franchise contracts, which naturally require repeated interaction 
between the principal and his agents, cooperative behavior is directly correlated to higher perform-
ance. The effect of any franchisor activity, opportunistic or cooperative, will simply multiply over 
time and shape the success of all partners. While cooperative behavior is economically rational if 
repeated interaction is anticipated from the start, subsequent reciprocity, i.e. the mutual strengthen-
ing of any action, paves the road for establishing a long-term cooperational relationship between the 
franchisor and his agents. Empirical results from the present study clearly support the link between 
performance and cooperational behavior. Franchisors that applied the plural form as described, re-
ceived significantly better rankings than opportunistically acting competitors. Hence by combining 
company ownership with franchising, chains successfully force themselves into cooperative behav-
ior and refrain from opportunism towards their franchisees. Doing so, they attract more and better 
members to join the system. 
Probably because of its strategic importance for chain performance, we do not foresee a significant 
conversion of plural chains towards wholly company-owned or purely franchised systems. Much 
more, organizational continuity seems to be based on the specific advantages of the plural structure 
– and these advantages may vary over the life of a system. While signaling and leveling diverse 
interest are more essential during the infancy and growth stages, improving processes of innovation 
and benchmarking gain importance as the system becomes bigger, better known and more complex. 
With its ability to benefit both the franchisor and its partners across the early, the growth stages and 
up to maturity, the plural form proves to be a strategic instrument for achieving long-term success 
in the franchise industry. 
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Appendix 
Table A.  Cross correlations 
   BUSEXP SIZE INVAVG FFAVG RRAVG GROWTH RANK LAMBDA 
BUSEXP 1 .372 .096 .092 -.045 .251 -.076 -.145 
SIZE .372 1 .034 -.017 -.081 .888 -.232 -.009 
INVAVG .096 .034 1 .395 -.218 .044 .074 -.229 
FFAVG .092 -.017 .395 1 .023 .002 .111 -.279 
RRAVG -.045 -.081 -.218 .023 1 -.098 .031 .209 
GROWTH .251 .888 .044 .002 -.098 1 -.187 -.052 
RANK -.076 -.232 .074 .111 .031 -.187 1 .108 
Pe
ar
so
n 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
LAMBDA -.145 -.009 -.229 -.279 .209 -.052 .108 1 
BUSEXP . .000 .078 .095 .439 .000 .199 .008 
SIZE .000 . .533 .754 .162 .000 .000 .872 
INVAVG .078 .533 . .000 .000 .421 .210 .000 
FFAVG .095 .754 .000 . .703 .971 .066 .000 
RRAVG .439 .162 .000 .703 . .090 .614 .000 
GROWTH .000 .000 .421 .971 .090 . .001 .342 
RANK .199 .000 .210 .066 .614 .001 . .066 S
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 (2
-s
id
ed
) 
LAMBDA .008 .872 .000 .000 .000 .342 .066 . 
BUSEXP 340 340 340 327 300 340 289 340 
SIZE 340 340 340 327 300 340 289 340 
INVAVG 340 340 340 327 300 340 289 340 
FFAVG 327 327 327 327 287 327 276 327 
RRAVG 300 300 300 287 300 300 259 300 
GROWTH 340 340 340 327 300 340 289 340 
RANK 289 289 289 276 259 289 289 289 
N
 
LAMBDA 340 340 340 327 300 340 289 340 
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II   Franchisee vs. Company Ownership – An Empirical Analysis of Franchisor Profit 
 
Overview 
 
? In this paper, we examine ownership structures of franchise chains and evaluate their impact on 
franchisor profit. Specifically we compare pure forms of franchising with those that use both 
company-owned and franchised outlets within one chain – a phenomenon termed the plural 
form. Theoretically such plural arrangements are supposed to provide franchisors with lower 
costs, higher growth, greater total-quality, and reduced business risk. 
 
? Empirical results of this study indicate the superiority of company-owned businesses over fran-
chised units in generating franchisor profits. Moreover plurally organized systems compensate 
for losses from franchising with profits from company units and outperform purely franchised 
competitors in overall profitability. 
 
? Despite a clear financial inferiority of franchise outlets, franchisors of our sample do not convert 
plural structures into wholly-owned chains. Much more when organizing the chain, franchisors 
face an (skewed) inverse u-shaped profitability curve with both pure franchising and pure com-
pany-ownership lying at the (undesirable) extremes and with a performance peak somewhere in 
between.1 
                                                 
1  Earlier drafts of this paper have been published in the proceedings of EMNet 2005 and in the SSRN Working Paper 
Series: http://ssrn.com/abstract=763364. 
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1   Introduction 
“As all of you know, the name of the game is not really franchising. The name of the game is com-
pany stores. …It becomes obvious to you, if two hundred company-owned units out of 1600-1700 
overall units produce 60 percent of the net after tax profit, the real name of the game is owning the 
stores yourself”2 
 
Economic transactions within firms are organized either by hierarchy or by price mechanisms – or 
by a mixture of both. Concerning the matter of franchising, only a minority of today’s leading fran-
chise chains relies on pricing systems alone. The vast majority operates a minor but still significant 
number of company-owned stores (the hierarchy) side by side with their franchisees (the price sys-
tem). Since Bradach/Eccles (1989) examined such special hybrid arrangements, mixes of company 
and franchise units within the same system, have been known as plural forms. In contrast to early 
research propositions by Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1968), Hunt (1973), Caves/Murphy (1976) and Martin 
(1988), plurally organized franchise chains have not significantly altered their structure into entirely 
franchised or company-owned systems. Thus plural forms appear to be a stable organizational phe-
nomenon. Upon these findings, organization science began to explain the widespread use of plural 
forms by researching its advantages over pure franchise systems (Bradach 1997, Ehrmann/Spranger 
2004). Compared to pure hierarchy (full vertical integration) or pure price systems (pure franchise 
chain), plural forms are firstly supposed to lower overall agency (i.e. monitoring) cost and the cost 
of searching for and implementing local and highly specific information. 
Secondly, it is argued that plurality improves system and process quality by the following effects: 
By signaling internal franchisor information to the franchisee, thus overcoming inefficiencies aris-
ing from asymmetrical information; by preventing conflicts among contracting parties through 
aligning divergent interests of principals (franchisors) and potential agents (potential franchisees); 
by combining a franchisee’s innovational power with the hierarchy of the company-owned distribu-
tion arm, leading to accelerated innovation and internal change; and, finally, by creating a competi-
tive environment where benchmarking franchisees against managers of company-owned units in-
creases overall system performance. 
Thirdly, plural forms are supposed to facilitate chain growth. While the franchise part alleviates 
                                                 
2 Hooker, J. (1970): p. 171. 
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resource constraints – such as capital and managerial talent – the company-owned units provide a 
high degree of flexibility for quickly developing new local markets. 
Lastly the plural form is understood as a tool of company-wide risk management that enables the 
principal to select franchising or ownership depending of specific local risk factors. In total, re-
search has found that plural structures outperform pure forms of franchising and of company-
ownership because of their positive effects on a chain’s organizational costs, quality, growth and 
risk management (Ehrmann/Spranger 2004). 
Following Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1968), we are not fully convinced that these aspects suffice to entirely 
explain the continued existence and stability of the plural form. Certainly, as Oxenfeldt/Kelly 
(1968, p. 69) state, “the arguments advanced by advocates of organizational science have force”, 
but, just like Oxenfeldt/Kelly, we are not fully persuaded by them because in their aim to solve the 
plurality puzzle, they focus on single aspects rather than analyzing franchise chains as one profit 
producing entity. We therefore ask: Is it possible that the organizational structure impacts on a fran-
chise chain’s profit situation? If this is the case, which then is the structure that maximizes franchi-
sor profit? 
Generally, the franchisor’s streams of income result from specific or residual claims towards his 
agents and differ depending on the chosen mode of distribution. Franchisees on the one hand pay an 
initial franchise fee upon joining the system, an ongoing royalty amount, and an advertising fee as a 
percentage of the outlet’s sales volume. Thus the franchisor’s claims towards franchisees are of a 
precisely specified nature. Company units on the other hand provide profit resulting from the posi-
tive difference between sales revenue and operating cost. Hence the franchisor’s claim towards 
company-owned units is of residual nature. From the perspective of the franchisor – which will be 
ours for the remainder of this paper – chain profit is defined as the difference of all revenues (i.e. 
franchisees’ fees and amount of company sales) and all costs (i.e. franchising overhead and com-
pany units' specific costs). It is important to note that costs arising from operating the single fran-
chise unit remain the franchisee’s and are irrelevant for the franchisor’s financials. From the princi-
pal’s view, income streams of specific claims need to be challenged with those of residual claims in 
order to receive a meaningful statement regarding the profitability of distributional alternatives. 
Research on ownership redirection for instance has explicitly (Hunt 1973) or implicitly (Ox-
enfeldt/Kelly 1968) implied a superiority in performance of company ownership over franchising. 
In order to shed more light on these issues, we will explore whether and how organizational struc-
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tures impact the franchisor’s income streams. Specifically we contrast profitability of company-
owned units with franchise units and ask whether and why plurally organized systems may be more 
efficient than purely franchised competitors. Our present approach is both theoretical and practical: 
In section two we will first use the findings of capital finance theory on the impact of financial 
structure on a firm’s market valuation. In the perfect world of Modigliani/Miller both company and 
franchise units should be equally efficient and therefore neither income streams nor firm value are 
affected by organizational changes. Traditional finance theory though accepts that structure influ-
ences profitability and therefore plays an important role in maximizing a firm’s valuation. These 
opposing views are challenged with the results of a recent IFA (International Franchise Association) 
study and with data received from franchisors’ annual reports. We conclude in section four by dis-
cussing the implications of our findings for future franchising. 
 
2   Corporate finance for governance structures 
Shaping the organizational setting of a chain means to choose between selling any new outlet to an 
independent franchisee or running it under company-ownership by hiring an experienced store 
manager. Hence structuring a franchise chain initially appears to be an issue of organizational 
choice only. Because each form is characterized by a specific mode of revenue and costs, from the 
controller’s perspective the choice of the organizational form results in decisive consequences for 
the franchisor’s corporate finances and thus concerns more than just organizational efficiency. The 
main differences between any franchise and company-owned unit stem from divergent ownership 
patterns. Whereas the franchisor will have to bear the costs of investment in every company unit 
himself, franchise units will ideally be financed through the investment of the franchisee. Accord-
ingly, residual ownership of the first remains with the chain, but of the second lies in the hands of 
the franchisee. In case of bankruptcy, the franchisor is liable for the company units, while claims 
against the franchise unit stay with the franchisee. While the franchisor receives residual profits 
from company-owned operations, franchisees in turn pay fees for entering the system, for using the 
common brand name and infrastructure and they contribute to advertising funds. With these specific 
attributes, the choice between organizational alternatives is as much an issue of corporate govern-
ance as it is of the franchisor’s corporate finances. According to Williamson (1988), using different 
organizational modes for running a system is comparable to the choice of the appropriate mode of 
financing a firm or a project. The difference is to be found in a rather sharp dichotomy – financing 
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the latter is done either by equity or by debt money. 
Due to the characteristics of franchise and company-owned units, franchising means to finance the 
project (the new outlet) with money from outside (the investment is made by the franchise under-
taking), while for company-ownership investment sources come from inside the system (the fran-
chisor needs to invest himself). Accordingly, the franchisor’s claims towards franchisees are spe-
cific (like a creditor’s charges for debt) and those towards company-owned units are residual (like a 
creditors charges for equity). Thus when asking whether the choice of corporate governance influ-
ences the firm value, one could alternatively ask whether the capital structure of a firm, being a mix 
of equity and debt, does influence the value of the firm. 
 
2.1   Modigliani/Miller for franchising 
In their classical work, Modigliani and Miller (1958) propose aim to explain the effects of a firm’s 
capital structure on its market value. By grouping firms “into ‘equivalent returns’ classes, such that 
the return on the shares issued by any firm in any given class is proportional to (and hence perfectly 
correlated with) the return on the shares issued by any other firm in the same class”3, they separate 
the risk of capital structure from the income risk, as now all firms in the same class have identical 
return patterns. They conclude that in an economist's ideal world of complete and perfect capital 
markets and with full and symmetric information among all market participants, the total market 
value of all the securities issued by a firm is governed by the earning power and risk of its underly-
ing real assets and is independent of how the mix of securities, issued to finance it, is divided be-
tween debt instruments and equity capital. Differences in market valuations of heterogeneously fi-
nanced firms within the same class would then be eliminated through arbitrage by rational inves-
tors. Applying Modigliani/Miller’s model of ‘leveling-the-field’ arbitrage dealing to the case of 
franchising, the irrelevance of financial (and thus organizational) structure on a chain’s value be-
comes obvious. 
With the investors’ ability to add equivalent leverage by borrowing on personal account, levered 
(plurally organized) companies would ultimately be priced equally (i.e. no price premium would be 
charged) to unlevered (pure) competitors of the same return class. 
As long as it is impossible to increase a chain’s market value by exchanging company units for 
                                                 
3 Modigliani/Miller (1958): p. 266. 
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franchise units, or vice versa, both forms have to be considered equally efficient for the franchisor.4 
Alternatively, these results could be translated into a discounted cash flow model for calculating a 
firm’s fair price. Accordingly the market value of a firm results from discounting future earnings 
with the interest rate measuring the weighted average costs of capital. The only ways of increasing 
the value of a firm, is by increasing its returns and/or decreasing the underlying interest rates. As 
long as altering a firm’s leverage will not affect the discounting interest rate of chains within one 
class, firm value will be independent of financial and in particular, for our case also of corporate 
governance structure. 
 
2.2   Traditional Capital Structure Theory for Franchising 
A second approach towards the influence of capital structure on firm value is taken by supporters of 
traditional capital structure theory. They criticize the Modigliani/Miller assumptions as being unre-
alistic.5 Indeed, assuming a perfect capital market does not comply with information asymmetries 
between actors, with incomplete information or with costs of bankruptcy and trading (e.g. equity 
into debt). Obviously for instance it is neither costless nor frictionless to exchange franchise units 
for company-owned ones. Moreover franchisees seem to anticipate different risk structures of fran-
chise chains according to their organizational setup. As Ehrmann/Spranger (2004, 2005a) demon-
strate for a sample of US-franchisors, plurally organized chains attracted larger investment volumes 
and charge lower royalty rates than pure franchise chains. The latter on the other hand realize sig-
nificantly smaller investments from franchisees and charge them a lower franchise fee but a signifi-
cantly higher royalty rate. Apparently franchisees demand fee-based risk compensation from those 
franchisors that relied too heavily on “debt” (“equity”) just as bond (stock) holders do with low 
(high)-equity firms. 
                                                 
4 To be consistent with the Modigliani/Miller proposal, we compared a fully integrated (fully company owned) with a 
plurally organized one. Of course the proof holds true also for the comparison of a wholly franchisee owned chain 
with a plurally organized one. 
5 These conditions are six fold: First Modigliani/Miller assume the existence of risk classes in which all firms share one 
identical pattern of income across changing states of the world. Second their model requires a frictionless perfect capi-
tal market, where asset trading actors are able to carry out arbitrage deals due to missing transaction costs and institu-
tional restrictions. Third, taxes are neglected or perceived to be neutral, i.e. to be identical across taxpayers and for all 
income sources. Forth, investors are able to borrow or lend on the same terms as firms and fifth, there are no bank-
ruptcy costs as in the state of failure all revenue is assumed to be given to the bondholders leaving them without seri-
ous financial damage. Finally firms are supposed to be unable of conveying information and thus influencing their 
market value by adjustment of their capital structure. 
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These results call for an analysis of the franchise organization process under the rules of traditional 
capital structure theory. In contrast to Modigliani/Miller, traditionalists propose a non-linear rela-
tionship between costs of debt and equity. Exchanging one form – organizational or financial – for 
another would then potentially minimize the costs of capital and thus maximize the firm’s valua-
tion. As long as a firm’s total value is the sum of its total equity and debt, an all-equity financed 
firm may now lower its costs of capital and thereby increase its market value by substituting some 
equity for debt. As long as debt is the higher ranking collateral in case of bankruptcy, its risk of 
termination is then less than it is for equity. Consequently, for the franchisor, debt will be cheaper to 
accumulate than equity. While exchanging equity for debt, the franchisors are subsequently limiting 
their financial scope during recession. This exposes their creditors to an increasing risk of losing 
their claims in the aftermath of entrepreneurial downturns. Therefore beginning at some point α* of 
leverage, creditors will start to compensate for such increased risks by adding a price premium on to 
their claim, which gradually equates the cost of debt and equity and makes additional degrees of 
leverage unfavorable. Correspondingly, leverage at α* represents the minimum of the weighted 
average cost of capital and, everything else being equal, the maximum of the firm’s valuation. 
Applying this approach to the case of plural franchise chains suggest that mixing company and 
franchise units is more efficient than running a pure system. Since franchisors escort organizational 
changes with adjustments of their franchise fees and royalty rates, franchisees seem to anticipate 
leverage risks just like every other creditor does. With the specific costs and benefits of each organ-
izational form, the overall organizational efficiency is supposed to increase when leveraging closer 
to the ratio α*. According to traditional capital structure theory, if leverage is too low, say the chain 
is wholly company-owned, the firm’s value increases by issuing more debt (to emphasize franchis-
ing) in exchange for equity. If leverage is too high – to much franchising compared to company 
ownership – the firm’s value increases by issuing equity (emphasizing company ownership) in ex-
change for debt (Bailey 2003). Here it would be the franchisor’s task to identify the chain-specific 
value-maximizing mix of company ownership and franchising. 
 
2.3   Explaining the ‘Swollen Middle’ 
In order to relate the existence of plural franchise chains to a maximization of firm value, evidence 
needs to be presented that mixing organizational methods (hierarchy and the price system) results in 
similar non-linear cost/benefit-effects as mixing debt and equity in traditional capital structure the-
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ory. According to Hennart (1993), the costs of using the market or the hierarchy depend on each 
form’s specific enforcement properties. When principals pay a fixed salary to the agent, they may 
impose behavior constraints in turn and hence exert control through hierarchy. Measuring an 
agent’s production though, and rewarding him for the fulfillment of a predefined output, the princi-
pal imposes price constraints and thus exerts control through price mechanisms. Concerning the 
agent’s reaction towards each form of constraint, each mode of control gives way to a distinct trade-
off situation. Price constraints, on the one hand, maximize personal effort (minimizing shirking) but 
encourage cheating, either by offering unacceptable high prices or low quality. Behavior constraints 
on the other hand, work exactly the opposite way. They reward individuals for following directives 
and discourage them from cheating. In the absence of proper supervision though, they provide room 
for excessive shirking through the minimization of work effort. Consequently, the trade-off between 
price system and hierarchy is one involving low shirking and high cheating or high shirking and low 
cheating cost. Based on rationality, any given transaction should be exercised by a mix of price and 
hierarchy resulting in the lowest organizational costs.6 
In case the relationship between the level of constraint and the specific amount of shirking and 
cheating costs is one of a linear nature, the choice of organizational form will tend towards one of 
the extremes. If it is easier, i.e. cheaper, to observe the agent’s behavior than the outlet’s output, 
behavior constraints are applied. If it is easier to control the output than the agent’s behavior, price 
constraints prevail. So as long as organizing costs are linear, mixing behavior and price constraints 
into plural forms will never reduce the total organizing costs. Should, on the other hand, the sum of 
costs (benefits) increase (decrease) non-proportionally as the organization specializes into one 
method, substitution results in a hybrid form similar to the leverage α* from above. At this point, 
the chain’s organizational costs (benefits) are at their minimum (maximum) and thus firm value is 
at its maximum (Ouchi 1980). Depending on the specifics of cheating and shirking costs, the organ-
izational mix is skewed more or less towards one of the extremes – resulting in hybrid forms that 
are dominated by behavior constraints or by price constraints. 
There is evidence that franchisors may find a non-linear relationship between the efficiency of fran-
chising and company ownership. Empirically, the mix of franchise to company-owned outlets 
ranges from 2:1 (Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier 2002), to 3:1 (Lafontaine/Shaw 2005) all the way to 9:1 
                                                 
6 Organizing costs are the sum of cheating and shirking costs in this case. As will be explained, there can be non-
financial factors other than cheating and shirking costs that determine the degree of efficiency. 
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(Ehrmann/Spranger 2004). Bradach (1997) and Lewin-Solomons (1998) have argued such non-
linearity exists because franchisors realize synergies when applying the plural form. Ehr-
mann/Spranger (2004, 2005a) have summarized those effects that may cause plural structures to be 
more efficient than pure forms: Plural forms may reduce agency and information cost, they may 
foster growth by overcoming limited resource accessibility without losing flexibility and keep en-
trepreneurial risk under control. Furthermore these plural forms improve system quality by signal-
ing internal information, by harmonizing divergent interests, by balancing innovation streams and 
by advancing intra-firm competition. 
Although franchising research has just started to explore the importance of these aspects, it should 
positively impact the plural franchise firm’s profitability if any, some or all of these aspects apply. 
Our empirical analysis therefore will examine the income streams of both company-owned and 
franchise units closely. H1 aims to compare the general productivity of both forms in terms of unit 
profit to the franchisor. In a second step, data is used to compare the overall profitability of plural 
chains with those of pure forms. As stated in H2, one mode (plural or pure) is supposed to outper-
form the other. What remains for testing in step three is the proposition of H3 that plurality (as it is 
supposed to apply to other hybrid forms) is a temporary phenomenon which will, sooner or later, 
dissolve into pure forms of market or hierarchy: 
 
H1A:  Company owned units are more profitable to the franchisor than franchise units. 
H2A:  Plural franchise chains are more profitable than purely franchised competitors. 
H3A:   Plural chains will evolve wholly-owned systems. 
 
These hypotheses are contrasted by the following anti-theses: 
 
H1B:  Franchise units are more profitable to the franchisor than company units. 
H2B:  Pure franchise chains are more profitable than plural competitors. 
H3B:  Plural chains will evolve towards wholly-franchised systems. 
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3   Empirical Analysis of the Profitability of Plural Chains 
3.1   Unit profitability 
The underlying supposition of those promoting ownership-redirection tendencies is – as explicitly 
stated in the introductory quote of John Hooker – that a franchisor extracts more profit from com-
pany-owned stores than from franchise units. Otherwise franchisors have little incentive to buy back 
successful franchises once their contracts have expired (as those supporting ownership redirection 
expect to happen). Franchising would then turn out to be a transitory phenomenon, serving the fran-
chisor for a variety of reasons: the acquisition of capital (Caves/Murphy 1976; Mathewson/Winter 
1985) or managerial talent (Thompson 1994), the compensation of extraordinary risks (Martin 
1988) or the integration of entrepreneurial spirit (Bradach 1997). In order to clarify the profitability 
schemes of both organizational modes, we model the income and cost structures of company-owned 
and of franchise units. 
Under the franchise contract, the franchisor will primarily receive an initial franchise fee plus ongo-
ing royalty and advertising payments based on the franchisee’s sales. Further he may charge the 
franchisee for training and business development, for leasing property and equipment and for pur-
chased raw materials and supplies from the franchisor (Justis/Feltes 1986). For company-
ownership, the franchisor receives revenue due to the outlet’s sales of products or services. 
Concerning a franchisor’s cost there are one-time as well as ongoing expenses. Examples of one-
time costs are: developing new sites, investing in hard- and software, recruiting staff, etc. Ongoing 
costs are either variable, like those for input material and labor, or fixed, such as management sala-
ries/benefits or rental and lease payments. Whereas franchisees will pay outlet specific costs, the 
franchisor bears all expenses accumulated by company-owned outlets. Thus the decision to fran-
chise or to own is also a choice of two alternative income streams. 
Out of their annual 10-k fillings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission we extracted 
data of seven large public US-restaurant retail chains displayed in table 1 below. In total, our sam-
ple contains ten of the best-known franchise chains in the restaurant business worldwide. With more 
than 76.500 franchise and company-owned outlets, they generate combined revenue of more than 
$28 billion.7 
                                                 
7 Furthermore they represent six of the 2002 top-ten Technomic100 chains. No data was available of the 2002’s No. 2 
(Burger King) and No. 4 (Subway) because of private ownership. The data of Starbucks (No. 9) and Domino’s 
(No.10) lacked the necessary breakdown of revenue and costs. See www.technomic.com. 
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Table 1. Unit Profitability of Seven Large Franchisors 
Chain McDonald’s 
Carl’s 
Jr. Hardee’s Denny’s Wendy’s Applebee’s YUM1 
1.  Year of annual report 2002 2003 2003 2002 2002 2002 2002 
2.  Company-owned units (CU) 9.000 440 730 547 1.320 357 7.523 
3.  Franchised & licensed units 
(FU) 
22.108 547 1.499 1.010 4.933 1139 25.397 
4.  Franchising in % 71,07% 55,42 67,25% 64,87% 78,89% 76,14% 77,15% 
5.  Total system-wide revenue2 $15.406 $694 $628 $949 $1.979 $827 $7.757 
6.  CU sales $11.500 $508 $562 $859 $1.700 $725 $6.891 
7.  Cost of CU sales $9.907 $397 $500 $738 $1.380 $614 $5.790 
8.  CU margins $1.593 $110 $62 $120 $320 $111 $1.101 
9.  Margin per single CU $0.177 $0.250 $0.085 $0.220 $0.242 $0.311 $0.146 
10.  FU revenue $3.906 $186 $66 $90 $279 $102 $866 
11.  Cost of FU revenue $840 $163 $33 $29 -- -- $49 
12.  FU margins $3.066 $23 $33 $61 $279 $102 $817 
13.  Margin per FU $0.139 $0.042 $0.022 $0.061 $0.057 $0.089 $0.032 
14.  General & admin. expenses $1.713 $43 $47 $50 $175 $81 $913 
15.  Other operating (inc.) ex-
penses 
$833 $34 $38 $82 $86 $2 ($30) 
16.  Operating income CU3 $857 $76 $35 $74 $265 $91 $899 
17.  Operating income FU3 $1.256 -$20 -$24 -$24 $73 $39 $136 
18.  Total operating income $2.113 $56 $11 $50 $338 $130 $1.035 
19.  Operating income per CU $0,095 $0,173 $0,047 $0,135 $0,201 $0,255 $0,120 
20.  Operating income per FU $0,057 -$0,036 -$0,016 -$0,024 $0,015 $0,034 $0,005 
21.  Margin ratio CU: FU 1,28 6,03 3,86 3,62 4,28 3,47 4,55 
22. Operating income ratio CU: 
FU 
1,68 -4,78 -2,98 -5,61 13,52 7,50 22,36 
1 YUM operates KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, A&W and 
Long John Silver’s. Figures are for the entire com-
pany. 
2 dollars in millions 
3 (14) and (15) are deducted proportionally to (4). 
 
For each chain, we first calculated the difference of revenue and direct costs for each form (rows 6-
7 and 10-11) and received the gross margin that each segment contributed to the gross profit. Sec-
ondly, we subtracted common cost (14 and 15) according to the form’s share of outlets. Finally we 
divided both margin (8 and 12) and operating income (16 and 17) positions of both segments by the 
number of company-owned and franchised outlets to receive the contribution that each single outlet 
made to the company’s overall gross margin (9 and 13) and to the operating income (19 and 20). 
The results in rows 21 and 22 exhibit both the gross margin ratios as well as the operating income 
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ratios for company-owned to franchised units. For each chain analyzed, the single company-unit 
added far more to both the gross margin and to the total operating income than the single franchise 
unit. The operating income ratio of Carl’s Jr., Hardee’s and Denny’s are negative. Hence franchi-
sors of our sample profited from self-run units but lost part of it again due to franchise operations. 
Three limitations apply to the analysis in table 1: 
First, our sample does not claim to represent the entire spectrum of all quick service restaurants, as 
for instance size and business experience of our sample chains are greater than the industry aver-
age.8 Nevertheless by analyzing just eleven out of the 100 largest restaurant brands, we covered 36 
% of all revenue and 33 % of all outlets of this population.9 
Second, we are fully aware of the difficulty associated with specifying general and other operating 
expenses (14 and 15 in table 1), although all other specific costs, per definition, have been already 
deducted in rows 7 and 11. We therefore included gross margins and the gross margin ratio and find 
the latter also supporting the thesis of company-ownership superiority. 
Finally we have ignored so far that company units are financed by the franchisor, calling for sub-
stantial amounts of franchisor capital. Franchise units in turn are financed by franchisees and do not 
stress the franchisor’s resources. Return-on-investment-figures, which fill this gap, cannot be de-
rived from the data because chains do not report detailed asset information. To overcome this 
weakness, we estimate the cost of capital for company-owned operations in table 2 below. Evi-
dently, even if costs of capital are included in the model, the superiority of company operations over 
franchising remains valid for any chain but McDonald’s (see table 2). To be perfectly accurate, fi-
nancing rates would have to be raised by surcharges to the general market rates according to each 
company’s individual credit rating. As surcharges of usually 50 to 120 basis points (according to the 
credit rating category) do not change the results of table 2, such speculative calculations have been 
omitted for the purposes of this analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Compare the industry average of size, age and degree of franchising as displayed in studies by Lafontaine/Shaw 
(2005), Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002) and Ehrmann/Spranger (2004, 2005a). 
9 See www.technomic.com figures of 2002. 
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Table 2. Capital Cost of Company Operations  
Chain McDonald’s Carl’s Jr. Hardee’s Denny’s Wendy’s Applebee’s YUM1 
23. Average in-
vestment per 
CU1 2 
$ 1,050 $ 0,991 $ 0,935 $ 1,385 $ 1,222 $2,455 $0,970 
24. S&P credit rat-
ing3 
A-1 B- B- CCC+ A-2 --- BB+ 
25. Long-term in-
terest rate (10 
yrs $TSR)4 
4,61% 4,01% 4,01% 4,61% 4,61% 4,61% 4,61% 
26. Cost of capital 
per CU2 
$0,048 $0,040 $0,037 $0,064 $0,056 $0,113 $0,045 
27. Adj. margin per 
CU 
$0,129 $0,211 $0,048 $0,156 $0,186 $0,198 $0,102 
28. Adj. income per 
CU 
$0,047 $0,133 $0,010 $0,071 $0,144 $0,142 $0,075 
29. Adj. margin 
ratio CU: FU 
0,93 5,07 2,17 2,57 3,29 2,21 3,16 
30. Adj. operating 
income ratio  
0,82 -3,68 -0,62 -2,96 9,73 4,18 13,99 
1 Source: Entrepreneur Magazine 2002  
    2 Dollars in millions 
3 www.standardandpoors.com  
4 www.federalreserve.gov, 2002: 4.61%, 2003 4.01%. 
 
Concerning the findings on unit profitability, operating company-owned units is clearly more prof-
itable in terms of maximizing the franchisor profit than engaging in franchise activities. Within the 
limits of our sample, we therefore accept H1A (and reject H1B) and continue with examining the 
profitability patterns of more heterogeneously organized and smaller firms in the next section. 
 
3.2   Chain profitability  
In order to identify and measure the key profit drivers in franchising, the IFA surveyed financial 
data of 65 member chains and published these findings in the 2001 Financial Benchmarking Study. 
Since survey participants volunteered for the study and were not selected according to statistical 
sampling methods, the data collected may not be a representative cross-section of all IFA member 
chains. Despite this limitation, the analysis contains valuable insights into the profitability patterns 
of franchisors, consisting both of plurally organized and of purely franchised chains. Table 3 dis-
plays the descriptive statistics of the sample chains. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 2001 IFA Study 
Characteristics      
 < 10 years 10 to 19 yrs 20 to 29 yrs >30 yrs  Total 
Age of Company 15% 29% 30% 26%  100% 
Years of Franchising 34% 36% 15% 15%  100% 
Total Franchise Revenue < $2 Mil. $2 to $5 Mil. $5 to $20 Mil. > $20 Mil.   
 24% 28% 31% 17%  100% 
Number of FU < 100 FU* 100 to 200 FU 200 to 300 FU > 300 FU   
 32% 24% 23% 21%  100% 
Franchise Type Maintenance Food Business Serv. Personal Serv. Retail  
 22% 23% 20% 22% 13% 100% 
Organizational Structure 5% or more Company-owned 95% or more Franchise focused   
 23  42   65 
  35%  65%  100% 
Median Number of CU*  130  0   
Median Number of FU  112  215   
Degree of Franchising λ*  46%  100%   
* CU = Company Units, FU = Franchise Units, λ = FU/(CU+FU)   
 
In total, the IFA sample covers a substantial part of the very broad spectrum of franchise systems. 
Only a minority of the chains is relatively young (15% < 10 years in business, 34% < 10 years of 
franchise experience) and small (24% < $2m in franchising revenue, 32% < 100 franchise units). 
Furthermore, different industries are well represented by the sample. Only the ratio of plural to 
purely franchised systems does not fully correspond to the figures of much larger samples (see the 
studies listed in part 2.3 above). Still with 23 chains being plurally structured (46% franchising on 
average) and 42 systems being fully franchised, the two groups are sufficiently different concerning 
their organizational structure. 
Franchisor profitability is calculated in a way similar to the approach taken in the previous section. 
As a first step, the participants calculated gross profit of all franchise operations as the residual of 
revenue (including franchisees’ fees and royalties10) and costs of goods sold. After deducting em-
ployee and general/administrative expenses for operating the franchise activities, the franchising 
                                                 
10 International Franchise Association (2003): p. 25.  
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profit is received. Then franchisors were asked to determine the profit from company-owned opera-
tions separately from that of franchising. Finally both profit streams, less the amount of other in-
come, determines the extent of profit before tax. Note that in table 4 analysis, the IFA choose to 
express the profit before tax figure as percentage on the chain’s franchise revenues only – and not 
on all revenue of franchise and company-owned operations. 
Table 4. Profitability Breakdown Chart11 
 All 65 Companies  All 65 Companies Adjusted* 
 5% or 
more CU 
95% or  
more FU 
 5% or  
more CU 
95% or  
more FU 
   CU 130  0  
   FU  112  215 
Franchise Revenues 100% 100%  100% 100% 
-  Cost of Goods Sold 14.5 10 - 14.5 10 
= Gross Profit 85.5 90.0 = 85.5 90 
- Employee Expenses 56.2 34.9 - 56.2 34.9 
- General & Administ. Exp. 68.5 39.6 - 68.5 39.6 
= Profit from Franchising  - 39.1 15.5 =  -39.1  15.5 
+ Profit from CU** 91.0 .6  91.0  .6  
+/- Other  
Income/Ex-  penses 
-14.1 -2.9  -6.6 -7.5 0 -2.9 
Profit Before Taxes** 37.8% 13.2%  84.4% -46.6% 0.6% 12.6% 
   Sum 37.8% 13.2% 
* weighted with degree of organization λ   **as percentage of franchise revenues 
 
Examining each channel’s economics, we separated the sample of 65 chains into those chains with 
5% or more of company units out of all outlets and those with less than 5% when calculating the 
profitability ratios equally for tables 1 and 2. Hence the sum of profit from franchising and com-
pany ownership is adjusted by other income/expenses12 weighted with the proportions of company-
ownership and of franchising. Again we allocated each outlet’s contribution, here, to the franchise 
revenue and not to the overall revenue.13 
                                                 
11 ibid: p. 24. 
12 According to the shares of company-ownership and franchising displayed in table 3. 
13 International Franchise Association (2003): p. 25f.: Franchise Revenue for the “5% or more CU“-Group (“95% or 
more FU”-Group) in this sample is made up by the following components: Royalties: 59.4% (62.9%), Initial Franchise 
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As clearly revealed in table 4, plurally organized chains display a distinctly different income pattern 
from that of pure franchisors. In terms of franchise revenue, franchisors with 5% or more of com-
pany ownership earned almost as much profit from owned locations as they received in total fran-
chise revenue. These figures are contrasted by losses that plurally organized chains encounter 
through their franchising business. Pure franchise chains on the other hand operate their franchising 
activities with profit. Contrasting the total profit before taxes of both organizational alternatives 
though, purely franchised chains achieve just one-third of the profit before taxes in proportion to the 
franchising revenue achieved by the group of plurally structured systems. Thus the central result of 
this analysis is that plural franchise chains of this sample realize negative profits from their fran-
chise activities, but offset these losses with highly profitable company-owned outlets. Overall, plu-
ral arrangements from this IFA survey are more beneficial for maximizing the franchisor’s profit 
than purely franchised competitors. 
Regarding the data’s consistency, proper allocation of revenues and cost to each organizational type 
may pose an accountancy problem to franchisors. Plural chains, for instance, will most likely incur 
higher expenses due to operating locations by themselves. The large difference in gen-
eral/administrative and employee expenses of both sample groups might indicate that costs of com-
pany operations had not been allocated correctly and thus were wrongly deducted from the franchis-
ing revenue. Even though the IFA advised all participants to separate the cost of each form, some 
doubt about the reliability of the data remains. Additionally the IFA purposely14 refrained from ana-
lyzing the efficiencies of company operations, but requested members to summarize a complex in-
come stream within one single profit figure which in turn is then related to franchise revenue. 
Within these limitations though, the data supports hypothesis H2A (rejecting H2B). Accordingly 
plurally organized chains of the sample suffer losses from franchising but compensate for these with 
high profits in company operations. Purely franchised systems on the other hand are profitable with 
their franchise business, but finish overall with just about one third of the profitability of plurally 
organized competitors. Although profits of both modes are not comparable on an absolute basis 
(due to relating company-owned profit to franchise revenues), these findings support the non-
linearity of organization costs as acknowledged by Hennart (1993) and presented in part 2.3 above. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Fees: 11.4% (18.4%), Other Franchise Fees: 0.8% (2.1%), Product or Service Sales to Franchisees: 16.8% (10.7%) 
and Other Revenue: 11.6% (5.6%). 
14 International Franchise Association (2003): p. 24. 
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3.3   Chain development 
What remain to be tested in a third step are the potential effects that the results of H1 and H2 may 
have on the evolution of franchise organizations. According to evidence from above, plural fran-
chise chains outperform purely franchise-based competitors in unit profitability. Much more, plural 
systems profit from their company operations while they suffer losses from their franchise activities 
at the same time. Under a strategy of profit maximization, a rational franchisor running a mature 
system should ultimately turn franchises into company-operated outlets, coming up with a wholly-
owned chain. Ownership redirection, as defined by Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1969) and reformulated by 
Dant/Paswan/Kaufmann (1996, p. 429) reads as follows: “Do franchisors use franchisees to open 
markets, develop consumer acceptance and preference for the franchisors’ trademarks and then ap-
propriate that brand equity by terminating or otherwise ending the franchisees’ rights to continue to 
operate the business?”15 
We test this thesis along a sample of the highest-ranking chains of the Franchise500 report (table 5 
below), which is annually published by the Entrepreneur Magazine. As the mean firm size de-
creases rapidly with lower rankings, concentrating on the first 300 systems hedges to some extent 
against fatal downward distortions.16 To measure structural changes once franchise agreements ex-
pire, a second test includes firms with more than 10 years of franchise experience (which is the 
mean term of franchise contracts for the sample) both for 2001 and 2004. Since the data is not dis-
tributed normally, we use non-parametric tests for measuring potential correlations between age 
(FRANAGE) and structure (LAMD).  
Three out of four tests revealed a slightly inverse relation between the firm’s experience (FRAN-
AGE) and the degree of franchising (LAMD), though strength decreased for the older-than-10-year 
fractions. Neither analysis however found the results to be significant on a confidence level of 5% 
or less. The sample therefore does not allow asserting the existence of a trend of converting franchi-
sees into company-owned units. 
 
 
                                                 
15 The central word of this quote is “appropriate”. Thus the authors presume that there is some value to be gained by 
integrating formerly franchisee owned units. This supports our results from above that company-owned units generally 
provide a higher return on investment to the franchisor than franchised outlets do. 
16 The strongly decreasing means of outlets were for the 1st quantile (1-100): 2981, the 2nd quantile (101-200): 267 and 
for the 3rd quantile (201-300): 171. 
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Table 5. Non-parametric Correlations of the Franchise300  
 FRANAGE01* / LAMD01** FRANAGE03 / LAMD03 
 ALL >10 yrs ALL > 10 yrs 
Kendall's tau_b Correlation Coefficient -0,38 0,20 -0,59 -0,009 
 Sig. (1-tailed) 0,179 0,337 0,082 0,423 
 N 300 222 284 235 
Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficient -0,54 0,27 -0,80 -0,011 
 Sig. (1-tailed) 0,174 0,347 0,089 0,432 
 N 300 222 284 235 
Descriptive      
Statistics N (ALL / > 10 yrs) 300 / 222 300 / 222 284 / 235 284 / 235 
 Mean (ALL / >10 yrs) 19,38 / 23,61 90,56 / 90,53 21,38 / 24,02 92,21 / 92,51 
Std. Dev. (ALL / > 10 yrs) 12,43 / 11,78 17,30 / 16,20 12,43 / 11,97 15,88 / 14,15 
   
* Franchise experience in years.  ** Degree of franchising λ = FU/(FU+CU) 
 
Other studies of Lafontaine/Kaufmann (1994), Lafontaine/Shaw (1999) and Pé-
nard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002) using much larger samples, were also not able to find empirical evi-
dence for ownership redirection tendencies. Only recently, Dant/Kaufmann (2003, p. 63) presented 
data on 152 US-chains claiming “although franchisors value the benefits of the mix of ownership 
types and do maintain that mix over time, there is some evidence of a greater tendency to perma-
nently convert existing franchised outlets to company-owned outlets as fast food systems mature 
and gain greater access to resources”. We fully agree with the authors that ‘tendency’ sounds plau-
sible for reasons of profit maximization to franchisors with a strong emphasis on franchising activi-
ties. But – and that is the issue of ownership redirection – there is no empirical evidence that fran-
chisors are permanently and fully converting their franchisees to company-owned units. As of the 
data presented, there is no significant relation between the degree of franchising and the length of 
franchise experience. Both H3A and H3B are therefore rejected. Despite a superiority of company 
over franchise operations concerning franchisor profit there is no indication for moving organiza-
tional structure into either one of the extremes. Chains are rather keeping it stable in the “swollen 
middle” of plural forms. 
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4   Conclusions and Discussion 
Researchers of organization science remain puzzled by the heterogeneity in organizational structur-
ing that they encounter when looking at matured franchise chains. Plural forms have long been 
viewed as unstable and transitory phenomena, being finally dissolved in either one extreme of mar-
ket (franchising) or hierarchy (company ownership). We have attempted to investigate whether and 
why such a moving to the extremes does not take place in reality. We applied an analogy of corpo-
rate governance and capital structure theory, stating that in a world other than the ideal of the Modi-
gliani/Miller model, structure impacts the valuation of a firm or a project. Applying the logic of 
Hennart, we then hypothesized that exchanging franchising for company-owned operations (or vice 
versa) resolves in a non-linear relationship of net benefits – perhaps for the reason of cost reduction 
or revenue increase or a combination of both. Within the limits of the gathered data, we have further 
demonstrated that major franchise chains extract a higher operating income and return on invest-
ment per unit out of their company-owned operations compared to their franchised ones. To our 
surprise, some chains suffered losses per unit from their franchise activities. The analysis of the IFA 
data supported these findings by demonstrating that plural chains realized negative profits from 
franchise activities, but offset these losses with highly profitable company-owned outlets. Com-
pared with the income of pure franchise chains, the plural arrangement proved to be almost three 
times as profitable – although the fair integration of capital costs did slightly alter, but not change 
this result. With this in mind – company operations are more beneficial for maximizing a franchi-
sor’s profit and plurally organized chains outperform purely structured competitors – we finally 
tested the thesis of ownership redirection on a sample of 300 franchise chains, but found no signifi-
cant supportive results. 
There are several conclusions to be drawn from these findings: First of all, in regard to the capital 
structuring analogy and in contrast to what Modigliani and Miller suggest, in the world of franchis-
ing, chain structure matters. As franchisors replace franchise units with company-owned ones, they 
improve their firm’s profit situation. Second, this increase in benefit – financially and non-
financially – seems to follow an inverse u-shape distribution, as otherwise evidence of ownership 
redirection would be significant.17 Thus the ultimate substitution of franchise business appears to be 
detrimental to the chain. More generally, this point is brought up by Bradach (1997, p. 298) formu-
                                                 
17 Note that the studies named in section 2.3 suggest such a mountain to be skewed towards the franchising part of the 
curve.  
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lating that “each structure has strengths and weaknesses, and if an organization can use each to lev-
erage the strengths and ameliorate the weaknesses of the other, then overall organization will be 
stronger than if either structure operates alone”. As we have shown in this paper, generating fran-
chisor profit seems to be a major strength of company operations and not one of franchising. By 
plurally organizing a formerly purely franchised system, a franchisor increases chain profit. While 
doing this, he gradually reduces the franchisee’s influence and simultaneously gives up on multiple 
strengths of the franchising arm (e.g. franchising being an important source of acquiring resources 
like managerial talent and capital, cultivating entrepreneurial spirit and enhancing intra-firm innova-
tion) – a move that we hypothesize to result in a net loss for the franchisor from some point on. This 
being the case we further conclude that there should exist some ratio λ* just like a* in capital struc-
turing theory, at which the franchisor will have optimized the combination of strengths and weak-
nesses of both forms. 
So how about John Hooker’s ‘name of the game’? As we have explained, he is right in so far as 
company units are important sources for franchisor profit. Pure franchise chains, disregarding this 
function, operate knowingly below their potential profit maximum and could win by emphasizing 
company operations. As in finance theory the optimal a* depends on firm specific characteristics, 
λ* will be individual for each chain and can hardly be determined from outside. Franchisors will 
first have to identify the strengths and weaknesses of both forms in regard to their firm specific 
characteristics.18 Then they will need to balance them realistically against each other in accordance 
to their firm specific business strategy. 
Although we lack the proof that too much company-ownership causes detrimental effects to profit-
ability, empirical evidence suggests that successful franchise systems rather remain plurally organ-
ized than becoming wholly-owned chains. Thus Hooker is wrong when postulating full ownership 
to be the desirable option for today’s franchisors. As we have demonstrated, the name of the game 
is neither owning the stores yourself nor going the franchising-only route. There is much more evi-
dence that the name of the game is the plural form. 
 
 
                                                 
18 See Ehrmann/Spranger (2005b) for a more detailed view on characteristics that may even call for a wholly company-
owned or a purely franchised structure. In short, the choice of organizational form is influenced by the individual total 
of net hybrid form benefits and net plural form synergies of each system. 
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III   Beneficially constraining franchisor’s power 
 
Overview 
 
? Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal’s side, 
providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents 
are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this 
threat upon signing a contract. 
 
? In this paper we analyze various forms of power and explain their asymmetrical allocation in the 
franchising industry. We demonstrate how franchisors restore those shifts in power that seem to 
disorder the desired balance by performing contractual, financial and organizational adjust-
ments.  
 
? The nature of these measures suggests that franchisors should cooperate with agents despite 
their freedom to behave opportunistically. According to empirical data, the better a franchisor is 
able to credibly alleviate a franchisee’s fear of being exploited by principal opportunism, the 
stronger the growth generated in the entire franchise system that embraces both the company-
owned and the franchise arms.1 
                                                 
1 Earlier drafts of this paper have been published in the proceedings of EMNet 2005 and in the SSRN Working Paper 
Series: http://ssrn.com/abstract=764126 under the title “Asymmetrical Power Distribution in Retail Channels and Co-
operative Franchisors”. 
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Introduction 
Driven by our interest in the organization of franchise chains, this work elaborates on the allocation 
of power in franchise arrangements, thereby building on the insights gained from two earlier pa-
pers.2 Both deal with “plural forms” – a term relating to the parallel use of company-owned and 
franchise outlets within the same organizational structure3 –, and provide five findings to note be-
fore starting with this current research: 
Firstly, the franchisor’s income streams generated from either of the two distributional channels 
differ greatly. Whereas franchisees generally outperform the average company-manager in terms 
of generating sales, the standard franchisor extracts more profit – gross profit and in terms of re-
turn on capital – from each single company unit.4 Secondly, plural franchise chains have proven 
more profitable than wholly franchised systems. Thirdly, despite these economic effects, plural 
chains do not strategically convert current franchisees back to full ownership, probably because 
the benefits of plural structures are greater than their costs.5 It has been shown – the forth aspect – 
that instead of using dual structures to lower organizing costs, to improve short term growth or to 
optimize risk exposure (measures promoting the company-owned arm at the expenses of the fran-
chisees), applying the plural form to improve a system’s level of total quality benefits both fran-
chisees and company-owned units. Thus being the fifth aspect, empirical data indicates that suc-
cessful franchisors prefer to cooperate with both types of agents and refrain from exploiting the 
franchising part opportunistically. Other studies support this hypothesis by presenting evidence 
that franchisors willingly abstain from using their full range of power towards franchisees. 
Whether it is granting of quasi-rents to franchisees, computing royalty rates based on revenue in-
stead of on profit or keeping contracts steady despite varying conditions (e.g. geographically, 
macro-economically, franchisee individually, etc.)6 – these all indicate (voluntary) cooperative 
franchisor behavior despite a formal ability to make use of their opportunistic power towards 
agents. 
                                                 
2 These are Ehrmann/Spranger (2004, 2005a) and Ehrmann/Spranger (2005b). 
3 See Bradach (1997), Bradach (1998), Lewin-Solomons (1999). 
4 See Shelton (1967) for a discussion on franchise and company-owned outlet efficiency. 
5 Such positive aspects need not only to make the combined distributional channels better than just one form on its own, 
but they have also to compensate for those negative effects (e.g. an increase in complexity and monitoring costs) that 
arise when dealing with two instead of just one organizational instrument. 
6 See Ehrmann (2002): p. 1137-1144. 
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In order to provide a better understanding on how to best use the powers given to the contracting 
parties of franchise organizations, this paper addresses both franchisees and franchisors. While we 
explain with respect to the former, why it is important that franchisors hold substantial powers 
when running a franchise system successfully, from the perspective of the franchisors we propose 
how and why these powers must be applied accurately for the benefit of all system members. 
Doing this, in the first section we will lay out the formal power structure of franchise systems, fo-
cusing on power asymmetries that favor the franchisor and leave the franchisee with a rather small 
amount of countervailing power. It will then be analyzed how, despite these power asymmetries, 
franchisors achieve to credibly convince franchisees that they will not have to suffer from detrimen-
tal opportunistic actions applied by the still powerful franchisor either ex-ante (section two) or ex-
post (section three) of signing the contract. Questioning the consequences of what can be called (a 
more) cooperative principal behavior, in section four we will investigate the consequences of co-
operativeness, hypothesizing that cooperative franchisors may be eventually more successful in the 
long term than their likely opportunistically acting competitors. 
 
1   Power allocation in franchise chains 
Instead of fully integrating their channels of distribution, (plural) franchisors sell some or all of the 
contractual rights for using a standardized concept to legally independent franchisees. Paying the 
fees7, the franchisee is permitted to use the concept within the limits defined by the franchisor. He is 
simultaneously expected by contract not to change or adapt the concept without the franchisor’s 
approval. Within such franchise arrangements, power – such as the ability of some individual or 
group to control or influence the behavior of another – can be exercised by both contracting parties 
towards each other. The franchisor’s sources of power enable him to apply both coercive and non-
coercive forces to achieve control over his franchisees. Due to French/Raven (1959) and 
Hunt/Nevin (1974) we know that coercive power is based on the franchisee’s anticipation of possi-
ble punishment by the franchisor in case of non-compliance. The four means of non-coercive force 
on the other hand originate from the franchisor’s ability to exert reward, legitimate, referent and 
expert power. For each case the magnitude of non-coercive power is determined by the franchisee’s 
expectation of how effectively the franchisor is able to grant rewards for obedience, how intensely 
                                                 
7 These are a one-time franchise fee due upon joining the system, ongoing royalty rates for using the trademark and 
marketing fees supporting efforts in national advertisement. 
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the franchisor deserves compliance for being the legitimate superior, how much the franchisee re-
fers to the franchisor’s goals as those that also benefit himself and how strongly the franchisee ac-
cepts the franchisor’s expertise as being equitable. The sum of coercive and non-coercive forces 
determines the potential of the franchisor’s gross power, which in turn is reduced to net power by 
the franchisee’s ability to countervail the principal’s force. According to Emerson (1962), con-
trolled members such as franchisees may build up anti-power by reducing their motivation to follow 
the given goals, by seeking alternative gratification sources of those goals, by improving their abil-
ity to adjust the goals according to their own wishes, and by opposing the former alternative sources 
for achieving the principal’s goals.8 One practical example for increasing negotiating power vis-à-
vis the franchisor lies in the forming of franchisee interest groups, a phenomenon highly visible 
especially at large franchise chains. In total, a franchisor’s net power over his franchisees results 
from the sum of gross power corrected by the amount of franchisee countervailing power. As long 
as the total of such net power differs from zero, we assume the power structure of the franchisor-
franchisee channel to be asymmetric. 
As long as the franchisors need to control franchisees for sticking to the rules, thereby safeguarding 
the business model as well as the good (i.e. compliant) system members against detrimental actions 
by bad system members, the principal needs to maintain a net power setting greater than zero. Such 
asymmetrical allocation of power favoring the franchisor benefits the system as long as it is not 
abused for a single-sided exploitation of franchisees. 
For the franchisor to use his powers effectively when building an environment of franchisee com-
pliance, he needs to know that the strength of his gross power is determined rather by what power 
channel-members believe he is willing and able to exert, than by what he could really exercise. As 
Lusch/Brown (1982) have demonstrated, the more a subordinate channel member B (the franchisee) 
believes another superior channel member A (the franchisor) will use potential coercive instru-
ments, the more power A has over B. Thus in order to establish an environment of compliance, the 
                                                 
8 These issues are more deeply discussed by Etgar (1976). Note that according to Gaski (1984), p. 25, the countervailing 
agent power is of different nature than the power exerted by the principal. “Countervailing power is channel member 
B’s ability to inhibit channel member A’s power over B’s decision variables … Countervailing power does not refer to 
B’s ability to control A’s decision variables. That is B’s power over A and represents a parallel structure. … B’s abil-
ity to get A not to do something A would otherwise have done (countervailing power) is formally equivalent to B’s 
ability to get A to do something A would not otherwise have done (power). The only operational difference is the tar-
get decision variable set.” Within a broader economical context, Galbraith (1956), p. 111, therefore defines “counter-
vailing power” as “restraints on power” – alternatively one could term it “countervailing of power” as well. 
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(presumed) existence of coercive power is important, exercising it though is not. Moreover empiri-
cal work by Hunt/Nevin (1974) suggests that the franchisee’s satisfaction level increases as the 
principal prefers the use of non-coercive forces to coercive ones to run the organization. Gaski 
(1984) proposes that exercising power to influence a channel member’s behavior decreases the sat-
isfaction of that individual and thus increases the potential of intrachannel conflict. Unexercised 
power is supposed to work exactly the opposite way by increasing the member’s satisfaction and by 
decreasing the likeliness of channel conflict. Practically, an increase in satisfaction will probably 
improve both the franchisee’s morale and his cooperativeness, and will simultaneously reduce the 
likeliness of voluntary contract termination, the filing of lawsuits against the franchisor and de-
manding further protective legislation.9 In total, seeking franchisee satisfaction should be a major 
task on the growth-oriented franchisor’s to-do list. And indeed, franchisors widely refrain from first 
using coercive means of power as long as other, non-coercive forces are available. As outlined in a 
study of franchise channels by Frazier/Summers (1986, p. 175), principals seem to use coercion 
with great reluctance, “only when other types of influence strategies have failed to produce a satis-
factory response on an important issue”. Concerning the impact of an asymmetrical power structure 
on the effectiveness of a channel organization, their conclusion is twofold: First: “The positions of 
the manufacturer and its dealers tend to be more congruent when the manufacturer has high power 
based on the dealer’s dependence in the interfirm relationship. Furthermore, the manufacturer is 
able to make more effective use of information exchange under these conditions. These factors tend 
to reduce the manufacturer’s need to engage in overt influence attempts [both coercive and non-
coercive] with its dealers.” 
And second: “Manufacturers with high power are better able to utilize non-coercive influence 
strategies (e.g. requests) effectively when overt influence attempts seem appropriate, and thereby 
avoid the use of coercion.”10 
As we understand from this analysis, even though the (presumed) existence of coercive forces in the 
hands of the franchisor – widely adding to an asymmetrical power structure – is vital to establish 
and to maintain compliance among subordinate channel members and thus to increase a system’s 
organizational effectiveness, using non-coercive means instead will positively impact the agent’s 
                                                 
9 Hunt/Nevin (1974): p. 187. 
10 See Frazier/Summers (1986): 175.  
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satisfaction with the system. However, prior to joining a franchise system with asymmetrical power 
structure, even potentially compliant members have to anticipate the application of damaging power 
if the franchisor should decide to act opportunistically. Thus for franchisors to attract good franchi-
sees it is crucial to credibly signal their restraint from exercising opportunistic action by abusing 
their dominant power, both ex-ante and ex-post of the agent signing the contract. 
 
2   Managing the franchisee’s ex-ante risk 
The process that prospective franchisees are supposed to complete when considering joining a fran-
chise system has been well documented by a variety of consulting sources.11 Generally they advise 
franchisees to narrow the possible alternatives to a finalist group by matching the available business 
opportunities with their own preferences. Subsequently, and in order to decide on one system, the 
applicant should thoroughly research his targets’ strengths, weaknesses, chances and risks by using 
public (e.g. rankings, awards) as well as disclosed (e.g. the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular 
(UFOC)) information and, important, by interviewing the franchisor as well as current and former 
franchisees. Resource consuming evaluation processes intend to match the agent’s needs with those 
of the principal, to select the optimal work environment for the franchisee and to find an investment 
prospect where risks and opportunities are balanced according to the investor’s profile and where 
the entrant’s investment is well protected against avoidable (capital) loss. 
Opportunistic franchisor behavior is one of the most prominent of such preventable risk factors as 
its impact on the franchise investment performance is extraordinarily detrimental. Therefore large 
parts of the system selection process are concerned with finding a franchisor that will neither abuse 
his principal power ex-ante nor ex-post of signing the franchise agreement.12 The more franchisees 
feel exposed to investment uncertainty, the more a franchisor is challenged by the following two 
issues: Firstly, prospective franchisees will be deterred from joining the system ex-ante if one or 
more competitors are able to credibly offer a more secure work environment and a more promising 
investment opportunity, i.e. one in which the perceived risk to incur capital damage due to franchi-
sor opportunism is smaller, everything else being equal. And secondly, existing franchisees could 
                                                 
11 Most prominent are online sources like www.smallbusinessnotes.com, www.betheboss.com, www.aafd.org, 
www.franchise.org or www.entrepreneur.com (10/01/04). 
12 It is the primary intention of disclosure statements like the (UFOC) to provide detailed information on the franchise 
system and thus to protect the agent from disadvantageous surprises ex-post of signing the contract. 
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be motivated to leave the system as the perceived risk of being treated unfairly begins to outweigh 
the supposed upside potential from being a member of the chain. 
Taken together, both scenarios cause more substantial harm to the franchisor’s reputation if made 
public, further increasing the difficulty of winning new members to join the system and thus to 
maintain a durable strategy of system growth. 
Statistics on intra-channel disputes demonstrate the importance of trust in franchise relationships. 
The National Franchise Mediation Program (NFMP) of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 
aims to resolve franchisor-franchisee conflicts without the expense and hostility of litigation. As of 
1993, it counts 96 cases filed by their 50 member chains in 1997 alone.13 Deducting those seven 
disputes jointly filed, roughly 70% of the cases were filed by franchisees. Concerning the subjects 
of the disputes, problems over encroachment14 (34%) dominated the list, exceeding alleged contrac-
tual (27%) and financial (15%) violations. Less frequent were disputes dealing with the non-
renewal of agreements (10%), development rights (7%), lease claims (3%), the sale of a franchise 
business (2%) and customer service (2%). Assuming that the number of disputes settled over the 
NFMP resembles a small but representative fraction of all lawsuits filed between franchisors and 
franchisees in 1997, the prospective franchisee’s concern about minimizing conflict potential seems 
justified. Moreover the higher the agent’s investment, the greater will be the risk of capital loss in 
case of opportunistic franchisor behavior. Therefore it seems rational for franchisees to ask addi-
tional sureties from the franchisor against detrimental principal conduct as investment volumes 
and/or asset specificity increase. 
Such commonly used securities can be of public relational, of contractual or of financial nature: The 
first group contains measures like participating in franchise system evaluations (e.g. the yearly 
Franchise500 by the Entrepreneur Magazine), publishing internal franchisee satisfaction surveys, 
joining interest groups like the NFMP, or submitting to the standards of the AAFD which promotes 
                                                 
13 Data is available at www.franchisemediation.org (01/10/04). 
14 According to www.franchiselaw.net (02/10/04), encroachment is defined as “the situation when a franchisor opens a 
company-owned unit or allows a franchisee to open a franchised unit near another franchisee’s unit. If the franchisee 
with the first unit suffers economic harm as a result of the opening of the new unit, that franchisee may have a claim 
against the franchisor for encroachment. Encroachment can also be caused by a franchisor selling goods or services in 
a franchisee’s territory through non-franchised channels of distribution.” There is no reliable data on the numbers of 
franchisors granting exclusive territories to franchisees. Personal interviews with franchisees though support the thesis 
this is a rather rare option to be offered. Franchisors prefer to remain in charge of decisions concerning the exploita-
tion of geographical entities. 
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the fair franchising seal.15 All of these measures intend to visibly strengthen the franchisor’s reputa-
tion as being a fair and non-opportunistic contracting partner by allowing for corporate governance 
transparency and open discussion on chain policy. 
The second group of contractual measures includes concessions like installing a powerful franchisee 
advisory council-type organization that has a role in decision-making and to which the franchisor is 
contractually committed.16 Cochet/Ehrmann (2005a) propose such franchisee councils to strengthen 
the enforcement of agent interests through threatening the deviant franchisor with collective fran-
chisee punishment. Another powerful contractual instrument in the hands of the franchisor is to 
vary the length of the franchise contract. Due to the practical difficulty of enforcing franchise con-
tracts by court decisions, longer terms will signal the franchisor’s motivation not to appropriate the 
franchisee’s rents opportunistically before the agent has received his projected return on investment. 
Finally a third instrument for the franchisor to signal cooperativeness is to offer financial support 
for franchisees that are about to invest into the system. By risking personal equity and thus holding 
a stake in the franchisee’s venture, franchisors may signal their willingness to share some of the 
financial risk encountered by franchisees. The following quantitative analysis uses contractual and 
financial instruments to explore whether and how franchisors achieve to overcome franchisee’s ex-
ante uncertainty.17 The hypotheses tested are the following: 
 
H1:  The length of franchise contracts are positively correlated with the investments 
asked of the franchisee.18 
H2:  The scope of franchisor financial support is positively correlated with the invest-
ments asked of the franchisee.19 
 
                                                 
15 The Fair Franchising Standards are controlled by the American Association of Franchisees and Dealers 
(www.aafd.com). Other regions have comparable guidelines like the ethic code of the European Franchise Federation 
(www.eff-franchise.com). 
16 See Selden (2000). 
17 Through the lack of appropriate data, public relational instruments could not be tested within this process. 
18 Such a concession keeps the franchisor from opportunistically appropriating franchisee rents through the arbitrary 
cancellation or non-renewal of contracts, thereby refusing the franchisee to amortize his investment and thus causing 
him financial harm. 
19 As stated above the franchisor is able to signal credibility into cooperational conduct by sharing part of the franchi-
see’s investment risk with personal equity or by using his reputation and track record in order to acquire franchisee 
financial support through third party sources. 
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Out of the data provided by the Entrepreneur Magazine and covering 925 US-franchise chains from 
1979 to 2003, 343 systems had length of contract information (“Terms”) available and provided 
financial help (“Finance”) through in-house (“In-house”) or third-party (“Third-party”) sources. To 
avoid statistical distortion through extreme values, the selected franchisors had to request an in-
vestment volume (“Intercept”) of less than two million dollars.20 
Table 1. Investment Volume and Financing Options 
Coefficients (a) Non-standardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
Model* B Standard error Beta T Sign. 
Intercept 370,550 88,207  4,201 ,000 
Terms 7,902 2,664 ,152 2,966 ,003 
In-house -28,877 12,036 -,132 -2,399 ,017 
Third-party 25,648 7,175 ,199 3,575 ,000 
Lambda -327,718 84,093 -,194 -3,897 ,000 
(a) Dependent variable: Investment volume in T€    
 *  N= 343, R-Square= 0,166, F= 16,840, Sign. at 0.1% level.  
Table 2. Investment Volume and Financing 
Coefficients (a) Non-standardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
Model* B Standard error Beta T Sign. 
Intercept 327,147 90,595  3,611 ,000 
Terms 10,706 2,685 ,206 3,988 ,000 
Finance 18,383 7,243 ,131 2,538 ,012 
Lambda -332,631 86,814 -,197 -3,832 ,000 
(a) Dependent variable: Investment volume in T€    
 *  N=343, R-Square= 0,109, F= 13,764, Sign. at 0.1% level.  
 
For the purpose of analyzing organizational measures in section 4, we employ Lambda as the de-
gree of franchising – this measure is arrived at by dividing the number of franchised outlets by the 
number of all (franchised and company-owned) units. Linear regression results are displayed in 
tables 1 and 2 above.21 They reveal significant support for the hypothesized franchisor objective to 
contractually and financially compensate franchisees for increased investment risk. According to 
the data, the duration of the franchisee agreement is strongly and positively correlated with the re-
                                                 
20 Those chains sorted out by the $2M-cap represent only 4% of the entire sample of 925 but they account for 75% of 
the standard deviation in investment volumes. 
21 See Table A in the appendix for correlation results. 
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quired investment volume. This is meaningful for franchisees as two coercive means of franchisor 
power are affected when terms increase: extraordinary contract termination, and the denial of con-
tract renewal. 
Concerning the first issue of terminating the contract, franchisors are generally not supposed to uni-
laterally cancel the franchise agreement unless there was a breach of contract by the franchisee. The 
actual definition of a violation that suffices to end a franchise contract as well as the proper mode of 
applying it, is largely determined by national or local legislation practices, by the franchise ethic 
standards that apply and by the actual practicability to execute the written sanctions. In the United 
States, for instance, state laws regulate franchise relationships. Altogether 19 states have adopted 
restrictions on terminating franchise contracts. Canceling a franchise agreement without good cause 
is illegal due to these regulations. Such “good cause” includes incidents like the franchisee becom-
ing insolvent or bankrupt, the franchisee voluntarily abandoning his operations, being convicted of 
a crime concerning the franchise operations or failing to substantially comply with his material ob-
ligations under the franchise agreement.22 In a sample of 76 franchise chains researched by Brick-
ley/Dark/Weisbach (1991), all contracts – both from states with and without termination rules – 
required a breach of contract for cancellation and allowed a period for correcting the causes of such 
violations.23 Even the International Franchise Association (IFA) advises all members to establish a 
franchise relationship governed by “trust, truth and honesty”24, which is severely impaired if a fran-
chisor should act opportunistically and terminate contracts unilaterally and without good cause. 
Finally Bradach (1998) reports on the practical hurdles that franchisors encounter when asserting a 
breach of contract by the franchisee. For ultimately canceling a franchise contract through litigation, 
in the opinion of one of his franchisor interviewees: “You need a dead rat in the kitchen, and pref-
erably three of four, if you want a chance of winning”25 
Regarding the second issue of denying the renewal of a contract, some states require “good cause” 
similar to that needed for terminating the contract. Others oblige the franchisor to give advance 
written notice of non-renewal and impose restrictions such as repurchase of the franchisee’s assets 
                                                 
22 www.franchiselaw.net (10/09/04).  
23 Excluded from the correcting period are criminal acts, bankruptcy and repeated contractual violations. See Brick-
ley/Dark/Weisbach (1991): p. 114. 
24 IFA – The Code of Ethics, www.franchise.org (10/09/04). 
25 Bradach (1998): p. 35. 
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or the waiver of any non-competition restrictions.26 In total, we agree with Bradach (1998) that both 
termination and non-renewal are formal and powerful instruments, but actual enforcement of them 
is limited by legislation, by ethic standards, or simply by not being practical. Despite these restric-
tions, the threat of contract termination and non-renewal constitute the franchisor’s ultimate tools to 
align the agent’s conduct or to ultimately cancel any individual membership for the sake of all other 
system participants. Hence increasing the length of contracts diminishes the power of these means, 
which is true especially for the non-renewal threat. Longer contractual terms therefore reduce the 
franchisee’s risk of suffering capital damages due to a principal opportunistically appropriating an 
agent’s rents.27 
Concerning the hypothesized financial concession of H2, correlations are interestingly diverse be-
tween outside and inside financial sources. While investment volumes increase, franchisors reduce 
their range of in-house financing and simultaneously strengthen their effort to provide more finan-
cial support through third-party sources (table 1). For both sources taken together, the scope of fi-
nancial support is correlated significantly and positively to an increase in investment volumes (table 
2). Apparently, offering financial support through third-party sources is more relevant to franchisors 
than providing equity.28 Although the franchisor personally does not face financial risk when arrang-
ing third-party financing contacts, the reputation of a fair franchisor requires the offering of such 
sources. 
A common third-party financier is the governmental U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). 
The SBA approach of backing loans made by commercial institutions with a governmental guaran-
tee transfers the risk of borrower non-payment from the lender to the SBA. Thus the usual credit 
risk of commercial banks is substantially reduced as soon as institutions like the SBA step in. Ac-
cording to SBA guidelines though, franchisees are eligible for SBA-loans only as long as the appro-
                                                 
26 www.franchiselaw.net (10/09/04). 
27 The reported reactions concerning lawmaker’s idea to introduce restrictions of termination, demonstrate some of the 
importance of these tools for the franchisor. As Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991, p. 116) state: “ The termination laws 
were opposed by major franchisors. The International Franchise Association (IFA), the primary lobbying group for 
franchisors, expended considerable resources opposing them … A major argument used by the IFA is that document-
ing good cause for the marginal franchisee ‘would be difficult at best’, hence the laws are equivalent to granting fran-
chisees ‘perpetual contracts’. The IFA argues that perpetual franchises make it difficult, if not impossible, to control 
quality within franchise system.” 
28 41,2 % of the 343 chains offer in-house financing, while 76,7% arrange contacts to third-party sources. These figures 
stand in contrast to those of the IFA in their Profile of Franchising (1998) study, where of 1226 chains 32% offered 
in-house financing, while only 10% have so called third party sponsored financing programs. 
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priate franchisor does not retain “power to control operations to such an extent as to be tantamount 
to an employment contract. The franchisee must have the right to profit from efforts commensurate 
with ownership.”29 
A franchisor appropriating a franchisee’s rent through opportunistic action (e.g. by terminating the 
franchise relationship before the franchisee has been able to amortize his investment) would prevent 
the franchisee from realizing profit on his investment and would consequently lose eligibility to 
negotiate third-party financing like the described SBA-loans. Qualification for offering financial 
assistance through third-party institutions should therefore be regarded as a positive signal by any 
prospective, risk-conscious franchisee. Neutral screening is a means to create a trustworthy fran-
chise business model and to reduce uncertainty in the franchisor’s fair conduct.30 The findings of 
tables 1 and 2 indicate that franchisors provide additional financial assistance as investment vol-
umes increase substantially. With the degree of investment uncertainty correlated positively to the 
size of the investment volume, franchisors seem to signal cooperative conduct through offering ad-
ditional financial support via independent third-party institutions. 
In summary, both contractual and financial concessions work to ease ex-ante barriers that could 
otherwise deter potential franchisees from joining especially systems requiring a high investment 
volume. Simultaneously they measure the franchisor’s ability to exercise coercive power against 
system members. As expressed in the IFA’s position, set out in footnote 27, limiting franchisor 
power by means of termination makes the punishment or the expulsion of detrimental system mem-
bers, and thus the maintenance of uniform quality standards, more difficult. Regarding the balance 
of power between a principal and an agent, in order to reduce the ex-ante uncertainty of franchisees, 
the franchisor consequently sacrifices part of his principal power. Doing this, he becomes more de-
pendent on an increasingly powerful agent. As a result of this kind of shift in power, the franchisor 
retains a smaller range of means to protect the good members of the system from harmful actions by 
inferior system members. Due to the importance of the franchisor as the central guardian of system 
quality, we suspect this net-loss in power to be detrimental to the franchisor and to all good franchi-
sees. Hence franchisors may substitute the loss of coercive power with a gain in non-coercive 
means also by effecting adequate organizational changes. 
                                                 
29 The United States Small Business Administration, www.sba.gov (10/10/04). 
30 The UFOC demands a description of any assistance available from the franchisor or its affiliates in financing the 
purchase of the franchise. 
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3   Managing the franchisee’s ex-post risk 
Just like any rational investor, a prospective franchisee will want to protect his investment against 
unwanted risks when joining a franchise chain.31 As demonstrated in the results of H1 and H2, fran-
chisors perform contractual and financial changes in order to create a more fair and trustworthy 
franchisor-franchisee relationship, which is supposed to guarantee restraint from franchisor ex-ante 
opportunism. The franchisor’s forfeiture of coercive power, which is a consequence of these meas-
ures, is detrimental in two respects: 
Firstly, both concessions – extending contractual terms, and using its reputation to acquire third-
party financial sources – shield the agents from exploitation only as long as the franchisor intends to 
manage and to grow the system for a time exceeding the duration of the franchise contracts. Both 
measures are of little value if the franchisor plays a one-shot game by attracting franchisees through 
signals of trust and by bankrupting the system immediately once enough members are aboard. All 
rational franchisees should therefore seek protection against franchisor opportunism occurring ex-
post of signing the contract as they are with safeguarding themselves from ex-ante opportunism. 
From the franchisor’s perspective, granting additional financial support through third-party sources 
works fine for securing against ex-ante risk (see H2) only. After a franchisor’s cash-out, a ruined 
reputation though will not hurt the principal much longer. Suffering from extra-debt related to in-
creased in-house financing on the other hand would serve as a burden even after the franchisor has 
terminated the business. According to the reluctant use of equity displayed in the data, financial 
concessions are, however, not applied to demonstrate the safeguarding from a franchisor’s oppor-
tunistic ex-post action. 
Secondly, shifting away the power from the franchisor by means of contractual and financial ad-
justments results in substantial changes in a chain’s economics. One extreme way of limiting fran-
chisor power is by making more difficult the principal’s ability to cancel a franchise contract 
through the introduction of legislation restricting termination of franchise contracts. Having intro-
duced franchise termination laws, Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991) found that franchisor give up on 
an important instrument of controlling quality standards and, at the outmost, of punishing miscon-
                                                 
31 We are fully aware that there are more risk factors for franchisees to consider prior to joining a system than just being 
exploited by an opportunistically acting franchisor. Obviously we picked one issue out of a broad spectrum that 
seemed central for us. Risk factors like choosing the wrong business concept, the wrong vicinity for the outlet or just 
the wrong time for starting and many more still remain problematic even after the perfectly fair franchisor has been 
identified. 
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duct by withdrawing the franchise agreement. As the cost of controlling the behavior and the per-
formance of system members increase, the franchise channel becomes less efficient and makes a 
prospective company-owned arm look more attractive.32 According to Brickley/Dark/Weisbach 
(1991), such a strong unilateral restriction of franchisor power results in decreased system effi-
ciency, in transfers of control away from the franchisor, and in significant wealth losses for the 
chain’s shareholders.33 Without taking appropriate counter-measures, the erosion of franchisor coer-
cive power appears to destabilize the franchisor-franchisee relationship and to be detrimental to the 
franchisor and to the franchisees. 
Apparently, successful franchise systems need to insure agents ex-ante and ex-post of signing the 
contract against opportunism by the principal. While the first is achieved via contractual and finan-
cial adjustments, any approach to insure agents against the second will simultaneously need to pro-
vide the franchisor with appropriate means to prevent a disadvantageous loss of overall power of 
the principal. According to the model developed by French/Raven (1959) and Hunt/Nevin (1974), a 
principal’s net power is defined by the sum of his gross power minus an agent’s countervailing 
power. The scope of coercive and non-coercive forces defines the strength of the gross power. As 
has been explained in section 2, non-coercive means are based on the franchisor’s ability to exercise 
legitimate, expert, referent and reward power. In contrast to coercive means of power, all of them 
are generally positive to the system performance. As Ehrmann/Spranger (2004, 2005a) reveal, sig-
nificant improvements of a system’s total quality are achievable as a rather pure franchise system is 
transformed into one that is more plurally structured. Plural franchise systems profit from signaling 
internal information to outsiders, from aligning formerly diverse interests between its actors, from 
accelerating the processes of innovation, and from fostering competition between franchise and 
company-owned units. Moreover, all of these benefits concerning total quality strongly increase a 
franchisor’s non-coercive power potential. Thus adjusting the organizational structure of franchised 
                                                 
32 Note the diametrical intentions that are behind a franchisors strategy to substitute franchisees with company-owned 
units as the first become economically less preferable (because of increased controlling costs as termination laws are 
adopted), and a franchisor managing growth by adding more company units than franchise ones in order to benefit 
from the advantages of a plural form structure! 
33 Other researchers have concluded that asymmetrical power distribution within cooperational arrangements stabilizes 
the entire system and therefore is one important success factor (Herrfeld 1998, Kuester 2000). Bonus/Wessels (1994) 
find power within franchise chains to be benefiting for all system members. Frazier/Summers (1986) and 
Sibley/Michie (1982) argue that vast franchisor power should not generally be abolished. It is rather the actual and in-
dividual usage of this power that determines the success of the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 
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and company-owned outlets and allowing for a more plurally organized franchise chain diminishes 
the risk of ex-post franchisor opportunism and results in a beneficial regaining of power by the fran-
chisor. 
Zooming in on this effect, the sources of shifts in power that apply to plural structures are fourfold: 
Firstly, every company-owned unit has to be set up by investments of the franchisor. Being a ra-
tional investor, the franchisor should avoid any self-investment if he has little confidence in the suc-
cess of his business model. The existence of company-owned operations therefore increases the 
franchisor’s financial dependence on the success of the business model. Operating company-owned 
units successfully serves as a signal of trust towards all agents. It substantially increases the franchi-
sor’s credibility34 and expands its own important legitimate power. Secondly, through the ownership 
of some units, the franchisor’s interests as a principal become more lined up with those of his 
agents.35 By aligning initially non-congruent profit schemes, the franchisor accepts the financial 
concerns of his franchisees and thus enhances, in their view, the perceived degree of expert power. 
Thirdly, the franchisor of a plural structure may benefit by each organizational form’s specific 
strengths to improve the innovation processes. While franchises are stronger in the exploration of 
opportunities, company-owned units prefer the exploitation of existing innovations.36 Thus by bal-
ancing both aspects through mixing the organizational forms, the system’s innovational power is 
raised. By accelerating innovation processes through the plural form, the franchisor simultaneously 
develops referent power. And finally, the plurally organized franchise chain creates a more com-
petitive environment where benchmarking franchisees against managers of company-owned units 
leads to increased system performance.37 By fostering such inner-firm competition, the franchisor 
gains on what Hunt/Nevin (1974) have called reward power. 
In total, the franchisor will strengthen his potential of non-coercive power when rearranging a fran-
chise chain’s organizational structure and emphasizing the company-owned distribution channel. 
Thus it is possible to increase the non-coercive powers through organizational changes and thereby 
to compensate for a loss of coercive powers caused by contractual and financial concessions. 
What needs to be explored empirically is whether franchisors use such organizational measures to 
                                                 
34 See Gallini/Lutz (1992), Michael (2000). 
35 See Lewin-Solomons (1999). 
36 See Sorenson/Sørensen (2001), March (1991).  
37 See Bradach (1997) and Bradach (1998).  
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insure agents against ex-post opportunism as they use contractual and financial means to eliminate 
the risk of ex-ante opportunism. As stated above, the franchisee’s risk exposure towards franchisor 
opportunism is supposed to be positively correlated with the size of the requested investment vol-
ume. If franchisors use the plural form as an organizational instrument to provide insurance against 
ex-post opportunism, the degree of franchising should therefore be negatively correlated to the size 
of the investment volume. 
 
H3:  The share of company-ownership is positively correlated with the investments 
asked of the franchisee. 
 
For this analysis, we characterize a chain’s organizational set-up as the percentage of franchised 
units out of the number of all outlets under a chain’s trademark (see “Lambda” in tables 1 and 2). 
For the year of 2003, the 343 chains of the data display a mean in Lambda of 92% and a standard 
deviation of 16%. The mean (standard deviation) for those (N=674) of the 925 chains of that organ-
izational data was available for 2003 corresponded with 89% (19%).38 In total, the regression results 
of tables 1 and 2 offer strong support for H3. For the sample applied, company ownership is signifi-
cantly positively correlated to the magnitude of the required investments. As the above arguments 
suggest, the more franchisees are supposed to invest in a franchise business, the higher the risk they 
will face, and thus the more the franchisor has to engage in company-ownership himself. 
Although we lack instruments to reveal sequential causalities of the selected parameters, the empiri-
cal results allow us to hypothesize over the pattern that evolves between the franchisor and his fran-
chisees: When joining a franchise chain, agents request credible insurance against franchisor oppor-
tunism. As the franchisee’s risks of suffering capital losses increases with rising investment vol-
umes, the quantity of insurance given by the franchisor needs to augment concurrently. By provid-
ing additional financial sources and long-term contracts as investment volumes increase, franchisors 
demonstrate abstinence from ex-ante opportunism. In turn though, these securities cause a loss of 
coercive franchisor power which weakens the necessary power asymmetry between the principal 
and his agents. By establishing a plural form structure, and engaging into company ownership as 
investment volumes rise, franchisors subsequently (need to) insure agents against detrimental ex-
                                                 
38 Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002) compute a mean Lambda of 67% (standard deviation 68%) for 521 chains from 
France. Lafontaine/Shaw (2005) receive a mean Lambda of 78% (71%) for 4842 U.S. and Canadian franchise chains.  
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post opportunism. Becoming more dependent on the system’s success, they will also protect all 
good members of the chain from deleterious behavior by opportunistic agents. Equally important, 
franchisors restore the former power asymmetry by gaining non-coercive powers due to the quality 
effects provided by plural franchise systems. While reducing ex-ante uncertainty of franchisees can 
be achieved through contractual and financial measures, only the introduction of an appropriate 
organizational structure seems to be powerful enough to insure agents against fatal ex-post oppor-
tunism.39 What remains to be analyzed is whether offering securities against opportunism and re-
fraining from agent exploitation is a rewarding franchise strategy. 
 
4   Consequences of cooperative franchisor management 
Any assessment of a business strategy will be naturally biased by two factors: First the definition of 
“success” will be subjective according to the preferences of the evaluator. And second the availabil-
ity of appropriate data will limit the choice of parameters along which success can be determined. 
Financial resources like balance sheets, income statements or stock prices are common means to 
evaluate the success of a business model.40 With a minority of all franchise firms being publicly 
traded at stock exchanges, other parameters need to be identified to measure the success of franchis-
ing strategies. We therefore propose employing the number of outlets and their long-term develop-
ment as indicators to reveal the success of a franchise chain.41 112 of the 925 chains contained in 
our sample display such information for the entire time since the survey of the Entrepreneur Maga-
zine was started in 1979. Covering 24 years of franchise development, these 112 chains suffice to 
analyze the efficiency of distinct organizational franchise strategies. 
A descriptive overview of the actual growth rates of these chains reveals very heterogeneous re-
                                                 
39 Franchise consultants regularly perceive the successful running of company-owned units to identify a cooperative 
franchisor. On the other hand, buying back franchise units, especially prime sites, and reconverting them into com-
pany stores is viewed as indicating an opportunistic franchisor. Such franchisors use company stores as a tactical in-
struments for appropriating the highest returns of the chain – a behavior strongly warned off by consultants. 
40 In an attempt to investigate how termination laws affect the wealth of the franchisor and the franchisee, Brick-
ley/Dark/Weisbach (1991) examined stock returns of Californian franchise firms around the introduction of these re-
strictions in California (p. 126-130). They obtained only 32 publicly traded companies of that appropriate data was 
available. 
41 It is widely accepted among researchers of franchising that increasing the number of outlets is a plausible parameter 
indicating success. Future research though will have to combine the number of outlets with the specific investment 
volume of each chain and relate the outcome to organizational structure. Due to this logic, opening one restaurant 
unit for about $1 million equals setting up 10 units for $100.000 each of a service concept franchisor. This aspect has 
been raised in a discussion with Rajiv Dant during EMNet 2005. 
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sults. On average, each chain of the sample accumulated more than 1200 stores and thus grew by 
nearly 500% over the period covered. The large standard variations (growth by stores: 3630, growth 
by percent: 2000%) indicate the diversity of the sample.42 
As argued above, franchisors put into operation financial, contractual and organizational adjust-
ments to their system in order to signal to their agents the franchisor’s abstinence from opportunis-
tic behavior. If these measures positively influence the development of the chain, those systems 
being governed rather by cooperative franchisors should achieve significantly stronger growth than 
those of less cooperative principals. According to the results in tables 1 and 2, a franchisor is per-
ceived to offer a higher amount of cooperation the more plurally the chain is structured. Concerning 
the efficiency of cooperative franchisor behavior, we therefore hypothesize:  
 
H4:  The degree of franchising (Lambda) is negatively correlated with absolute outlet 
growth. 
 
For the subsequent analysis of H4, the highly heterogeneous sample can be separated into three 
clusters of growth: The first set includes systems (N=31, 28%) of negative growth. From 1979 to 
2003, these chains, on average, grew by –40% in number of outlets. The second cluster (N=50, 
44%) contains chains of small to medium growth rates, growing by 157% in 24 years. The third set 
(N: 31, 28%) finally consists of systems that achieved extremely strong growth, surging by more 
than 1300% in outlets over the time covered.43 
As displayed in figure 1 below, the three sets reveal very distinct organizational structures. While 
strong (SG) and medium (MG) growth chains (sets 2 and 3) are plurally structured with a very simi-
lar degree of franchising, negatively (NG) growing systems (set 1) operated far fewer company-
owned units and almost completely relied on franchisees alone.44 
 
 
                                                 
42 Extreme values are: Growth in stores (Min –1302/Max 24432); Growth in percent (Min –89%/Max 16923%). 
43 Standard deviations are 3649% for the strong growth chains, 210% for the medium growth chains and 25% for the 
negatively growing chains. 
44 In 2003, SG-chains were franchised to 91% (standard deviation of 12%) and MG-chains to 89% (20%). NG-chains in 
contrast were franchised to 96% (6%) on average in that same year. 
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Figure 1. Absolute System Growth and Organizational Structure 
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Concentrating on the extreme examples of growth for sets 1 and 3, the results of the group statistics 
(table 3 below) and of the independent sample t-test (table B of appendix) reveal even more distinc-
tions in parameters beyond the degree of franchising. Apparently, the strongly growing chains are 
not only more plurally organized, but they also charge their franchisees a higher initial investment 
and offer longer terms for franchise contracts than their negatively growing competitors. On aver-
age, SG-chains offer greater financial support to their franchisees, both for in-house and for third-
party sources. 
Table 3. Group Statistics 
 Group* N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Lambda SG 31 .909 .11640 .02091 
  NG 31 .959 .05802 .01042 
Investment SG 31 1225.1 1964.82 352.89 
  NG 31 575.5 832.27 149.48 
Term SG 24 16.35 5.212 1.064 
  NG 28 12.57 5.397 1.020 
In-house SG 31 .84 1.594 .286 
  NG 30 .37 .556 .102 
Third-party SG 31 1.90 2.399 .431 
  NG 30 1.50 2.030 .371 
Finance SG 31 2.74 2.658 .477 
  NG 30 1.87 1.925 .351 
* SG: Strong Growth, NG: Negative Growth  
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The results of the independent sample t-test mark the differences of both extremes to be highly sig-
nificant concerning Lambda, Investment Volume and Terms. Diversities in financial support (In-
house, Third-party and Finance) are as expected (see the directions of t-values), but they lack statis-
tically sound significance. Correlations between the parameters are also as projected. Results of the 
Kendall’s Tau analysis are to be found in table C of the appendix. 
The results of all of these tests clearly support H4. Plural franchise chains of the dataset grow sig-
nificantly stronger, they request higher investment volumes and offer longer contracts than the 
rather purely structured systems. Interestingly, total outlet growth is fueled by an increase in fran-
chise and in company-owned units and not by a substitution of one form for the other.45 Other than 
the Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991) report for their sample, franchisors of the SG- and MG-chains 
successfully accompany contractual and financial concessions with beneficial organizational ad-
justments. As every new company-owned outlet requires the franchisor to invest in the system, he 
becomes more dependent on the chain’s success as the plural form takes over. The more the fran-
chisor requires the agent to invest in the system, the stronger is the signal that evolves from running 
company-owned units. Hence the franchisee’s ex-post risk of being exploited opportunistically is 
substantially lower when joining a plurally organized chain instead of the purely structured system. 
The data researched in this paper suggests that franchisees respect the franchisors’ signal for coop-
eration and reward such cooperative franchisor management by joining the chain in larger numbers. 
The findings of this paper correspond to transaction cost theory. Due to empirical data of Dahl-
strom/Nygaard (1999), intrachannel opportunism causes frictions stemming from costly bargaining, 
from monitoring and from maladaption. Bargaining costs result from negotiation between transact-
ing parties (Milgrom/Roberts 1991), monitoring costs are expenditures to guarantee the fulfillment 
of contractual obligations to the best interest of the channel members (Lal 1990) and maladaption is 
costly because of deficient communication and poor coordination between contracting partners 
(Reve 1986). Those costly frictions can be reduced by improving the quality of formalization and 
interfirm cooperation. While the level of formalization is determined by the scope of written fran-
chise contracts, its force is naturally limited by the inability of contracting partners to define rules 
ex-ante for every thinkable situation of a business relationship. For this reason interfirm cooperation 
is inevitably needed to accompany formalization, as it stabilizes and guides a partnership precisely 
                                                 
45 Compare table C of the appendix for the highly significant correlations between Total Growth-Growth_FU, Total 
Growth_Growth_FU and Growth_FU-Growth_CU. 
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during those situations which formalized contracts are unable to specify. Reducing franchisor op-
portunism in franchise channels, both ex-ante and ex-post of signing the contract, is therefore highly 
efficient and, as demonstrated, an important determinant of strong chain growth. 
 
5   Concluding remarks 
The purpose of the preceding pages has been to examine solutions to conflicts arising from asym-
metrical distribution of power between contracting partners of franchise systems. With a franchi-
sor’s net-power over his agents being greater than zero, franchisees initially anticipate uncertainty 
of being exploited opportunistically both ex-ante and ex-post of signing the franchise agreement. As 
has been demonstrated, franchisors meet rising agent uncertainty (which, for example, increases as 
the required investment volumes rises) by offering longer contractual terms as well as by providing 
additional monetary support to franchisees. Whereas the first instrument weakens the franchisor’s 
scope to terminate or to deny renewal of contract before the franchisee’s investment has been amor-
tized, the second puts a franchisor’s equity and reputation at stake if an agent is exploited opportu-
nistically. Thus both contractual and financial concessions effectively alleviate franchisee’s ex-ante 
barriers and make joining the system more attractive. 
The franchisor though, by lowering ex-ante barriers, automatically sacrifices part of his ability to 
exercise coercive power over his agents, which is detrimental if the franchisor’s role, of centrally 
guarding quality standards against harmful influence, is jeopardized. By increasing company own-
ership, franchisors are able to re-establish the former power asymmetry. The advantages of such 
organizational changes are twofold: Firstly, they gain non-coercive means of power through the 
quality effects of the plural form. Secondly, by becoming more dependent on the system’s success, 
they need to rely more closely on cooperative interaction with all of their agents. Any emphasis of 
cooperative behavior thus greatly reduces the agent’s risk of being exploited opportunistically. 
Concerning a chain’s economics, exchanging a franchisor’s coercive means of power with non-
coercive means results in truly buoyant economical benefits for the system. Chains that credibly 
signal cooperation generate significantly stronger growth, both for the company-owned and the 
franchise outlet arms as well as for the entire system. Thus to both franchisors and franchisees, the 
recommendations based on the findings of this paper are straightforward: 
Franchisees on the one hand need to acknowledge that a strong franchisor in nothing to be afraid off 
in the first place (Frazier/Summers 1986; Sibley/Michie 1982). Franchisors hold centralized power 
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to achieve concerted effort from all channel members towards meeting a chain’s primary challenges 
of adding new units to the system, of maintaining uniformity across all outlets, responding locally 
when appropriate and keeping the system flexible for adaptation to new threats or opportunities 
(Bradach 1998). Without the ability to exercise the utmost coercive power, the franchisor exposes 
the entire system, including all compliant members, to be vulnerable to manipulation by a minority 
of non-compliant agents. 
Franchisors, on the other hand, need to anticipate and to manage the franchisee’s uncertainty of 
being exploited opportunistically by the potential asymmetry of franchisor power. Therefore they 
should initially use coercion with the greatest reluctance and do so only when other means of exert-
ing influence have failed to achieve a satisfactory result (Frazier/Summers 1986). Using non-
coercive means while coercive force is available will increase both franchisee compliance 
(Lusch/Brown 1982) and the satisfaction level (Hunt/Nevin 1974). Additionally, cooperative man-
agement will relax intrachannel frictions and thus prevent costly litigation (Gaski 1984). With a 
cooperative signaling function, building a more plurally organized system does even more than just 
giving the franchisor additional non-coercive means in his arsenal. Taken together, the empirical 
results of this study suggest the cooperative aspects of the plural form reward the franchisor through 
superior outlet growth as systems mature. 
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Appendix 
Table A. Pearson Correlation Table N:343 
Pe
ar
so
n 
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Fa
ct
or
s*
**
 
Investment Terms In-house Third-party Finance Lambda 
CC 1 ,246** -,248** ,297** ,164** -,203** 
Sig. . ,000 ,000 ,000 ,002 ,000 
In
ve
sm
en
t 
N 343 320 343 343 343 343 
CC ,246** 1 -,196** ,244** ,141* -,022 
Sig. ,000 . ,000 ,000 ,011 ,700 
Te
rm
s 
N 320 320 320 320 320 320 
CC -,248** -,196** 1 -,426** ,178** ,011 
Sig. ,000 ,000 . ,000 ,001 ,832 
In
-h
ou
se
 
N 343 320 343 343 343 343 
CC ,297** ,244** -,426** 1 ,814** -,026 
Sig. ,000 ,000 ,000 . ,000 ,628 
Th
ird
 P
ar
ty
 
N 343 320 343 343 343 343 
CC ,164** ,141* ,178** ,814** 1 -,021 
Sig. ,002 ,011 ,001 ,000 . ,695 
Fi
na
nc
e 
N 343 320 343 343 343 343 
CC -,203** -,022 ,011 -,026 -,021 1 
Sig. ,000 ,700 ,832 ,628 ,695 . 
La
m
bd
a 
N 343 320 343 343 343 343 
* significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level,  
*** CC = Correlation Coefficient, Sig. = Sig. (2-tailed), N = number of systems 
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Table B. Independent Sample t-Test 
  Levene’s Test* for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F Sig, T Df 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean  
difference 
95% Confidence  
Interval of the Mean 
  
Eq
ua
l v
ar
i-
an
ce
s*
* 
            Lower Upper 
A 10.334 .002 -2.11 60 .038 -.049461 -.09619 -.00273 
La
m
bd
a 
NA   -2.11 44.043 .040 -.049461 -.09654 -.00238 
A 3.751 .057 1.69 60 .095 649.52 -117.08 1416.12 
In
ve
st
-
NA   1.69 40.430 .098 649.52 -124.79 1423.83 
A .038 .847 2.56 50 .014 3.78 .815 6.75 
Te
rm
 
NA   2.56 49.260 .013 3.78 .822 6.74 
A 17.135 .000 1.53 59 .130 .47 -.144 1.08 
In
- NA   1.55 37.410 .129 .47 -.143 1.08 
A 3.754 .057 .71 59 .482 .40 -.737 1.54 
Th
ird
-
NA   .71 57.978 .481 .40 -.735 1.54 
A 9.115 .004 1.46 59 .147 .88 -.317 2.06 
Fi
na
nc
e 
NA   1.47 54.709 .146 .88 -.313 2.06 
* If the significance value for the Levene test is high (typically greater than 0.05), the results that assume equal 
variances for both groups apply. If the significance value for the Levene test  is low instead, the results that do 
not assume equal variances for both groups are relevant.  
** A = equal variance assumed; NA= equal variance not assumed 
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Table C. Correlation values N :112 
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CC 1,000 -,112 ,112 ,207** -,025 ,078 ,107 ,898** ,212** 
Sig. . ,097 ,080 ,007 ,743 ,283 ,126 ,000 ,001 
To
ta
l G
ro
w
th
 
N 112 112 112 95 108 108 108 112 112 
CC -,112 1,000 -,201** -,138 ,096 ,070 ,124 -,036 -,422** 
Sig. ,097 . ,003 ,088 ,232 ,355 ,094 ,594 ,000 
La
m
bd
a 
N 112 112 112 95 108 108 108 112 112 
CC ,112 -,201** 1,000 ,366** -,442** ,167* -,010 ,129* ,019 
Sig. ,080 ,003 . ,000 ,000 ,021 ,881 ,044 ,766 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
N 112 112 112 95 108 108 108 112 112 
CC ,207** -,138 ,366** 1,000 -,291** ,248** ,122 ,204** ,093 
Sig. ,007 ,088 ,000 . ,001 ,003 ,138 ,007 ,233 
Te
rm
 
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
CC -,025 ,096 -,442** -,291** 1,000 -,228** ,171(*) -,040 -,020 
Sig. ,743 ,232 ,000 ,001 . ,007 ,037 ,595 ,796 
In
-h
ou
se
 
N 108 108 108 95 108 108 108 108 108 
CC ,078 ,070 ,167* ,248** -,228** 1,000 ,811** ,091 -,135 
Sig. ,283 ,355 ,021 ,003 ,007 . ,000 ,208 ,065 
Th
ird
-p
ar
ty
 
N 108 108 108 95 108 108 108 108 108 
CC ,107 ,124 -,010 ,122 ,171* ,811** 1,000 ,117 -,149* 
Sig. ,126 ,094 ,881 ,138 ,037 ,000 . ,096 ,038 
Fi
na
nc
e 
N 108 108 108 95 108 108 108 108 108 
CC ,898** -,036 ,129* ,204** -,040 ,091 ,117 1,000 ,108 
Sig. ,000 ,594 ,044 ,007 ,595 ,208 ,096 . ,098 
G
ro
w
th
_F
U
 
N 112 112 112 95 108 108 108 112 112 
CC ,212** -,422** ,019 ,093 -,020 -,135 -,149* ,108 1,000 
Sig. ,001 ,000 ,766 ,233 ,796 ,065 ,038 ,098 . 
G
ro
w
th
_C
U
 
N 112 112 112 95 108 108 108 112 112 
** Correlation significant on 1% level; * Correlation significant on 5% level. 
*** CC = Correlation Coefficient, Sig. = Sig. (2-tailed), N = number of systems 
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IV   A Franchisor Decision Matrix for Structuring the Chain 
 
Overview 
 
? Early research work theorized franchising to exist because Hybridal Form Benefits (HFB) are 
achieved by the franchisor. Compared to the full hierarchy, franchising was held to reduce 
agency costs, to overcome resource scarcity and to enable risk sharing. Lately, the focus has 
shifted to an enquiry into the parallel use of franchise and company-owned outlets – the plural 
form – to provide the chain with Plural Form Synergies (PFS). More so than wholly franchised 
or entirely integrated systems, plural forms may align the interests of diverse actors, signal prof-
itability, enhance innovation speed and increase inter-firm competition.  
 
? Due to costs specific to each form, net HFB (HFBnet) and net PFS (PFSnet) evolve as organiza-
tional decision variables.We analyze both HFB and PFS, we review their influence on the proc-
ess of structuring the chain and develop a decision matrix to aid franchisors improve their distri-
butional setting.  
 
? Accordingly, if neither positive HFBnet nor PFSnet are realized, full ownership is efficient. In a 
state of positive HFBnet only, the chain should be fully franchised. If only PFSnet are positive, the 
chain will be structured either plurally or fully company-owned depending on the impact of pos-
sibly negative HFBnet. For a positive HFBnet and PFSnet finally, plural forms prevail.1 
                                                 
1 Earlier drafts of this paper haven been published in the proceedings of ISOF 2006 and in the SSRN Working Paper 
Series: http://ssrn.com/abstract=764147. 
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1   Introduction 
The road international research on franchising has taken since the mid 1970s up to the present is 
roughly divisible into three consecutive stages. Departing from the Coaseian dichotomy (Coase 
1937) of carrying out transactions either via markets or via firms, stage one attempted to explain the 
mere existence of the franchise phenomenon as a form somewhere in-between these extremes. Due 
to the passage of time, the available literature today have gone beyond those earlier developed the-
ses. Compared to a fully hierarchically structured system, franchising has been argued to reduce 
agency costs (Rubin 1978, Brickley/Dark 1987, Norton 1988a, Minkler 1990, 1992, Brickley et al. 
1991, Lafontaine 1992, Thompson 1992), to overcome resource scarcity for rapid market penetra-
tion (Oxenfeldt/Kelly 1969, Ozeanne/Hunt 1971, Hunt 1973, Caves/Murphy 1976, Lillis et al. 1976, 
Hunt 1977, Lafontaine 1991, Thompson 1994) and/or to enable the franchisor to share risks with his 
franchisees (Martin 1988, Chaudhuri et al. 2001). 
In broader sense, franchising with both its market- and firm-like attributes is perceived to exist like 
any other hybrid form because of its higher efficiency in running the economic system (Arrow 
1969) under specific environmental parameters (Williamson 1991). In other words, the Hybrid 
Form Benefits (HFB) are supposed to be greater than its Hybrid Form Costs (HFC). The drawback 
of these arguments though – that also marks the (preliminary) termination of the first stage of re-
search – is that HFB, and thus their explanatory momentum, were thought to partly peter out as a 
system matures. In view of that, Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1969) and Hunt (1973) have early postulated – 
but openly doubted – that franchise chains would ultimately revert to wholly owned systems. 
Stage two of the research on franchising has therefore dealt with empirically testing Oxenfeldt and 
Kelly’s thesis of ownership redirection. As of their analyses, neither Lafontaine/Kaufmann (1994), 
Lafontaine/Shaw (1999), Pénard et al. (2002) nor Ehrmann/Spranger (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 
2005d) have found significant tendencies towards ownership redirection, not even for matured sys-
tems where initial franchise contracts had already expired and a renewal was up for decision. More-
over all of those researchers confirmed that the majority of franchisors consistently operate both 
franchise and company-owned units side by side, the extremes ranging from a franchisee-to-
company-owned ratio of 2:1 (Pénard et al. 2002) up to almost 9:1 (Ehrmann/Spranger 2005b). 
In what has become the third and current phase of analysis, researchers like Gallini/Lutz (1992), 
Bradach (1998), Lewin-Solomons (1997, 1998, 1999), Lafontaine/Shaw (1999), Sorenson/Sørensen 
(2001) and Ehrmann/Spranger (2004a) have since begun to examine the franchisor’s motivation of 
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constantly employing what Bradach (1997) initially labeled the plural form, i.e. the parallel use of at 
least two distinct organizational forms under one common trademark and management. The usual 
argument of these scientists is that franchisors of plurally organized systems may, under certain 
conditions, realize Plural Form Synergies (PFS) which make the sum of the distributional arms 
more valuable than their added individual values. Accordingly the plural form is chosen as long as 
PFS exceed the associated Plural Form Costs (PFC). At the current status of this journey of research 
though, it has remained unexplained why competing chains of the same industry are still managed 
under sharply distinct organizational doctrines. 
While, to name just two examples, McDonald’s, as the mother of all franchise systems, has been 
plurally organized since long ago, the number one franchise system over the last four years2, sand-
wich maker Subway, is so clearly a full franchise organization that it promotes its fully franchised 
structure literally everywhere – even on each of their napkins. Furthermore, numerous systems 
again have fully integrated structures (i.e. are company-owned), like for instance many chains in the 
food retailing industry. We believe the reason for this explanatory deficit is twofold. 
Firstly, both Hybrid Form Benefits and Plural Form Synergies have not yet been combined into one 
single model. And secondly, the meaning of the constraint “under certain conditions”, pointing to 
the cost of both forms, i.e. HFC and PFC, have so far been undervalued. To fill this gap, we will 
explain those aspects leading to fully franchised, plurally organized and fully company-owned 
chains over the course of this paper. Hence our review covers aspects of hybrid forms (section 2), 
reviews the influence of the so-called franchise life-cycle (section 3) and touches on plural form 
characteristics (section 4). These findings are then combined into one model (section 5), which is 
aimed at guiding the practitioner to choose the appropriate distribution structure: either hierarchi-
cally, or hybridally, or plurally. We then (section 6) relate our model to the dynamics of franchise 
life-cycles and explain how organizational forms may be sustained while changing entrepreneurial 
challenges may alter organizational imperatives over time. This writing concludes (section 7) with 
some applied implications that our analyses provide to general franchisor management. 
 
 
                                                 
2 See the yearly Entrepreneur Magazine’s ranking of franchise chains for 2006 at www.entrepreneur.com. 
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2   Hybrid form characteristics of franchising 
Pure franchise chains organizationally combine decentralized ownership and control, at the final 
production and/or distribution level, with a centralized management of the somewhat general tasks, 
ideally fostering system growth, marketing the common brand name, supervising outlet uniformity, 
directing system-wide adaptation and capturing, concentrating and applying existing know-how. 
Other than hierarchically governed company-owned systems, pure franchise chains combine fea-
tures of two organizing methods – prices and hierarchy – within one institution, i.e. the firm. Be-
cause of personal risk bearing via residual ownership, franchisees are bound to the chain by a firm-
like franchise contract, but they are motivated and directed via market-like price constraints. Re-
garding the institutional continuum presented by Williamson (1991), pure franchise chains are lo-
cated in-between the polar modes of pure markets and pure firms as hybrid organizational forms. 
For a permanent use of such forms, which we claim to be apparent due to the international spread of 
franchise chains, they must defeat rival arrangements in organizational efficiency. Implicitly devel-
oped in the early work of Coase (1937), such efficiency has been defined as generating minimal 
transactions costs (Williamson 1975) – a term later broadened to the economizing of organization 
costs (Hennart 1993). Considering the hybrid form’s benefits against its costs should therefore suf-
fice to decide which structure is the most appropriate for the chain. 
 
2.1   Hybrid form benefits 
Most efforts explaining franchisee ownership have built on the deficiencies of fixed wage contracts. 
One important issue of such contracts is how to control the suitability of conduct of the agent ex-
post of signing the agreement, an action generally costly to the principal. By sharing the outlet 
profit with the agent via the franchisee’s residual ownership, harmful behavioral options such as 
shirking or exercising further opportunistic actions are largely reduced. The franchisee simply will 
share in those costs that come with every universal act of damage. According to the reasoning of 
Rubin (1978, p. 226) and others (see above), franchising is supposed to be efficient because it re-
duces monitoring costs that would exist to “avoid [an agent’s] shirking and excessive consumption 
of leisure” in company ownership. 
Minkler (1990, 1992, p. 243) has extended this view by proposing that franchisors require specific 
local information such as consumer preferences, local supply and infrastructure etc., whose acquisi-
tion costs increase with “the unfamiliarity, heterogeneity and volatility of local markets”. Although 
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we question Minkler’s assumption that franchisees “know” more than managers of company-owned 
units, it is plausible that they are more willing to pass on detailed knowledge to the franchisor as 
they, other than line managers, benefit both directly (outlet revenue) and indirectly (brand name 
recognition) from enhanced business success. Following Minkler, franchising is supposed to be 
more efficient as the franchisor’s expenses for acquiring local information, which otherwise would 
be spent on third-party research facilities or on incentives to managers of company-owned units, are 
reduced substantially. 
Another prominent approach to explain the existence of franchising states that resource shortages, 
restricting rapid growth of purely company-owned systems, are alleviated by the provision of both 
expansion capital and managerial talent with the addition of every new franchisee who comes on 
board (Oxenfeldt/Kelly 1969, Ozeanne/Hunt 1971, Hunt 1973, Thompson 1994)3. Quickly reaching 
a critical firm size is important for two reasons: Firstly, fixed costs of system overhead for develop-
ing, standardizing, marketing and controlling a network of decentralized distribution units will only 
be acceptably competitive when shared among a large number of outlets (Caves/Murphy 1976). 
And secondly, with every new point-of-sale adding consumer recognition, increased brand name 
value will gradually raise the turnover of every single outlet and hence that of the entire chain (Car-
ney/Gedajlovic 1991). 
A third explanation of franchising has been presented by Martin (1988) and Chaudhuri et al. (2001) 
who propose that franchisors act like risk managers when choosing an organizational form for a 
prospect site. As locations with highly volatile sales are thought to be both more risky and expen-
sive to monitor, supposedly they are more likely to pass these on to franchisees. On the other hand 
those more stable sites, which therefore need less frequent monitoring, are retained and managed as 
company-owned outlets. Ultimately, a franchisor’s risk aversion could motivate him to withdraw 
from any direct risk of distribution by choosing a pure franchise arrangement, retaining not more 
than the duties of general management for himself. 
Summarizing these arguments, franchising is thought to outperform full ownership as it reduces the 
franchisor’s costs for monitoring agents and for gathering important local information. Furthermore 
                                                 
3 Rubin (1978) has questioned the efficiency of franchising as a means for capital acquisition. Since investing in a single 
outlet is supposed to be riskier than buying shares of a portfolio from all outlets in a chain, franchisors would have to 
reward this additional risk and thus raising capital by selling franchises would be inefficient. Rubin though does not 
account for the franchisee’s extra effort which is vital to the system success and only realized via highly specific in-
vestments such as buying a franchise outlet (Lafontaine 1992). 
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franchising is supposed to increase system growth by providing scarce resources, namely capital 
and outlet management, and to decrease a franchisor’s specific risk of distribution by actively pre-
selecting sites due to their more favorable individual risk profiles. However, it has been acknowl-
edged that these benefits are accompanied by certain costs of the franchise format. 
 
2.2   Hybrid form costs 
Due to their different reward mechanism, hybrid forms like franchising face organizational costs 
that differ from those of pure hierarchies. While managers of company-owned units receive a fixed 
salary in return for a contractually predefined amount of work input, franchisees are rewarded rela-
tive to their accomplished work output. Following Hennart (1993, p. 529), “each form therefore has 
its own biases”. Under the hierarchy, where individuals like employees are paid to follow direc-
tives, they have a stronger incentive to shirk on their effort simply by working less than agreed 
upon.4 Using price mechanisms in franchising results in the opposite bias, so that they (the franchi-
sees) are driven to cheat on their true effort in order to reduce the principal’s share of the output and 
maximize their own. The less both parties are properly supervised, the higher will be the enticement 
for shirking and cheating. 
Franchisees are able to cheat on their work output in two ways: Firstly, by offering lower than stan-
dard quality they may free ride on the brand name’s value and thus on behalf of all other system 
members. As Norton (1988b) has explained, such danger of free riding is especially high where 
repeat customers constitute only a small portion of all unit sales like on freeways, railway stations 
or tourist areas.  
Secondly, franchisees may be reluctant to follow franchisor initiatives that may be promising from a 
system perspective while their positive value to each franchisee is uncertain or even completely 
lacking. Such resistance is most likely to occur toward investments with spillover effects for co-
members of the chain. National promotion events financed by all franchisees for example benefit 
the entire chain while the single franchisee will only appropriate part of the return of his investment 
(Carney/Gedajlovic 1991). As for the imperative of strict uniformity across all outlets, both free 
riding on quality and reluctance to follow strategic conduct can be fatal to the franchisor and need 
                                                 
4 Certainly there may exist highly motivated managers of company-owned units who do not exploit the potential of 
agent opportunism to its maximal scope. Ideally, our argument assumes the full spectrum available to the franchisee 
due to contractual incentives and control mechanisms. 
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to be dealt with via franchisee control and advisory or, in the worst case, through expensive and 
time-consuming litigation. The more customers are left unsatisfied as rebellious franchisees mess 
up their business, the more seriously the chain’s reputation will suffer and the more acutely all the 
other agents of the system will be hurt. 
 
3   Implications of the franchise life-cycle thesis 
In regard to the benefits and costs of hybrid forms, determining ownership patterns in distribution 
networks should function rather predictably. The franchisor needs to consider the costs of hybrid 
form against its benefits5, so that, following Carney/Gedajlovic (1991, p. 609) “it is this trade-off 
which leads the franchiser to own and operate their outlets in a discriminating way”. Both general 
organization science (e.g. Ouchi 1980, Williamson 1991, Hennart 1993, Menard 2002) and fran-
chise theory (e.g. Rubin 1978, Brickley/Dark 1987, Klein 1995) have supported this view over the 
last two decades. 
In conflict with such a process stands what researchers like Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1969), Hunt (1973) 
and Lillis et al. (1976) have presented within their model of a franchise life cycle. As chains expand 
in number of outlets, they state, former restrictions, goals, capabilities and opportunities are altered 
and finally structural changes must follow. A mature franchisor increasing the density of outlets in 
specific local markets will eventually face lower costs of monitoring and of gathering local informa-
tion. In addition, growth will make previously scarce resources, like capital and managers, become 
more readily available and diminish the impact of operating an outlet at a rather risky location. Con-
cerning the trade-off situation, net benefits of hybrid forms should continue to wane as the system 
approaches maturity, making franchising the less desirable option for mature chains. In what has 
become known as the thesis of ownership redirection, Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1969, p. 69) have formu-
lated it as follows: “We will contend […] that most successful franchise systems will end up as al-
most wholly-owned chains; we will argue that franchising is advantageous to a successful franchi-
sor mainly during the infancy and adolescence of the enterprise and even thereafter for the exploita-
tion of marginal locations.” 
 
                                                 
5 In part this aspect has been discussed by Brickley/Dark (1987) and Carney/Gedajlovic (1991). They recommend 
weighing off agency costs from free-riding, inefficient investment and quasi-rent appropriation against monitoring 
benefits from franchising. 
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As a result, hybrid forms like pure franchising and plural structures should be of limited use during 
the growth period of a system, returning to nearly full company-owned arrangements at some point 
as the chain ages. Patterns where franchising dominates and company-ownership plays a minor but 
significant role should, according to this reasoning, be observable during a transition time of system 
expansion only. As displayed below, empirical results reveal a greatly different reality. 
The data used to compile figure 1 portrays the development of 925 US-franchise chains of which 
the oldest have been tracked since 1979 by the Entrepreneur Magazine. On average the systems of 
our sample franchise 84% of their stores and run 16% of them under company-ownership in 2004. 
Comparable figures have been reported by Lafontaine/Shaw (2001) with 78% and, earlier, by the 
International Franchise Association (IFA) (1994) with 80% franchising. Clearly figure 1 does not 
indicate a shift towards an increased used of company ownership as systems gain business experi-
ence and expand in number of outlets. 
Figure 1.  Ownership redirection tendencies from 1981-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These findings are also supported by studies of Lafontaine/Kaufmann (1994), Lafontaine/Shaw 
(1999) and Pénard et al. (2002). Neither of them has found evidence supporting ownership redirec-
tion. Even as initial franchise contracts expire and franchisors were able to buy back franchised out-
lets, ownership does not become more dominant (Ehrmann/Spranger 2005b). Rather than integrat-
ing their outlets during maturity, those firms reviewed maintain a large share of franchising, accom-
panied by a minor but significant portion of company-owned outlets. Remarkably, even pure finan-
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cial reasoning would commend a majority share of company ownership in a firm’s mature stages. 
While Shelton (1967) and Boeckenholt/Wiens (2001) have argued that franchise units realize higher 
revenues per unit, company-owned stores are ultimately more profitable to the franchisor (Hunt 
1973, Ehrmann/Spranger 2005c). Thus it remains unclear so far why, even during the late stages of 
their entrepreneurial life, a major proportion of franchise chains prefers to be plurally organized, 
why a minority chooses to remain fully franchised and why nearly none attempt to replace franchis-
ing entirely with company-ownership. This puzzle will not be solved as long as franchising and 
company-ownership are understood as rival forms and the choice of organizational structure is re-
garded in either-or-terms only. Explaining the static existence and dynamic continuity of hybrid and 
plural forms will require the acknowledgement of a theory that incorporates mixtures of franchising 
and company-ownership that provide synergetic effects which strengthen as the chain matures. 
 
4   Plural form characteristics of franchising 
The theory of the plural form as initialized by Bradach (1997) accounts for synergies accomplished 
as company-owned and franchised stores are run simultaneously. In contrast to the theory of hybrid 
form characteristics, the plural form idea argues that organizational structure is not the outcome of a 
multitude of singular decisions, each concerning the optimal setting for a particular site. Rather by 
franchising some stores and owning others, franchisors are able to achieve dynamic efficiency 
through overcoming informational asymmetries, aligning diverse interests, balancing innovation 
streams and advancing inter-firm competition – all of benefit the chain and are unlikely to be real-
ized in a homogeneous system. Still, plural forms incorporate drawbacks as well; the greatest of 
which, compared to pure forms, lies in increased and costly organizational complexity. 
 
4.1   Plural form synergies 
The first plural form synergy relates to the resource scarcity thesis. It assumes a quick roll-out of the 
franchise concept to be necessary in order to achieve economies of scale and to raise outlet revenues 
via an enhanced consumer brand name recognition. While selling the franchise concept, especially 
young franchisors without a winning financial record will face reluctant franchisees questioning the 
soundness of the business concept concerning profitability and consumer acceptance. According to 
Gallini/Lutz (1992), the franchisor is able to overcome such information asymmetry by signaling 
commitment in the business concept through owning and running a proportion of the outlets him-
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self. As Ehrmann/Spranger (2005b) propose, such company-owned elements within chains con-
vince external partners of the system’s success and assist franchisors in attracting franchisees espe-
cially during the start-up and growth phases of the system. 
Secondly, the occurrence of different income patterns enjoyed by franchisees and the franchisor 
may result in costly conflicts between contracting partners. While franchisees are motivated to 
maximize outlet profit, franchisors at the outset prefer to maximize an outlet’s revenue as they 
benefit from a marginal royalty rate. By running units himself, the franchisor will bear the full con-
sequences of all strategic measures and is likely to refrain from actions that seem preferable for 
maximizing revenues of the entire system but are disadvantageous for maximizing each outlet’s 
profit. According to Lewin-Solomons (1999), a franchisor using the plural form will balance the 
powers of the chain with those of the franchisees, a process that counteracts the agent’s uncertainty 
of opportunistic principal behavior and facilitates a trustful interaction with current and potential 
franchisees. 
A third important aspect of operating plurally has been advanced by Lewin-Solomons (1997) and 
Sorenson/Sørensen (2001) who find interaction between two organizational modes to accelerate and 
progress a chain’s innovational activities. While franchisees will exercise more initiative to advance 
innovation themselves, company owned units are necessary to give the franchisor both sufficient 
incentive and power to evaluate and to market such opportunities. 
Finally, Bradach (1997) has emphasized the plural form’s importance for creating a competitive 
environment between the two distribution channels. With a precise knowledge of financial figures 
drawn from their operation of company units, the franchisor is able to initiate and to evaluate fran-
chisees (and vice versa) with high-class goals. Benchmarking the results of franchise outlets with 
those of company stores will support internal competition and may increase the overall system per-
formance. 
According to these arguments, the plural form is superior to pure franchising as divergent interest of 
franchisor and franchisee are harmonized and as franchisors are able to signal trust in the business 
concept to external agents. With innovation processes being accelerated and total performance be-
ing improved through benchmarking one arm of the system against the other, the plural form 
equally succeeds over pure company-owned arrangements. As operating a plural form will make the 
management of the entire firm more difficult though, plural form synergies are also accompanied by 
costs. 
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4.2   Plural form costs 
The costs associated with plural forms are mainly caused by a higher complexity of the parallel 
running of two distributional arms rather than just a single one in the case of pure franchising or 
pure company-ownership.6 As Bradach (1997) reports, franchisees have to be managed vastly dif-
ferent than managers of company-owned units. While unit managers are treated rather as employees 
of the chain, franchisees are understood more like business partners. Hence coordination of the first 
is assigned to district executives whereas that of the latter is the job of field consultants. In compari-
son to the franchisees’ ability to apply personal initiative, the controlling of company managers on 
quality standards requires more frequent local visits and thus proportionally more staff than for 
checking on franchisees.7 A plural franchisor will need to tailor contracts, communication means, 
controlling instruments, financial reporting, quality surveillance, human resource supply, etc. to 
each form’s individual requirements. Since coordination becomes even more critical with more 
units being added, the franchisor may face increasing plural form costs as coordinating the system 
becomes more complex during phases of maturity. 
 
5   A decision matrix for franchisors 
Neither one-dimensional analysis of HFB and PFS will explain the full spectrum of organizational 
structures observed in reality. While concentrating on HFB alone will not suffice to confirm the 
stability of plural forms, relying on PFS only will not account for the existence of pure franchise 
chains. In order to derive applicable strategies for realistic conditions, we therefore propose a dis-
crete two-scale model based on net outcomes of HFB and PFS. Both net values result from deduct-
ing the franchisor’s organizational costs from its benefits for each arrangement. These resultant 
amounts will turn out either positive or neutral to negative. Consequently we receive a four-
quadrant matrix displayed below as figure 2 which, depending on the sum of HFBnet and PFSnet, 
advises the franchisor either to franchise, to own, or to plurally structure the chain. Notice that for 
the sake of distinct classification, we argue from a static position when presenting the four quad-
                                                 
6 This aspect has been emphasized by Jeff Bradach during a discussion with the author. 
7 In what Bradach (1998, p. 46) calls “the span of control”, he compares the resources in chain operator’s field staff 
needed to monitor franchisee and company-owned units. While for instance at Kentucky Fried Chicken every fran-
chise consultant covers 15 franchisees or a total of 90 franchise units, one company area manager is needed to monitor 
6 company-owned units. 
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rants of the matrix (section 5.1). In a second step (section 5.2), we then account for changes in envi-
ronmental settings of chains by taking up a dynamic view of the life-cycle problem and its charac-
teristics. 
 
5.1   The quadrants of the matrix 
Quadrant I of the matrix presents cases in which HFBnet are positive and PFSnet are neutral or nega-
tive. While the principal will, for instance, be able to profit from franchising by benefiting from the 
franchisee’s initiative and resources or by transferring risk away from himself, simultaneous com-
pany-ownership is more costly than beneficial for this setting. For example, business concepts of 
low investment requirements typically show positive HFBnet and neutral to negative PFSnet. Other 
than large hotel or full-service restaurant chains, small points of sale are highly dependent on the 
personal work input of the franchisee and that of his family members. Additionally, potential fran-
chisees are more easily to acquire the lower the price for buying a franchise unit is. Thus the low-
investment chain will not depend as much on signaling profitability and aligning franchisor-
franchisee interests through company-ownership as a high investment concept does. Profiting less 
from plural form benefits, while PFC would still exist, will result in neutral to negative PFSnet. With 
exceptions where franchise statutes require a minimum of company-ownership8, quadrant-1-chains 
thus will ultimately be structured as nearly pure forms of franchising. 
Quadrant II describes a setting for which both HFBnet and PFSnet are neutral to negative. For such 
cases, franchising does not result in economic advantages or, if it does, they are fully (over-
)compensated for by the accompanying costs. One reason for the existence of concepts belonging to 
quadrant II may be that their agent’s personal work input has close to no influence on keeping unit 
sales high. For industries like food retailing, maximum revenues are much more determined by the 
low pricing of goods than through outstanding service quality offered by highly motivated (franchi-
see) store managers. The surge of food discounters like Aldi or Lidl in Germany over the last two 
decades has well documented the success of fully integrated systems in a quadrant-II-setting. As 
long as it is primary to ensure the agent’s proper conduct and to make him execute predefined rou-
tine work, hierarchical structures are sufficiently efficient. Without personal initiative being an im-
                                                 
8 For instance the German Franchise Association requires each franchisor to own and operate at least one unit by him-
self. Relating to a large number of franchise units though, the ownership of one required unit does not demonstrate a 
substantial commitment towards company ownership. 
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portant aspect of the unit’s success, neither franchising nor a plural form is able to outperform full 
ownership. Thus for quadrant-II settings, franchising as a high incentive organizational form is only 
the second best choice and chains will be organized as fully integrated hierarchies. 
Figure 2.  Decision matrix to franchising 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For quadrant-III-cases, a franchisor finds himself with HFBnet being neutral to negative while posi-
tive PFSnet are achieved. This, for instance, applies to high investment chains that locate their out-
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ing effects, or the alignment of diverse interests, may result in efficient PFSnet, the hybrid form’s 
costs of free riding or reluctance to follow financial and strategic franchisor conduct have to be sub-
tracted. Thus for chains facing a quadrant-III-situation, the franchisor needs to weigh the advantage 
of PFSnet against the drawback of negative HFBnet. When the latter outweigh the PFSnet, he will run 
the system through full company-ownership. With the benefits of the PFSnet compensating for the 
disadvantageous HFBnet although a plural structure will be best. 
Finally, quadrant IV typifies settings in which the franchisor enjoys both positive PFSnet and 
HFBnet. Many franchisors of quick-service restaurants belong to this group; most famous among 
them are chains like McDonalds, Carl’s Jr., Hardee’s, Denny’s, Wendy’s, Applebee’s or YUM. For 
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5.2   The dynamic aspects of the decision matrix 
As demonstrated by the decision matrix, static organizational structure is determined by the abso-
lute sum of two sets of variables, which have been identified as the characteristics of hybrid 
(HFBnet) and plural (PFSnet) forms. Hence we have partially answered our research question of sec-
tion 3, which required interpretation for the simultaneous existence of fully-franchised, fully com-
pany-owned and plural structures. 
What remains unclear is the observed stability of distinct forms, a phenomenon whose existence is 
denied for instance by Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1969) but empirically confirmed in figure 1 and by others 
(see section 3). Regarding the organizational development of an expanding firm (examined more 
closely in section 6), we agree with the Oxenfeldt/Kelly proposition that a chain’s operating envi-
ronment (restrictions, goals, capabilities, challenges etc.) undergoes continuous changes over time. 
The second part of the research question therefore seeks to find out why organizational settings (i.e. 
franchising and plural structures) survive unchanged the altering of ex- and internal conditions dur-
ing expansion. In other words, it is unclear why franchising and plural structures prevail each by 
themselves and why there is no increased level of ownership during maturity of the business. 
In order to answer this question, the simplified organizational development of franchise systems 
needs to be understood as a sequence of two phases. As outlined in figure 1, when operating one or 
several pilot outlets during the first years in business, every chain is initially organized into full 
company-ownership. As soon as the chain expands via franchising at some point after the seed 
phase, it successively adds franchise units until it has reached its final form somewhere between the 
10th-12th year of operation. From here on it will continue either as a purely franchised or as a plu-
rally structured organization.9 Provided that HFBnet are positive and positive PFSnet cannot be real-
ized, the chain should be fully franchised according to the decision matrix. Otherwise (where 
HFBnet is negative) it should be fully company-owned. Changing conditions during expansion (as 
proposed by Oxenfeldt/Kelly 1969 and Hunt 1973) may now reduce the absolute value of HFBnet. 
Without HFBnet becoming negative though (together with the lack of positive PFSnet), no rational 
motivation would urge the franchisor to buy-back outlets and to revert the structure to a fully com-
                                                 
9 The dividing line between “pure franchising” and “plural form” is rather diffuse. What is unclear is how many com-
pany-owned outlets are needed to define a chain as plurally organized. Strategically “pure franchising” means that the 
management does not engage in serious effort to own a significant number of outlets itself. In numbers, we define a 
chain as “purely franchised” as long as its share of franchising is 99% or greater. 
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pany-owned system. While those claiming that the benefits of franchising erode during maturity 
may be correct in this aspect, they are obviously wrong in their conclusion that full ownership will 
come about at the end of such a process. For plurally organized chains, the case is similarly straight-
forward. As explained above, they result in the sum of HFBnet and PFSnet being positive, which is 
the case in quadrant IV and for some chains in quadrant III. Now, as conditions change, the absolute 
value of HFBnet may decrease, as is the case for purely franchised chains. PFSnet though, if realized, 
will rather escalate in absolute value (see section 7 below for detailed arguments) during expansion, 
which compensates for a diminishing HFBnet. Thus, as long as the existence of positive PFSnet keeps 
the absolute sum of HFBnet and PFSnet greater than zero, the chain will be structured plurally. 
What is it then that allows a chain to appreciate positive PFSnet influence during the second phase of 
development? We have used the data of franchise chains that have been named the 100 top global 
players in the 2006 survey by the Entrepreneur Magazine to answer this question. In total, these 
systems run more than 281.000 franchised and 28.000 company-owned outlets at the end of 2005. 
Hence they represent approximately 36% of all points of sale organized under franchise trademarks 
worldwide. Of those factors that might influence a chain’s structure, we tested investment volume, 
franchise fee, royalty rate, terms of contract and franchisee financial support provided by the fran-
chisor and through third-party sources. Labeled as λ (LAMBDA), organizational structure is ex-
pressed in percent of the franchise outlets in relation to all outlets of the chain. The factor that 
yielded both a highly significant influence on λ and a good R² was the magnitude of the required 
investment volume. Table 1 displays regression results for the proposition that organizational struc-
ture (partly) depends on the size of the investment volume.10 
Table 1.  Linear regression results 
Coefficients (a) Non-standardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
Model* B Standard error Beta T Sign. 
Intercept 0.981 0.015  65.541 0.000 
Investment Volume in $T 0 0 -0.455 -5.055 0.000 
(a) Dependent variable: Lambda    
 *  N= 100, R-Square= 0,207, F= 25,557, Sign. at 1% level.  
     To avoid distortion by outliers, the model purposely excludes chains whose average investment volume 
is greater than $2 million, i.e. Inter Continental, Super 8, Ramada, Days Inn, Motel 6 and Hilton. 
                                                 
10 See www.entrepreneur.com for a list of the 2006 100 top global chains and the appendix of this paper for correlation 
results of λ and investment volume. 
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Two popular franchise chains included in the sample stand as models for the strong influence of the 
investment volume. While plurally organized McDonald’s (75% franchising) asks $500K-1.6M 
from its franchisees, its purely franchised rival Subway requires its agents to invest between $86-
213K. Ehrmann/Spranger (2005b) moreover support table 1 findings by demonstrating that invest-
ment volume is inversely related to the degree of franchising for a much larger sample of 925 US-
franchise chains. Taken together, these findings are especially striking as HFB-arguments, such as 
resource scarcity or risk aversion aspects, advise the franchisor to strengthen franchising and to re-
duce company-ownership as investment volumes surge. To explain this inconsistency, one has to 
apply PFS-aspects. In terms of the plural form, the franchisor’s profit from running company-
owned outlets is positively influenced in proportion to the required investment volume. In other 
words, whereas investment volume is positively correlated with PFSnet, its influence on HFBnet is 
rather negative. For the organizational development during phase two we may therefore conclude: 
The more money franchisees are required to invest into the franchise business, the higher a plural 
form will reward the franchisor (in terms of increased PFSnet). Consequently the high-investment 
chain will more likely be run with franchise and company-owned units. The less franchisees are 
required to invest on the other hand, the smaller will be the benefit a franchisor could receive from 
operating plurally. Consequently the low-investment chain will concentrate on franchising and ab-
stain from costly company-ownership.11 
 
6   A new model of the franchise life cycle 
In light of the findings that have been presented so far, the model describing the development of 
franchise-chains as proposed by Oxenfeldt/Kelly (1969) and Hunt (1973) has to be abandoned. 
While it was correct to assume altering conditions during a chain’s expansion, they underestimated 
the powers of franchising and underrated the power of those aspects that would make hybrid or plu-
ral forms attractive even during maturity. Applying the findings from above on a modeled devel-
opment process, we propose a new model for presenting and understanding the growth path of fran-
chise chains. For each of the five phases of growth, the strategic challenges will define a certain set 
of organizational imperatives, which in turn will determine the appropriate structural solution. 
 
                                                 
11 This aspect has also been supported by an interviewee who has been a multi-unit franchisee of McDonald’s for 20 
years and is currently engaged as a franchisor for two chains on his own. 
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6.1   Life-cycle models in general 
The basic assumption that organizational life-cycle models build on is that firms, like humans, ani-
mals or plants, move through distinctive stages on their way from inception to maturity (Greiner 
1972). Each phase is individually marked by a specific management focus and style, by special 
structural and managerial challenges, and by an altering role and function of the entrepreneur. Only 
if an organization successfully meets the specific challenges of each stage will it be possible to con-
tinue its operation on the next and more advanced level; failure to meet these challenges will stop 
the process and collapse the entire structure. With the characteristics of each phase being identical 
regardless of industry specifics, factors like a skillful management team or a high-growth industry 
may shorten the time needed to accomplish each step. Accordingly, a high-potential management 
team operating in a fast developing industry will experience shorter cycles and reach maturity 
sooner than a standard team in a low-growth industry. Detailed knowledge about the characteristics 
of each phase may prepare any management team up-front for meeting those challenges in a pros-
pering manner that are critical to the organization’s survival. 
According to Greiner (1972), organizational development as a function of size (employees, sales 
volumes, number of units, etc.) and time, is a sequence of evolutionary and revolutionary phases 
which inevitably depend on each other. During times of evolution, the organization grows without 
major turbulence as long as the appropriate strategic challenges are met. Determined by the limits of 
each evolutionary process, every stage of growth automatically creates its own times of crisis, a 
period of revolutionary format in which formerly adequate strategies have become outgrown and 
where a new strategic set-up has to be created in order to master the subsequent stage of evolution-
ary growth. Every successfully managed process of turmoil will elevate the organization onto the 
next level of superior organizational quality and size. Every failure to meet new challenges though 
will slow down or bring the growth process to halt. In extremes, the inability to manage crises may 
even cause the destruction of the firm. Concerning the skills of the entrepreneur, it is the profes-
sionalization of himself and of his organization that turn out to be the top managerial challenges 
across every stage of the corporation’s life-cycle (Hellmann/Puri 2002). Even three decades of sub-
sequent research have not caused major harm to Greiner’s attractive life-cycle model. He himself 
(Greiner 1998) still claims its practical validity. Having researched 63 stage models, Levie/Hay 
(2001) have concluded that the idea of a stepwise organizational development cannot be rejected, in 
spite of repeated failures to confirm it empirically. 
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6.2   A model of franchising development 
The modeled path towards expansion in the franchising industry fits into the general five-stage 
model outlined by Greiner (1972, 1998). Instead of assuming evolutionary linearity though, we pro-
pose each stage to follow an s-shaped curve as applied in marketing science to explain product-life-
cycles. Moreover, our model of franchising development (figure 3 below), explicitly illustrates the 
option to undergo entrepreneurial setbacks caused by a surrender to revolutionary crises. Note that 
we have chosen to describe the development of a high-investment chain which, according to the 
reasoning above, will realize positive PFSnet once a plural form structure is installed. Applying the 
propositions of figure 3 to chains without positive PFSnet is straightforward. As explained in detail 
in section 5, the chain will use full franchising as long as HFBnet remain positive during phase 3 
through phase 5. 
In the first stage of initializing the business, the founders of the system act entrepreneurially. All 
their energy is absorbed by creating the central product or service and by bringing it to the market. 
The business concept has to be tested by operating one or more pilot outlets initially. More than in 
later stages, the founders will be involved in operational tasks while their management style may 
still be informal. Above all they must create a critical environment of constant improvements and 
endeavor to demonstrate the concept’s soundness by documented financial results. In order to move 
quickly and to directly experience the outcome of their initial strategy, the management needs to 
keep its control structure tight for passing on instructions directly and effectively. When entering 
the market the first time, using immediate customer feedback in order to adjust operational activi-
ties is highly important. Any form other than a purely integrated one would unnecessarily slow 
down the process of early business development. Moreover, the benefits of more complex structures 
cannot be exploited yet at this stage. Full ownership during stage one is therefore the common ap-
proach. 
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Figure 3.  The life-cycle of franchise chains 
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During the second stage of growth, the business concept has to maintain its quality standards at 
places other than at the initial pilot(s). Establishing and successfully running local hubs is the pri-
mary strategic task during this time. When undertaking the first wave of expansion, the business 
format needs continuous improvement while centrally located functional structures like marketing, 
financial accounting, agent support, etc. have to be set up. Managing the young system will require 
a more formal, directive style where controlling the efficiency of operations becomes gradually 
more important. Considering organizational structure as an adjustable strategic instrument now be-
comes important for realizing further growth. Backed by the financial record of the pilot(s), during 
stage two the system will begin to set up franchise units for some of their local hubs while others 
will be developed as company-owned units. With many processes like quality control, logistics, 
customer service, etc. still being in a state of trial-and-error, organizational adjustments are increas-
ingly influenced by the creative input of franchisees. Through their personal initiative, the franchi-
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sor will receive refined and reliable data on the financial capability and the competitiveness of the 
business concept. Moreover every franchisee contributes substantial financial resources while the 
franchisor’s expansion capital is still most likely to be limited. In total, HFBnet have turned positive 
during stage two, whereas the time for positive PFSnet is still to come. 
Having proven the reliability of the concept through running selected hubs, the chain is now pre-
pared to roll out its business concept nationwide during stage three. Decentrally expanding into one 
market will require an organizational structure that allows fast growth and at the same time provides 
mechanisms to keep communication and control such that standards of uniformity and rules of con-
duct may still be enforceable. With every new unit operated successfully, the chain’s brand name 
value will successively increase the overall sales volume, making the membership to the system 
more promising for every potential agent. The primary managerial challenge of this stage is to add 
new units quickly and to assure quality standards simultaneously. This will be achievable as the 
management now understands how to promote organizational structures that establish a climate of 
competitive and cooperative conduct among its agents. Expressed in terms of our model from figure 
2, while HFBnet remain positive from the third stage on, their relative value gradually gives way to 
the increasingly important PFSnet. The more units are added by a franchisor, the more will he de-
pend on the plural form aspects of supporting inner-system innovation processes and of establishing 
an environment of productive competition among his agents. Thus the chain will accomplish its 
final mode of plural form structure during stage three of the development process.12 13 
In the forth stage, the franchisor will move beyond national boundaries and export his business con-
cept to one or more international markets. The challenges of this stage are similar to those of stage 
three, although greater distance from headquarters and the increased diversity of foreign markets 
will require the system to be simultaneously even more adaptable and controllable. The scalability 
of organizational structure and its ability to exchange know-how between distant entities of the 
chain is crucial when expanding on an international basis. While bringing these tasks to perfection 
during stage four, advanced structures must have been established already in stage three during the 
system’s national expansion. Having spread over an entire national market, the chain will continue 
to profit less from hybrid form benefits than from plural form synergies. As long as both remain 
                                                 
12 Again, if PFSnet are neutral to negative, the chain will choose full franchising as long as HFBnet are positive. 
13 As displayed in figure 1, this stage will usually be reached after about 11 years of business experience. 
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positive, the chain will continue to transfer its experienced plural structure from the home country 
to any foreign market. 
Consequently, constant growth should bring a franchise system to the point where its concept is 
spread all over the globe and organic growth slows down or comes to a natural end. Such decreas-
ing rates of growth are expressed in the final stages of the S-shaped curve model. During stage five 
of the organizational development, the franchisor would have to diversify in ways that suit to create 
additional shareholder value.14 Since only very few chains reach phase-5-status, evidence on practi-
cal experience about the right structural solution during a time of exploring new business opportuni-
ties is naturally limited. 
The world’s largest restaurant chains, YUM Brands and McDonald’s, that have reached saturation 
both in their home country and in many foreign markets, provide some insights into diversification 
strategies and their results. Following an extensive acquisition strategy, YUM Brands nowadays 
combines a large part of the food spectrum. Its assortment of quick-service facilities ranges from 
chicken (Kentucky Fried Chicken), over quick-service seafood (Long John Silver's), pizza (Pizza 
Hut), Mexican (Taco Bell) to all American food (A&W).15 To face the challenges of a highly com-
petitive quick-service industry, especially in the US-market, YUM just lately has chosen to follow a 
strategy of multibranding, i.e. combining two or more brands into one restaurant location. While 
multibrand stores roughly accounted for 10% of all restaurants and 5% of overall sales volume in 
2004, the franchisor aims to expand this strategy and hopes to realize “dramatically improved re-
turns on invested capital”(YUM 2005) in the future. McDonald’s (2002) on the other hand, operates 
more than 1.000 restaurants under its partner brands Boston Market, Chipotle Mexican Grill and 
Donatos Pizzeria. In total, these restaurants achieved more than $1 billion in sales volume in 2002. 
In 2003 though, the company (McDonald’s 2003) recorded $237 million of pretax charges relating 
                                                 
14  Note that additional value may not be created unless synergies like economies of scale or scope will be realized final 
to the process of diversification. For more than a decade there has been an active debate on whether and why diver-
sification ultimately creates or destroys value. The dilemma becomes obvious as researchers argue that diversified 
firms trade at discounts compared to a) single-segment firms in the same industry, b) the same firm’s value split into 
pieces and c) the same firm’s value prior to diversification (see Villalonga (2003) for an overview of these issues). 
Hence it remains unclear so far, whether those discounts claimed are effectively a cause for or an effect of diversifi-
cation. Under the premise of increasing shareholder value, franchisors with stage-5-status will have to thoroughly 
weigh both long-term costs and benefits of diversification strategies against each other before taking action to spend 
access resources.  
15  Taken these sorts of related businesses, YUM’s management has followed instructions for shareholder value creating 
diversification strategies as outlined in footnote 14.  
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to losses on sales of Donatos Pizzeria, the closing of all Donatos and Boston Market restaurants 
outside the U.S. and the terminating of a business relationship with another domestic joint venture 
partner. In total, the number of partner restaurants was reduced by 140 or about 12% during 2003. 
Nevertheless both YUM and McDonalds clearly engage in diversification strategies which widen 
their initial portfolio to opportunities adjacent to their core business. 
As depicted in figure 3 we have to hypothesize about the functions of HFBnet and PFSnet during 
phase-5 situations. Learning from diversification strategies by plurally structured YUM (77% of 
franchising during 2002) and McDonald’s (71% of franchising during 2002), it seems as if the plu-
ral form’s characteristic of successfully combining two opposing structures remains beneficial in a 
late stage development phase also, where acquiring and operating businesses of the same industry is 
the preferred move towards further growth. 
 
7   Implications for franchisor management in general 
This empirical study’s results are naturally limited by the quality of the data used to develop both 
the concept of the decision matrix and that of the life-cycle model. Regarding the first objection, 
data on purely company-owned chains would be helpful to challenge the arguments related to (plu-
ral and pure) franchise chains presented in section 5. In regard to the second issue, scarce informa-
tion on status-5-systems – their strategic charges, organizational imperatives, strength of HFB and 
PFS – allow rather speculative propositions towards a proper structural solution.  
Still this research provides very practical propositions to franchisors: Firstly, franchisors should 
become aware of those factors that determine the organizational setting of their chain. An improved 
understanding of structure as an instrument of strategic management should replace its widely un-
derestimated importance. Secondly, the franchisor should build competence to fully understand its 
structure’s potential to provide HFB and PFS across the distinct stages of the franchise chain’s life 
cycle. Equally important, the relevant costs of both forms have to be accounted for. Structural deci-
sions should be largely based on a sound analysis of HFBnet and PFSnet. And finally, the franchisor 
needs to understand and to identify the distinct phases of growth, their individual strategic require-
ments and their organizational imperatives. 
Translating these challenges into the appropriate structure should increase a franchisor’s chances 
both to embrace the phases of evolution and to prevail during times of revolution. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.  Correlation results of organizational structure (λ) and investment volume 
 Pearson Correlation Lambda Investment Volume 
Lambda Correlation coefficient 1 -0.455** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.000 
 N 100 100 
Investment Volume Correlation coefficient -0.455** 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 . 
 N 100 100 
 Kendall Tau-b Lambda Investment Volume 
Lambda Correlation coefficient 1 -0.350** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.000 
 N 100 100 
Investment Volume Correlation coefficient -0.350** 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 . 
 N 100 100 
** significant at 1% level   *  significant at 5% level  
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PART C 
Appendix 
 
A.   Entrepreneur Magazine Data 2004 
 
No. 
 
Franchise Chain 
 
Year of  
Business 
Start 
Year of 
Franchising
Start 
 
Total 
Franchisee 
Investment 
 
Franchise 
Fee 
 
Royalty 
Rate 
No. Chain BusExp FranExp Inv FF RR 
       
1 @Wireless 2000 1994 $70.5K-131.9K $15K 5-10% 
2 1-800-DryClean 2000 1997 $133K-493K $6.9K 7% 
3 1-800-Got-Junk? 1998 1989 $46.7K-58.6K $18K+ 8% 
4 1st Propane Franchising Inc. 1998 1990 $176.6K-442.5K $30K 6% 
5 24 Seven 2001 1997 $523.3K-544.8K $500K 10% 
6 5 & Diner Franchise Corp. 1993 1987 $300K-1M $35K 5% 
7 7-Eleven Inc. 1964 1927 Varies Varies Varies 
8 A & W Restaurants Inc. 1925 1919 $212K-1.4M $20K/50K 5-6% 
9 A Thousand Points of Knowl-
edge 
2000 1998 $175K-201K $50K+ 12.5% 
10 A-1 Concrete Leveling Inc. 1993 1992 $75K-89K $70K 6% 
11 AAMCO Transmissions Inc. 1963 1963 $187.5K-207K $30K 7% 
12 Aaron's Sales & Lease Owner-
ship 
1992 1955 $263K-543K $35K 6% 
13 ABC Inc. 1978 1973 $98.1K-212.5K $18K Varies 
14 Accountants Inc. 1994 1986 $185.8K-259K $30K 10% 
15 AccuTrak Inventory Specialists 2000 1993 $30K-43K $22.5K 7% 
16 ACE America's Cash Express 1996 1968 $118.2K-259.1K $15K-30K 6% 
17 ACFN 2003 1986 $71.2K $29K 0 
18 ACS Int'l. 2000 1984 $38.4K-43.8K $35K 10% 
19 Action Int'l. 1997 1993 $52.2K-79K $25K-40K $1.5K/mo. 
20 Advantage Golf Tournament 
Services 
1998 1996 $79.8K-172.7K $25K-65K+ 5% 
21 Adventures in Advertising Inc. 1994 1982 $11.9K-47.7K $5K-27.5K 6-7% 
22 Aero Colours Inc. 1993 1985 $56.4K-164.4K $25K-125K 7% 
23 Aerowest/Westair Deodorizing 
Services 
1978 1943 $10.3K-36.7K $4K 8% 
24 Affiliated Car Rental LC 1987 1987 $46.4K-69.5K $6K-10.8K Varies 
25 AIM Mail Centers 1989 1985 $88.9K-133.9K $26.9K 5% 
26 Airbag Service 1995 1992 $45.9K-116.3K $25K-35K 8.5% 
27 Aire Serv Heating & Air Condi-
tioning Inc. 
1993 1993 $31.6K-119.5K $17.5K 2.5-4.5% 
28 Aire-Master of America Inc. 1976 1958 $40.6K-110.9K $22K-50.5K 5% 
29 Al & Ed's Autosound 1986 1954 $160.3K-560.2K $25K to 7% 
30 All American Frozen Yogurt & 
Ice Cream Shops 
1987 1986 $91K-224K $6K-25K 5% 
31 All Tune and Lube 1985 1985 $125K $25K 7% 
32 Allegra Network 1977 1976 $256K-358.5K $25K 3.6-6% 
33 Allstate Home In-
spect./Environ. Testing 
 
1996 1989 $23.9K-44K $23.9K 7.5% 
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34 AlphaGraphics Printshops Of 
The Future 
1980 1970 $352K-545.9K $25.9K 1.5-8% 
35 Alta Mere Industries 1993 1986 $93K $27.5K 7% 
36 Alternative Board TAB, The 1996 1990 $27.9K-57.9K $9.9K-39.9K 0 
37 Altracolor Systems 1991 1988 $37.5K-53.95K $8K-19.95K $95/wk. 
38 am/pm Mini-Markets 1979 1976 $1M-3.2M $35K-95K 5% 
39 American Asphalt Sealcoating 
Co. 
1998 1988 $35K-45K $15K 5-7% 
40 American Leak Detection 1984 1974 $71.3K-155.1K $57.5K+ 6-10% 
41 American Poolplayers Associa-
tion 
1982 1981 $11.6K-14K $5K+ 20% 
42 American Town Mailer 2000 1976 $23.9K-37.2K $20K 0 
43 American Wholesale Thermo-
graphers Inc. 
1981 1980 $357.6K-381.1K $30K 7% 
44 American Wildlife Association 
LLC 
2002 1989 $23.1K-76.2K $19.8K 0 
45 AmeriHost Franchise Systems 
Inc. 
1998 1989 $3.2M-4.5M Varies 4-5% 
46 AmeriSpec Home Inspection 
Services 
1988 1987 $24.6K-63.6K $18K/26.9K 7% 
47 AmeriSuites Franchising Inc. 1998 1985 $5.9M-9.7M Varies 5% 
48 Anago Franchising Inc. 1991 1989 $7.8K-457K $5.4K-500K 10%/5% 
49 Andy OnCall 1999 1993 $30.6K-49.2K $23K 5% 
50 Apartment Movers etc. 1998 1995 $67.3K-95K $19.5K 5% 
51 Arby's 1965 1964 $333.7K-2.3M $37.5K/25K 4% 
52 Archadeck 1984 1980 $29.3K-78.8K $28K 3.5-5.5%+ 
53 Around Town Community 
Magazine Inc. 
2003 1996 $32.5K-42.9K $25K 5% 
54 Arrow Neighborhood Pub 
Group, The 
1996 1990 $400K $35K 5% 
55 Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips 1970 1969 $145.5K-267.9K $30K 5% 
56 Ashley Avery's Collectables 1990 1983 $272.1K-403.6K $30K 6% 
57 Assist-2-Sell 1993 1987 $30K-57K $14.5K 5% 
58 Athlete's Foot, The 1973 1972 $201.6K-640.3K $35K 5% 
59 Atlanta Bread Co. 1995 1993 $629.7K-806.3K $40K-30K 5% 
60 Atwork Personnel Services 1992 1990 $59.5K-105K $11.5K 1.4-6.1% 
61 Auntie Anne's Hand-Rolled 
Soft Pretzels 
1989 1988 $192.5K-326K $30K 6% 
62 Aussie Pet Mobile 1996 1996 $60K-352.5K $32.5K-
112.5K 
8% 
63 Autowraps Inc. 2002 2000 $36.1K-60K $20K 5% 
64 AWC Commercial Window 
Coverings 
1992 1963 $110K-120K $25K 5-12.5% 
65 AZPCO Arizona Pizza Com-
pany 
2002 1996 $256.5K-397K $25K 4% 
66 Babies 'N' Bells Inc. 1997 1996 $16.7K-28.9K $9K 8% 
67 Back Yard Burgers Inc. 1988 1986 $800K-1.4M $25K 4% 
68 Bad Ass Coffee Co. 1998 1991 $200K $20K 6% 
69 Bahama Buck's Original 
Shaved Ice Co. 
1993 1989 $95K-275K $20K 6% 
70 Baja Sol Tortilla Grill 1995 1995 $166K-400K $25K 4.5% 
71 Baker Bros. American Deli 2000 1998 $353K-641K $20K-30K 4-5% 
72 Barbizon School of Modeling 1967 1939 $47.9K-106K $19.5K-35K 7.5% 
73 Bark Busters 1994 1989 $45K-70K $22.5K 8% 
74 Barnie's Coffee & Tea Co. 1981 1980 $202K-350K $20K 7% 
75 Baskin-Robbins USA Co. 1948 1945 $145.7K-527.8K $40K 5.9% 
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76 Bath Fitter 1992 1984 $60K-100K $24.5K 0 
77 Batteries Plus 1992 1988 $164.5K-255K $25K 4% 
78 Baymont Franchises Int'l. Inc. 1986 1973 $4.1M-4.9M $35K 5% 
79 Beaner's Gourmet Coffee 1999 1994 $225K $22.5K 5% 
80 Bear Rock Cafe 1998 1997 $449.5K-525.3K $35K 4% 
81 Beef `O'Brady's 1998 1985 $300K-350K $30K 4% 
82 Ben & Jerry's 1981 1978 $129.5K-316K $9K-30K 1.5% 
83 Benjamin Franklin Plumbing 2001 2000 $41.5K-279.5K $10K 3-5% 
84 Bennigan's Grill & Tavern 1995 1976 $1.4M-2.6M $65K 4% 
85 Best Inns/Best Suites 1982 1970 $170K-577K $10K 3-5% 
86 Better Homes Realty Inc. 1975 1964 to $61.5K $9.95K 6% 
87 Between Rounds Bakery Sand-
wich Cafe 
1992 1990 $168K-215K $18K-25K 4% 
88 Bevinco Bar Systems Ltd. 1990 1987 $41.5K-45K $34.9K $12/audit 
89 Big Apple Bagels 1993 1993 $174.8K-349.5K $25K 5% 
90 Big Boy Restaurants Int'l. 1952 1936 $1.5M $40K 4% 
91 Big O Tires Inc. 1962 1962 $150K-1.5M $27.5K 2% 
92 Big Picture Framing 2003 2000 $120K-150K $25K 5.5% 
93 Billboard Connection Inc. 2003 1997 $19.5K-26.5K $19.5K 2.5% 
94 Bingo Bugle Newspaper 1983 1981 $5.1K-11.5K $1.5K-10K 8% 
95 BioLogix 1995 1989 $24.5K-45.6K $12.5K 4% 
96 Black American Income Tax 
Service 
2003 1997 $33.6K-43K $20K 15% 
97 Blackjack Pizza Franchising 
Inc. 
1988 1983 $140.8K-300.4K $10K to 4% 
98 Blimpie Int'l. Inc. 1970 1964 $72.8K-338.2K $18K 6% 
99 Bojangles' Famous Chicken 'n 
Biscuits 
1978 1977 $145K-558.8K $15K-25K 4% 
100 Bonanza Restaurants 1966 1963 $1.3M-2.1M $40K 4% 
101 Bonus Building Care 1996 1996 $7.6K-13.3K $6.5K 10% 
102 Booster Juice 2000 1999 $153K-240K $20K 6% 
103 Boston Pizza 1968 1963 $1.5M-2.1M $35K/50K 5%/7% 
104 Brake Depot Systems Inc. 1999 1990 $70.5K-204K $25K 7% 
105 Brake Masters Systems Inc. 1991 1983 $107.5K-647.3K $22.95K 5% 
106 Breadeaux Pizza 1985 1985 $69.5K-310K $15K 5% 
107 Breadsmith 1993 1993 $217.5K-416K $30K 7% 
108 BrickKicker Home Inspection, 
The 
1994 1989 $13.6K-52.1K $7.5K-25K 6% 
109 Brooke Franchise Corp. 1988 1986 $95.9K-116.1K $95K 15% 
110 Bruster's Old-Fashioned Ice 
Cream & Yogurt 
1993 1989 $165K-968K $30K 5% 
111 Buck's Pizza 1994 1994 $111.3K-196.9K $10K 3% 
112 Budget Blinds Inc. 1994 1992 $54.7K-81.1K $24.95K Varies 
113 Buffalo Wild Wings 1991 1982 $969K-1.5M $30K-40K 5% 
114 Buffalo's Cafe 1990 1985 $309.3K-464.7K+ $35K 5% 
115 BuildingStars Inc. 2000 1994 $1.9K-42.2K $995-3.99K 10% 
116 Burger King Corp. 1961 1954 $294K-2.8M $50K 4.5% 
117 Business Products Express 1999 1996 $49.99K-100K $24.99K+ 4% 
118 Buster Enterprises Inc. 1992 1985 $30K-81.5K $7.5K-24K 5.5-7% 
119 Cafe Ala Carte 2000 1996 $56.2K-80.8K $25K 8-5% 
120 California Closet Company 1982 1978 $121.5K-341.9K $45.9K 6% 
121 Camille's Sidewalk Cafe 1999 1996 $210K-470K $25K 5% 
122 Camp Bow Wow 2003 2000 $108.5K-315.5K $25K 5% 
123 Candleman Corp. 1992 1992 $155.9K-329.5K $35K 6% 
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124 Candlewick Homes 2003 2002 $300K-1.3M $50K 5% 
125 Candlewood Suites 1996 1995 $3.9M-6.1M Varies 4-5% 
126 Candy Bouquet 1993 1989 $7.3K-44.1K $2K-27K 0 
127 Candy Express 1989 1988 $77.3K-225K $35K 7% 
128 Capital Bonding 2001 1988 $58K-87K $25K 0 
129 Capri Coffee Break 2002 2000 $110K-200K $30K 6% 
130 Captain D's Seafood 1969 1969 $223K-894K $20K/10K 3.5% 
131 Captain Tony's Pizza & Pasta 
Emporium 
1985 1972 $150.8K-282.9K $10K-20K 4.5% 
132 Cardsmart Retail Corp. 2001 1996 $151.2K-194K $10K 2.5% 
133 Careers USA 1988 1981 $110.9K-159.6K $14.5K Varies 
134 Carl's Jr. Restaurants 1984 1941 $783K-1.2M $35K 4% 
135 Carlson Wagonlit Travel 1984 1888 $2.5K-164K $1.5K-29.9K $480-965/mo. 
136 Carpet Network 1992 1991 $25K-35K $14.5K 2-7% 
137 Carstar Franchise Systems Inc. 1989 1989 $24.4K+ $5K Varies 
138 Cartex Limited 1988 1987 $34.5K-95.2K $23.5K-36.5K 7% 
139 Cartoon Cuts 2000 1991 $97K-216K $25K 5% 
140 Cartridge World 1997 1997 $75K-120K $25K-35K 6% 
141 Carvel 1947 1934 $177.5K-260.9K $15K-25K $1.74/gal. 
142 Car-X Auto Service 1973 1971 $232K-341.5K $25K 5% 
143 Cash Now 2001 1999 $120.1K-363.5K $34.5K 5% 
144 Cash Plus Inc. 1988 1985 $123.7K-200.7K $22.5K 5-6% 
145 CD Tradepost 2002 1998 $85.9K-139.9K $18K 5-6% 
146 CD Warehouse Inc. 1992 1992 $127.1K-164.3K $15K-20K 4-5% 
147 Celsius Tannery 2000 1995 $265K-598.5K $20K 1% 
148 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. 1972 1971 $11.6K-522.4K to $25K 6% 
149 Certa ProPainters Ltd. 1992 1992 $66.2K-84.3K $30K 2-5% 
150 CFO Today 1990 1989 $24.4K-40K $24K Varies 
151 Champion Cleaners Franchise 
Inc. 
1995 1993 $425K-444K $25K 2% 
152 Charley's Grilled Subs 1991 1986 $122.5K-294.5K $19.5K 5% 
153 Cheeburger Cheeburger 1989 1986 $200K-387K $24.5K 4.5% 
154 Chem-Dry Carpet Drapery & 
Upholstery Cleaning 
1978 1977 $23.6K-82.8K $9.95K $213/mo. 
155 Chemstation 1983 1965 $500K-700K $45K 4% 
156 Chicago's Pizza Franchises 1981 1979 $87.3K-173.1K $18K 4% 
157 Child Care Choices 1999 1998 $23.5K-46.6K $19K 6% 
158 Children's Lighthouse Fran-
chise Corp. 
1999 1997 $250K-1.5M $50K 7% 
159 Children's Orchard 1985 1980 $69.5K-144.95K $19.5K 5% 
160 CHIP - The Remarkable Child 
I.D. Program 
2002 2001 $29.9K-42.2K $27.9 0 
161 Choice Hotels Int'l. 1962 1939 $4M-6M $25K-50K 3.5-5.3% 
162 Christmas Decor Inc. 1996 1984 $19.2K-42.4K $10.9K-17.5K 2-4.5% 
163 Church's Chicken 1972 1952 $203K-750K $10K/15K 5% 
164 CiCi's Pizza 1987 1985 $400.9K-606.9K $30K 4% 
165 Cindy's Cinnamon Rolls 1986 1985 $69K-130.5K $25K 5% 
166 Cinnabon 1986 1969 $232.5K-333.5K $30K-35K 5% 
167 Cinnzeo 1998 1987 $214K-621K $15K 7% 
168 Clean & Happy Windows 2000 1991 $100-2K 0 7% 
169 Cleaning Authority, The 1996 1978 $67.2K-96.5K $22.5K-36K 4-6% 
170 CleanNet USA Inc. 1988 1988 $3.9K-35.5K $2.95K-32K 3% 
171 ClickTown Int'l. LLC 2001 2000 $13.3K-25K+ $7.5K+ 0 
172 Closet & Storage Concepts 2000 1987 $145K $40K 5% 
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173 Closet Factory, The 1986 1983 $99.5K-196.1K $28K-39.5K 5.75% 
174 Closets By Design Franchising 1998 1982 $88.5K-275.9K $19.5K-34.9K 6% 
175 Coffee Beanery, The 1985 1976 $50.5K-384K $5K-25K 6% 
176 Coit Drapery & Carpet Clean-
ers 
1964 1950 $45.1K-111.3K $20K+ 2-6% 
177 Colbert/Ball Tax Service 2002 1995 $23K-40K $5K 15% 
178 Cold Stone Creamery 1994 1988 $245K-353K $31K-35K 6% 
179 Coldwell Banker Real Estate 
Corp. 
1982 1906 $23.5K-477.3K $13K-20.5K 6% 
180 Color Me Mine Enterprises Inc. 1995 1992 $138.6K-181.3K $25K 5% 
181 Color-Glo Int'l. Inc. 1983 1979 $26.5K-30.3K $25K 4% 
182 Colors On Parade 1991 1989 $50K-594K $5.5K-15.5K 7-30% 
183 ColorTyme 1982 1979 $319.1K-560.5K $7.5K-35K 2-5% 
184 Comet Cleaners 1967 1947 $196K-368K $25K-50K 0 
185 ComForcare Senior Services 
Inc. 
2001 1996 $19.5K-50K $12.5K 3% 
186 Comfort Keepers 1999 1998 $39.7K-65.1K $18.8K 5-3% 
187 Commission Express 1996 1992 $85.3K-172.5K $10K-40K Varies 
188 Complete Music 1983 1974 $19.7K-33K $12K-20K 6.5-8% 
189 CompuChild 2001 1994 $13.9K-15K $12.5K Varies 
190 Computer Builders Warehouse 1999 1990 $250K+ $35K 2% 
191 Computer Moms Int'l. Corp. 1998 1994 $46.2K-75.2K $9.7K+ to $800/mo.  
192 Computer Renaissance 1993 1988 $50K-150K $15K 4% 
193 Computer Troubleshooters 1997 1997 $16.3K-24.4K $11K $220/mo. 
194 Computertots/Computer Ex-
plorers 
1988 1983 $32.1K-48.5K $15K/29.9K 8% 
195 Concerto Networks Inc. 2003 2002 $36.5K-47.9K $15.8K 14% 
196 Concrete Raising of America 
Inc. 
1993 1947 $16.9K-200K $16.9K-25K 4-8% 
197 Connoisseur, The 1988 1972 $200K-270K $29.5K 6% 
198 Contours Express 1998 1998 $31.2K-45.7K $10K $395/mo. 
199 Cookie Factory Bakery 1991 1970 $98K-237.5K $15K 5% 
200 Cookies By Design/Cookie 
Bouquet 
1987 1983 $90K-175K $12.5K-35K 6% 
201 Cookies in Bloom 1992 1988 $60K-114K $19.5K 5% 
202 Copy Club Inc. 1994 1992 $311.3K-421.95K $30K 7% 
203 Cost Cutters Family Hair Care 1982 1982 $69K-148K $12.5K-22.5K 6% 
204 CottageCare Inc. 1989 1988 $49.5K-75.5K $9.5K-17K 5.5% 
205 Cottman Transmission Systems 
LLC 
1964 1962 $155K-221K $31.5K 7.5% 
206 Country Clutter 1992 1991 $153.9K-348.5K $25K 5.5% 
207 Country Inns & Suites By Carl-
son 
1987 1986 $3M-5.5M Varies 4.5% 
208 Cousins Subs 1985 1972 $200K-275K $20K 6% 
209 Coustic-Glo Int'l. Inc. 1981 1979 $12K-18K $12K 5% 
210 Coverall Cleaning Concepts 1985 1985 $6.3K-35.9K $6K-32.2K 5% 
211 Crack Team, The 2000 1985 $38.6K-69.1K $15K 6% 
212 Craters & Freighters 1991 1990 $95K-131K $27K 5% 
213 Creative Colors Int'l. Inc. 1991 1980 $53.6K-70.4K $19.5K+ 6% 
214 Creative Playthings 2002 1951 $135.7K-207K $25K 4% 
215 Crescent City Beignets 1999 1997 $250K-300K $25K 5% 
216 Crestcom Int'l. Ltd. 1991 1987 $47.8K-78.5K $39.5K/58.5K 1.5% 
217 Critter Control Inc. 1987 1983 $9.8K-66K $2.5K-33K 6-16% 
218 Crown Trophy Inc. 1987 1978 $115K-144K $32K 5% 
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219 Cruise Holidays Int'l. 1984 1984 $70.7K-126.2K $5K-19.5K $525+/mo. 
220 Cruise Planners 1999 1994 $8.99K-18.6K $8.99K 3-0% 
221 CruiseOne Inc. 1993 1989 $9.8K-26.3K $9.8K 3% 
222 Culligan Water Conditioning 1938 1936 $104.5K-695K $5K 0.5-5% 
223 Culver Franchising System Inc. 1988 1984 $340.4K-2.9M $50K 4% 
224 Curves 1995 1992 $35.6K-41.1K $24.9K $395/mo. 
225 Cuts Fitness For Men 2003 2003 $47.1K-70.9K $25K $400/mo. 
226 CW&E Franchise Corp. 2000 1995 $66.7K-181.7K $20K 5% 
227 Dairy Queen 1944 1940 $655K-1.3M $20K/35K 4-5% 
228 Dale Carnegie Training 1999 1912 $32.7K-221.9K $25K 12% 
229 Damon's Int'l. 1982 1979 941.5K-2.7M $50K 4% 
230 Dancercise Kids 1999 1988 $16.8K-33.3K $9.5K-19.5K 10% 
231 D'Angelo Sandwich Shops 1988 1967 $200.1K-342.4K $15K 5.5% 
232 Days Inns Worldwide  1972 1970 $400K-5.4M Varies 5% 
233 Dealer Specialties Int'l. Inc. 1996 1989 $10.2K-35.4K $2.5K $0.66/unit 
234 Deck The Walls 1979 1979 $147.1K-267.4K $30K 6% 
235 Deckare Services 1997 1995 $25K-40K $14.5K 5% 
236 Decor & You Inc. 1998 1994 $29.7K-119.2K $14.5K/75K 10% 
237 Decor-At-Your-Door Int'l. 1995 1983 $10.6K-46K $6K 1% 
238 Del Taco Inc. 1967 1964 $1M $25K 5% 
239 Denny's Inc. 1984 1953 $971K-1.8M $40K 4% 
240 Dent Doctor 1990 1986 $47.5K-84.9K $19.9K+ 6% 
241 Dentist's Choice, The 1994 1992 $25.9K-30.1K $17.5K 1-5% 
242 Desert Moon-Fresh Mexican 
Grille 
1999 1992 $186.5K-356.4K $25K 5% 
243 Diamond Home Cleaning Ser-
vices Inc. 
1997 1993 $29K-61.2K $15K 4-6% 
244 Dickey's Barbecue Pit Restau-
rants 
1994 1941 $450K-1.7M $25K 4% 
245 Dippin' Dots Franchising Inc. 2000 1988 $45.6K-189.8K $12.5K 4% 
246 Discount Imaging Franchise 
Corp. 
1998 1995 $90K-115K $25K 6% 
247 Discount Sport Nutrition 2000 1996 $82.7K-165.3K $25K 5% 
248 Discovery Map Int'l. 1999 1987 $32.3K-36.3K $18K 0 
249 Dollar Discount Stores 1987 1982 $99K-195K $18K 3% 
250 Dolly's Pizza Franchising Inc. 1993 1966 $125K-180K $17.5K 4% 
251 DOTI (Designs Of The Interior) 1998 1983 $266K-326K $36K 6% 
252 DoubleDave's Pizzaworks Res-
taurant 
1995 1984 $295K-320K $25K 4% 
253 Doubletree Hotels, Suites, Re-
sorts, Clubs 
1989 1969 $7M-40.4M $50K+ 4% 
254 Dr. Glass Window Washing 2001 1978 $4.6K $3K 10% 
255 Dr. Vinyl & Associates Ltd. 1981 1972 $41K-66.5K $29.5K 7% 
256 Drama Kids Int'l. Inc. 1989 1979 $33.4K-39.6K $25K 10% 
257 DreamMaker Bath & Kitchen 
by Worldwide 
1972 1971 $64.1K-113K+ $27K 6-3% 
258 Dry Cleaning Station 1992 1987 $42.5K-485.5K $9.5K-25K Varies 
259 Dry Cleaning To-Your-Door 1997 1994 $39.99K-63.4K $24.5K/29.5K 4.5% 
260 Dry-B-Lo Int'l. Inc. 1997 1993 $44.7K-150.3K $15K/25K 7.5% 
261 Dryclean USA 1978 1976 $80.7K-518.5K $15K/30K $5K/yr. 
262 Duct Doctor USA Inc. 2000 1985 $41K-64K $25K 5-8% 
263 Dunhill Staffing Systems Inc. 1961 1952 $84.98K-162.8K $17K/55K Varies 
264 Dunkin' Donuts 1955 1950 $255.7K-1.1M $50K 5.9% 
265 Dunn Bros Coffee 1994 1987 $143.8K-418K $30K 5% 
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266 Duraclean Int'l. 1945 1930 $25.1K-81.5K $10K 2-8% 
267 E.P.I.C. Systems Inc. 1994 1994 $10.2K-28.5K $6.5K/25K 4-10% 
268 EagleRider Motorcycle Rental 1997 1992 $219.5K-674K $15K-35K 5%/10% 
269 Earth Graphics 1999 1994 $34.1K-40.3K $15K 8% 
270 East of Chicago Pizza Com-
pany 
1991 1990 $163K-356.7K $20K 5% 
271 easyInternetcafe 2001 1999 $30.8K-208.4K $1K-10K 5% 
272 Econotax 1968 1965 $15.4K-33K $10K 15% 
273 Edible Arrangements 2000 1998 $80.2K-130K $25K 5% 
274 Edo Japan Inc. 1986 1977 $150K-287K $20K 6% 
275 Educational Outfitters 2001 1998 $72.2K-172.2K $25K 5% 
276 Eight at Eight Dinner Club 2003 1998 $28.6K-44.6K $25.5K 10% 
277 El Pollo Loco 1980 1975 $504.98K-1.1M $40K 4% 
278 ELDirect Homecare 2002 1996 $21.9K-29.7K $15K 5% 
279 Elephant House 1991 1991 $28K-44.5K $10.2K 0 
280 Elliott & Company Appraisers 1993 1980 $3.65K-18.9K $900-9.9K 8-18% 
281 Embassy Suites Hotels 1984 1983 $17M-23M $100K+ 4% 
282 EmbroidMe 2001 2000 $43.3K-211.1K $35.5K 5% 
283 eModel.com 2000 1996 $35K-50K $20K-30K 0 
284 Entrepreneur's Source, The 1997 1984 $71K-79K $45K 0 
285 ERA Franchise Systems Inc. 1972 1971 $42.7K-205.9K to $20K 6% 
286 Erbert & Gerbert's Subs & 
Clubs 
1992 1987 $158.5K-289K $25K 6.5% 
287 Essentials Protective Coatings 1997 1996 $53.6K-154.7K $25K-85K 8% 
288 Ever Dry Waterproofing 1984 1978 $147.7K $67.5K 6% 
289 Executive Tans Inc. 1995 1991 $125K-499K to $25K $795/mo. 
290 Expetec 1996 1992 $57.2K-78.2K $20K-28K $150-300 
291 Express Mart Franchising Corp. 1990 1975 $86.2K-361K $15K 4% 
292 Express Oil Change 1983 1979 $114.5K-149.5K $17.5K 5% 
293 Express Personnel Services 1985 1983 $120K-160K $17.5K-20.5K 6-9% 
294 Express Tax 2002 1997 $9.9K-16.6K $4.5-5K $12/return 
295 Extreme Pizza 2000 1994 $123.5K-351K $25K 4% 
296 Faces 1980 1974 $77K-109.5K U.S. $16.3K U.S. 5% 
297 Famous Sam's Inc. 1989 1979 $573K-1.3M $30K 5% 
298 Fantastic Sams 1976 1974 $75K-164K $25K $236/wk. 
299 Farmer Boys 1997 1981 $732.4K-1.8M $35K 5% 
300 Fast-Fix Jewelry Repairs 1987 1984 $123K-221K $30K 5% 
301 Fastframe USA Inc. 1987 1986 $94.8K-139.3K $25K 7.5% 
302 FasTracKids Int'l. Ltd. 1998 1998 $30K-60K $22.5K 1.5% 
303 FastSigns Int'l. Inc. 1986 1985 $152.3K-225K $20K 6% 
304 Fazoli's Systems Inc. 1991 1988 $431K-1.1M $30K 4% 
305 Fibrenew 1987 1985 $30K-50K $30K-50K $300/mo. 
306 Fiducial Inc. 1999 1999 $44.4K-115.6K $12.5K-25K 1.5-6% 
307 Figaro's Italian Kitchen 1984 1982 $85K-205.5K $2.5K-24.5K 5% 
308 FiltaFry 1997 1996 $46.3K-47.5K $15K to $450/mo. 
309 First Choice Haircutters 1982 1980 $118K-205K $10K-25K 5-7% 
310 Fish Window Cleaning Services 
Inc. 
1998 1978 $55.7K-115.8K $24.5K-49.5K 6-8% 
311 Fitness Together 1996 1984 $130K-175K $29K 5% 
312 Five Guys Burgers & Fries 2002 1986 $152.6K-360.3K $25K 6% 
313 Flamers Charburgers 1987 1986 $164.5K-268.5K $30K 5% 
314 Floor Coverings Int'l. 1989 1988 $36K-79.1K $18K-25K 6-3% 
315 Flowerama of America 1972 1966 $180K $35K 5% 
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316 Foliage Design Systems 1980 1971 $49.4K-144.4K $25K-100K 6% 
317 Foot Solutions Inc. 2000 2000 $171.7K-230.8K $25K 5% 
318 Fortune Personnel Consultants 1973 1959 $76K-115K $40K 7% 
319 Four Seasons Sunrooms 1984 1975 $13.3K-82.5K $7.5K/10K/15
K 
0 
320 Fourth R, The 1992 1991 $85K+ $16K Varies 
321 Fox's Pizza Den 1974 1971 $68.3K-79K $8K $200/mo. 
322 Frank & Stein 1986 1985 $170K-300K $20K 6% 
323 Friendly Computers 1999 1992 $14.5K-180K $9.5K/25K 3% 
324 Friendly's Restaurants Fran-
chise Inc. 
1996 1935 $629.8K-1.9M $30K-35K 4% 
325 Fuddruckers 1983 1980 $740K-1.5M $50K 5% 
326 Full Circle Image 1997 1991 $25K $20K 5% 
327 Fun Cuts 4 Kids 1999 1998 $75.1K-161K $25K $50-125/wk. 
328 Furniture Medic 1992 1992 $35.5K-78.9K $22K 7% 
329 Fuzziwig's Candy Factory Inc. 2002 1996 $194.8K-315.1K $20K-30K 7% 
330 GarageTek Inc. 2001 2000 $184K-234.2K $50K 6% 
331 Garfield's Restaurant & Pub 1987 1984 $1.2M-1.96M $30K 4% 
332 Gateway Cigar 
Store/Newstands 
1983 1983 $55.9K-362.8K $15K-125K 3% 
333 Geeks On Call America 2001 1999 $48.4K-77.2K $15K Varies 
334 Glamour Shots Licensing Inc. 1992 1988 $78K-113K $15K-20K 0 
335 Glass Doctor 1981 1962 $107.2K-259.2K $19.9K 4-7% 
336 Global LeaderBoard 2001 1995 $36K-138K $5K-36K Varies 
337 Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees 
Franchising Cor 
1986 1979 $25.2K-437K $15K/30K 6% 
338 GNC Franchising Inc. 1988 1935 $132.7K-182K $40K/30K 6% 
339 Goddard Systems Inc. 1988 1986 $350K $60K 7% 
340 Golden Chick 1972 1967 $442.6K-780.9K $15K 4% 
341 Golden Corral Franchising 
Systems Inc. 
1987 1973 $1.7M-3.9M $40K 4% 
342 Golden Krust Caribbean Bakery 1996 1988 $135.2K-325.9K $25K 3% 
343 Gold's Gym Franchising Inc. 1987 1979 $300K-2M $20K $1K/mo. 
344 Golf Etc. 1995 1992 $151K-181K $15K $35/sq. ft. 
345 Golf USA Inc. 1989 1986 $235K-297K $34K-44K 2% 
346 Goodfella's Old World Brick 
Oven Pizza 
1997 1993 $247.2K-931K $22.5K/40K 5% 
347 Gotcha Covered 1999 1995 $50.5K-76.3K $44.95K $700/mo. 
348 Grease Monkey Int'l. Inc. 1979 1978 $120K-220K+ $28K 5% 
349 Great American Cookies 1977 1977 $138K-680K $30K 7% 
350 Great Clips Inc. 1983 1982 $94.6K-180.1K $25K 6% 
351 Great Earth Vitamins 1978 1970 $92.5K-111K $30K 6% 
352 Great Frame Up, The 1975 1971 $126.1K-162K $30K 6% 
353 Great Harvest Franchising Inc. 1978 1976 $107.6K-352.3K $8K-30K 4-7% 
354 Great Steak & Potato Co., The 1986 1983 $153K-280K $25K 5% 
355 Great Wraps Inc. 1983 1974 $180K-273K $17.5K 5% 
356 Greco Pizza-Donair 1977 1977 $150K-170K Cdn. $15K Cdn. 5% 
357 Green Mill Restaurants 1991 1975 $1M-1.5M $40K 4% 
358 Greenleaf's Grille 1998 1998 $190.2K-399.5K $25K 5% 
359 Griddle Family Restaurants, 
The 
1977 1964 $62K-507.5K U.S. $17.5K U.S. 5% 
360 Griswold Special Care 1984 1982 $6K-30K $0 Varies 
361 Groucho's Deli 2001 1941 $115.7K-163.2K $15K 4% 
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362 Grout Doctor Global Franchise 
Corp. 
2001 1994 $15.7K-28.6K $12.5K $750/mo. 
363 Grout Wizard 2001 1997 $15.6K-25.2K $12.5K Varies 
364 Growth Coach, The 2003 2002 $22.5K-34.9K $17.9K 6% 
365 Guardsman WoodPro 1994 1865 $10K-25K $7K Varies 
366 Gumball Gourmet 2001 2001 $24.6K-462.1K $17.2K $100/mo. 
367 Gutter Guys, The 2000 1988 $71.6K $10K 5% 
368 Gymboree 1978 1976 $76.7K-214.2K $35K 6% 
369 Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Co. Inc., 
The 
1977 1961 $54.6K-390.6K $10K-20K 3% 
370 Haircolorxpress 2001 2000 $199.8K-295K $15K 6% 
371 Hamburger Mary's Bar & Grille 1999 1972 $250K-1M $45K 5% 
372 Hampton Inn/Hampton Inn & 
Suites 
1984 1983 $4.9M-8.7M $45K+ 4% 
373 Handyman Connection 1991 1990 $80K-180K $35K-90K 5% 
374 Handyman Network 2002 2000 $46.9K-95.6K $28.5K 5% 
375 HandyPro Handyman Services 
Inc. 
2000 1996 $36.4K-61.9K $25K $600-1.5K/mo. 
376 Hangers Cleaners Inc. 1998 1996 $750K-1.5M $50K 4% 
377 Hannoush Jewelers 1995 1980 $291K-717K $20K 4% 
378 Happy & Healthy Products Inc. 1993 1991 $23K-55K $17K-24K 0 
379 Happy Joe's 1973 1972 $79.7K-1.1M $1.5K-20K 4.5% 
380 Hardee's 1962 1961 $770.8K-1.1M $35K 4% 
381 Hawaii's Java Kai 2000 1997 $168.99K-355.9K $30K 6% 
382 Hawthorn Suites 1986 1986 $4.4M-7.4M $40K 5% 
383 Hayes Handpiece Franchises 
Inc. 
1995 1989 $57.2K-59.9K $45K 3.5-5% 
384 Heaven's Best Carpet & Uphol. 
Cleaning 
1983 1983 $15.9K-55.6K $2.9K $80/mo. 
385 Heel Quik! Inc. 1985 1984 $45K-95K $15.5K-17.5K 4% 
386 Help-U-Sell Real Estate 1978 1976 $64.5K-190.5K $16.5K 6% 
387 High Touch-High Tech 1993 1990 $20.1K $15K 7% 
388 Hilton Garden Inn 1996 1996 $8.8M-11.4M $60K+ 5% 
389 Hilton Hotels, Suites, Resorts 1965 1919 $2M-44.8M $75K+ 5% 
390 HobbyTown USA 1986 1969 $140K-700K $10K-19.5K 2.5-3.5% 
391 Hogi Yogi Sandwiches & Fro-
zen Yogurt 
1992 1989 $108.2K-452.5K $20K 6% 
392 Hollywood Tans 1998 1994 $269.5K $34.5K 7% 
393 Home Cleaning Centers of 
America 
1984 1981 $23.8K-25.8K $9.5K 3-5% 
394 Home Helpers 1997 1997 $22.5K-35.9K $15.9K 4-6% 
395 Home Instead Senior Care 1995 1994 $30.2K-39.5K $21.5K 5% 
396 HomePros 2002 2001 $50.8K-89K $26K 6% 
397 Homes & Land Magazine 1984 1973 $48K-104K $25K Varies 
398 HomeTeam Inspection Service, 
The 
1992 1991 $19.5K-46.1K $11.9K-29.9K 6% 
399 Hometown Threads 2001 1998 $150K $25K 5% 
400 HomeVestors of America Inc. 1996 1989 $139.2K-219.5K $43K Varies 
401 Homewatch Caregivers 1986 1973 $23.8K-43.7K $12K-17.5K 3-5% 
402 Homewood Suites by Hilton 1988 1988 $9M-12.2M $50K+ 4% 
403 HoneyBaked Ham Co. & Cafe, 
The 
1998 1957 $217.3K-340.5K $30K 5-6% 
404 Honors Learning Center, The 1991 1987 $48.5K-53.7K $15K $2K/mo. 
405 Hospitality Int'l. Inc. 1977 1971 Varies $2.5K-5K 3-4% 
406 House Doctors 1995 1994 $24K-51.6K $13.9K-32.9K 6% 
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407 House of Bread 1998 1996 $99K-249K $24K 6% 
408 HouseMaster 1979 1971 $25K-65K $12K-29K 6-7.5% 
409 Howard Johnson Int'l. Inc. 1954 1925 $365K-6.2M Varies 4% 
410 HR First Contact 2002 2001 $89.1K-206.4K $35K 6% 
411 Huddle House 1966 1964 $120K-800K $20K 4% 
412 Hungry Howie's Pizza & Subs 1982 1973 $83.1K-220.5K $15K/9.5K 5% 
413 Huntington Learning Centers 
Inc. 
1985 1977 $155.3K-206.6K $38K 8% 
414 Hydro Physics Pipe Inspection 
Corp. 
1996 1991 $70K-95K $22.5K 7.5% 
415 i9 Sports 2003 2002 $26.5K-59.7K $16K-36K 10% 
416 Ice Magic Franchising Inc. 2001 1996 $300K-554.3K $30K Varies 
417 Icebox/Soupbox 1998 1995 $69.5K-174.5K $14K-20K 4% 
418 Ident-A-Kid Services of Amer-
ica 
2000 1986 $29.5K-64.96K $29.5K 0 
419 IDRC Franchising Corp. 2001 1997 $144K-194.5K $20K-40K 6% 
420 Image Sun Tanning Centers 2000 1994 $110K-287K $25K 5.5% 
421 Incredibly Edible Delites Inc. 1993 1985 $100K-150K $25K 4.5% 
422 Inner Circle Int'l. Ltd. 1997 1985 $67K-84K $56K 15% 
423 Inspect-It 1st Property Inspec-
tion 
1998 1991 $26.8K-50K $19.9K-27.9K 6-8% 
424 Instant Imprints 2001 1992 $50.5K-187.1K $25K 5% 
425 InterContinental Hotels Group 1954 1952 Varies Varies 5% 
426 Interface Financial Corp. 1991 1971 $77.1K-128.3K $25K 0.8% 
427 Interim Healthcare 1966 1966 $123K-404K $5K-30K 5% 
428 Interim Personnel 1956 1946 $96.9K-395.7K $10K-15K Varies 
429 Interiors by Decorating Den 1970 1969 $40K $24.9K 7-9% 
430 International House of Pan-
cakes Inc. 
1960 1958 $92K-810K $50K-600K 4.5% 
431 Interquest Detection Canines 1999 1988 $46.5K-85.3K $30K 6% 
432 Island Ink-Jet Systems Inc. 2000 1995 $80.4K-109.1K $22.5K 6% 
433 Italian Pie Franchise LLC, The 1995 1994 $241.5K-351K $25K 5% 
434 It's A Grind 2000 1995 $227K-397.3K $30K 6% 
435 It's Just Lunch Franchise LLC 2000 1992 $77K-148.5K $25K-35K 9% 
436 J.D. Byrider Systems Inc. 1989 1979 $289.2K-2.5M $50K 3.5% 
437 J.W. Tumbles, A Children's 
Gym 
1993 1985 $115.5K-142.2K $30K $500/mo. 
438 Jackson Hewitt Tax Service 1986 1960 $47.4K-75.2K $25K 15% 
439 Jani-King 1974 1969 $11.3K-34.1K+ $8.6K-16.3K+ 10% 
440 Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l. Inc. 1992 1991 $1K-14K+ $1K-14K+ 8% 
441 Jantize America 1988 1988 $9.8K-16.8K $3.5K-8.5K 6-9% 
442 Jasneek Medical Staffing 2000 1997 $54K-186K $17K 5.5% 
443 Jazzercise Inc. 1983 1977 $2.6K-32.8K $325/$650 to 20% 
444 Jennifer Maxx Inc. 2001 1994 $99K-151.2K $25K 5% 
445 Jerry's Subs & Pizza 1980 1954 $250K-350K $25K 6% 
446 Jersey Mike's Submarines & 
Salads 
1987 1956 $71K-185K $18.5K 6.5% 
447 Jet City Pizza 1996 1994 $59.1K-258.3K $15K 4.5% 
448 Jet-Black Int'l. Inc. 1993 1988 $39.7K-106.7K $15K 8% 
449 Jets Pizza 1990 1978 $201.8K-269.5K $15K 8-10% 
450 Jiffy Lube Int'l. Inc. 1979 1979 $174K-194K $35K to 5% 
451 Jimmy John's Gourmet Sand-
wich Shops 
1993 1983 $199.4K-353K $20K-30K 6% 
452 Jo to Go The Drive Thru Es-
presso Bar 
2001 1998 $104.5K-782.1K $25K 7% 
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453 Jody Maroni's Sausage King-
dom 
1998 1979 $50K-425K $30K 7% 
454 Joey's Only Seafood Restaurant 1985 1985 $358.8K-504.5K $20K-25K 4.5% 
455 Johnny Rockets Group Inc. 1987 1986 $581K-877K $45K 5% 
456 Juice It Up! 1998 1995 $173.8K-277.7K $25K 6% 
457 JumpBunch Inc. 2002 2002 $14K-45K $7.5K-17.5K 8% 
458 Just Dogs! Barkery 2003 2001 $94K-159.5K $22.5K 8% 
459 KaBloom 2001 1998 $143K-212K $30K 4.5-5.5% 
460 Kampgrounds of America Inc. 1962 1961 $716K-1.6M $25K 8% 
461 KCS Applications Inc. 1994 1992 $15.5K $15K to $350/yr. 
462 Keller Williams Realty 1987 1983 $121K-252K $25K 6% 
463 KFC 1952 1930 $1.1M-1.7M $25K 4% 
464 Kid to Kid 1994 1992 $96.8K-127.1K $25K 5% 
465 Kiddie Academy Child Care 
Learning Centers 
1991 1979 $233.3K-606.6K $50K 7.5% 
466 KidzArt 2002 1997 $16.6K-22.4K $14.9K-16.4K 7% 
467 Kilwin's Chocolates Franchise 1982 1946 $209.9K-480K $25K 5% 
468 Kinderdance Int'l. Inc. 1985 1979 $9.95K-27.1K $7K-21K 6-15% 
469 Kitchen Solvers Inc. 1984 1982 $40.3K-73K $19.99K 4-6% 
470 Kitchen Tune-Up 1988 1986 $39.6K-46.9K $25K/10K 4.5-7% 
471 Knights Franchise Systems Inc. 1991 1972 $225K-4.4M Varies 5% 
472 Koya Japan 1986 1985 $213.7K-335.1K $25K 6% 
473 Krystal Restaurants 1990 1932 $900K-1M $32.5K 4.5% 
474 Kumon Math & Reading Cen-
ters 
1958 1958 $8K-30K $1K $30+/student/mo.
475 Kwik Kopy Business Centers 
Inc. 
2001 2001 $187K-277.7K $30K 7% 
476 Kwik Kopy Printing 1967 1967 $320K-404K $25K 4-8% 
 
477 La Salsa Fresh Mexican Grill 1988 1979 $431K-612K $20K-30K 5% 
478 Labor Finders 1975 1975 $67.1K-111.6K $10K Varies 
479 Lady of America 1986 1984 $21.4K-175.4K $12.5K-35K 10% 
480 Lakewood Engine Exchange 1997 1989 $112K $25K 5% 
481 Lapels 2001 2000 $66.2K-92.1K $20K 5% 
482 Larry's Giant Subs 1986 1982 $131K-195.6K $20K 6% 
483 Las Vegas Golf & Tennis Inc. 1984 1974 $537K-774K $39K 3% 
484 Laser Chem Commercial 
Cleaning 
1990 1979 $12.1K-34.5K+ $9.3K-13K+ 8% 
485 Lawn Doctor 1967 1967 $82.9K-83.3K $74.9K 10% 
486 LazerQuick 1990 1968 $172.5K-275K $25K to 5% 
487 Leadership Management Inc. 1965 1965 $33.5K-37.5K $30K 6% 
488 Learning Express 1987 1987 $185K-290K $30K 5% 
489 Ledo Pizza System Inc. 1989 1986 $115.3K-419K $20K 5% 
490 Lee Myles Transmissions 1964 1947 $126.2K-169.1K $27.5K 7% 
491 Lemon Tree, The 1976 1974 $44.9K-78K $15K 6% 
492 Lentz U.S.A. Service Centers 1989 1983 $114K-130K $20K to 7% 
493 Liberty Tax Service 1973 1972 $38.1K-49.1K $25K Varies 
494 Lil' Angels Photography 1998 1996 $27.7K-32.2K $17K 0 
495 Line-X 1999 1993 $70.2K-157.5K $20K-30K 0 
496 Link Staffing Services 1994 1980 $85.5K-156K $17K Varies 
497 Lloyd Personnel Systems Inc. 1986 1971 $93.5K-155.3K $20K 7-40% 
498 Logan Farms Honey Glazed 
Hams 
 
1985 1984 $369.4K-425.7K $25K 4% 
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499 Long John Silver's Restaurants 
Inc. 
1970 1969 $192K-2M $20K/50K 5-6% 
500 Lotusea Franchise Group Inc. 2000 1990 $56.8K-96.2K $35K 7-8% 
501 Maaco Auto Painting & Body-
works 
1972 1972 $249K $30K 8% 
502 Macy's Vision Express 2002 1996 $350K-685K $15K 7% 
503 Mad Science Group, The 
 
1995 1985 $36.9K-78.5K $10K-23.5K 8% 
504 Made In Japan Teriyaki Experi-
ence 
1987 1986 $183K-229.8K $25K 6% 
505 MaggieMoo's Ice Cream & 
Treatery 
1997 1996 $198.9K-296.9K $28K 6% 
506 Maid Brigade USA/Minimaid 
Canada 
1980 1979 $46.4K-232.5K $18.5K+ 3.5-6.9% 
507 Maid To Perfection 1990 1980 $36.3K-43.6K $9.95K 4-7% 
508 MaidPro 1997 1991 $27.9K-75.9K $7.9K 3-6% 
509 Maids Home Service, The 1981 1979 $69.7K-216.6K $10K 3.9-6.9% 
510 Maids To Order 1992 1988 $47.6K-95K $25K-50K 3-5% 
511 Mama Fu's Noodle House Inc. 2003 2002 $325K-450K $20K 5% 
512 Management Recruiters/Sales 
Consult./MRI Worl 
1965 1957 $115.6K-160.4K $79K 7-7.5% 
513 Manchu Wok 1989 1981 $268.6K-332.8K $20K 7% 
514 Manhattan Bagel Co. Inc. 1988 1987 $159K-300K $20K 5% 
515 Marble Slab Creamery Inc. 1984 1983 $187.4K-251.98K $25K 6% 
516 MarbleLife 1989 1989 $56K-140K $15K+ 6% 
517 Marco's Inc. 1979 1978 $119K-250K $15K 3-5% 
518 Martinizing Dry Cleaning 1949 1949 $250K-396K $30K 4% 
519 Matco Tools 1993 1979 $60K-158K $0 0 
520 Mathnasium Learning Centers 2003 2002 $27.1K-65.3K $3.1K Varies 
521 Maui Wowi 1997 1983 $55K-200K $27.5K 0 
522 McAlister's Deli 1994 1989 $329.5K-1.4M $20K-30K 5% 
523 McDonald's 1955 1955 $506K-1.6M $45K 12.5%+ 
524 McGruff Safe Kids Total Iden-
tification System 
2002 2001 $28.8K-42K $25K 0 
525 Medicap Pharmacies Inc. 1974 1971 $22.1K-447K $3K-15K 2-3.9% 
526 Medicine Shoppe Int'l.  1970 1970 $74.3K-253.4K $10K-18K 2-5.5% 
527 Meineke Car Care Centers 1972 1972 $180K-365K $30K 2.5-7% 
528 Melting Pot Restaurants Inc., 
The 
1984 1975 $595.8K-1M $32K 4.5% 
529 Me-N-Ed's Pizzerias 1958 1958 $175K-486K $25K 5% 
530 Merle Norman Cosmetics 1989 1931 $33.1K-162K $0 0 
531 Merlin's Franchising Inc. 1975 1975 $183.6K-315.9K $26K-30K 4.9-6.9% 
532 Merry Maids 1980 1979 $22.95K-55.5K $17K-25K 5-7% 
533 Metal Supermarkets 1987 1985 $225K-275K $39.5K 6% 
534 Microtel Inns & Suites 1988 1987 $2.8M-5.6M Varies 4-6% 
535 Midas Auto Service Experts 1956 1956 $379.4K-528K $20K 10% 
536 Mighty Distrib. System of 
America 
1970 1963 $150K-200K $12.9K-34.8K 5% 
537 Milex Tune-Up & Brakes 1979 1978 $149K $27.5K 7% 
538 MilliCare Commercial Carpet 
Care 
1996 1982 $94K-128K $20K 6% 
539 Mini-Tankers USA Inc. 1997 1997 $169K $1K 0 
540 Minuteman Press Int'l. Inc. 1975 1973 $119.5K-214.9K $44.5K 6% 
541 Miracle Auto Painting Inc. 1964 1953 $216K-273K $35K 5% 
542 Miracle Ear Inc. 1983 1948 $89K-198K $30K+ $49/aid 
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543 Miracle Method Surface Resto-
ration 
1980 1977 $25K-45K $18.5K 5% 
544 Mocha Delites Inc. 2001 2000 $53.5K-218K $22.5K 5% 
545 Model Merchandising Int'l. L.P. 1979 1979 $64.2K-137.4K $20K-40K 7% 
546 Modernistic Carpet & Uphol-
stery Cleaning 
2000 1972 $50K $12K-42K 6% 
547 Moe's Italian Sandwiches 1993 1957 $50K-119K $12.5K 5% 
548 Moe's Southwest Grill 2001 2000 $300K $20K 5% 
549 Molly Maid 1979 1979 $62.6K-92.1K $6.9K 6.5-3% 
550 Mom's Bake At Home Pizza 1979 1961 $46.8K-52.9K $15K 0 
551 Monday Morning Moms 1989 1981 $24.2K-31.2K $9K-16K 4-6% 
552 Money Mailer LLC 1980 1979 $53K-76.5K $35.5K-48.5K Varies 
553 More Space Place 1993 1985 $89.5K-166.8K $22.5K 4.5% 
554 Motel 6 1996 1962 $1.8M-2.2M $25K 4% 
555 MotoPhoto 1982 1981 $200K-250K $35K/5.3K 6% 
556 Mountain Comfort Furnishings 1991 1984 $189.97K-410.8K $22.5K $10K/yr. 
557 Mr. Appliance Corp. 1996 1996 $32.2K-68.9K $15.9K 3-7% 
558 Mr. Electric 1994 1994 $64.1K-156.5K $19.5K 3-6% 
559 Mr. Goodburger's 2003 2001 $155K-210K $25K 6-8% 
560 Mr. Goodcents Franchise Sys-
tems Inc. 
1990 1988 $77K-242.8K $12.5K 5% 
561 Mr. Handyman Int'l. LLC 2000 2000 $92K-110K $6.9K 7% 
562 Mr. Hero Restaurants 1970 1965 $113K-305K $18K 5.5% 
563 Mr. Jims Pizza 1981 1975 $70K-100K $10K 6% 
564 Mr. Rooter 1972 1968 $46.8K-120.5K $22.5K 4-7% 
565 Mr. Transmission 1976 1956 $149K $27.5K 7% 
566 Mrs. Fields Cookies 1990 1977 $180K-247K $30K 6% 
567 Mrs. Vanelli's Fresh Italian 
Foods 
1984 1981 $168.8K-226.6K $25K 6% 
568 Multistate Transmissions 1973 1973 $149K $27.5K 7% 
569 Music Go Round 1994 1986 $190.3K-274.6K $20K 3% 
570 My Friend's Place 1990 1980 $97.2K-192.3K $20K $200-325/wk. 
571 My Gym Children's Fitness 
Center 
1995 1983 $120K-200K $42.5K 6% 
572 Nathan's Famous Inc. 1988 1916 $250K-450K $30K 5% 
573 National Home Buyers Assis-
tance 
2003 2001 $105K $25K 2% 
574 National Property Inspections 
Inc. 
1987 1987 $28.5K-31K $19.8K 8% 
575 Nationwide Floor & Window 
Coverings 
1992 1992 $42.8K-115.1K $24.9K-39.9K 5% 
576 NaturaLawn of America Inc. 1989 1987 $55K-60K $29.5K 7-9% 
577 Nature's Pro 1999 1975 $57.2K-103K $17.5K-40K 5% 
578 NaturZone Pest Control Inc. 1998 1982 $19K-25K $20K 5% 
579 Navis Pack & Ship Centers 1984 1980 $89K-160K $29.8K 5% 
580 Nelson's Direct Casket Outlet 
Inc. 
1998 1997 $73.7K-145K $10K-30K 4% 
581 Nestle Toll House Cafe by Chip 2000 2000 $177.1K-313.5K $25K 7% 
582 Netspace 2000 1996 $51.2K-70.9K $39.5K 10% 
583 Nevada Bob's Discount Golf 1978 1974 $338K-358K $45K 3.5% 
584 New Horizons Computer 
Learning Centers Inc. 
1992 1982 $370K-560K $25K-75K 6% 
585 New York Burrito-Gourmet 
Wraps 
1996 1995 $75K-130K $12.5K 7% 
586 New York Butcher Shoppe, The 2003 1999 $209.9K-259K $25K 6% 
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587 Nite Time Decor Inc. 1999 1989 $58K-87.8K $17.9K 2-4.5% 
588 NorthWest Aquifer Surveying 
Inc. 
2002 2001 $53.6K-85K $15K-25K 4-6% 
589 Norwalk - The Furniture Idea 1987 1902 $380K-400K $35K 0 
590 Novus Auto Glass 1985 1972 $37K-170K $7.5K 7-8% 
591 Nutri-Lawn 1985 1983 $75K $25K 6% 
592 Odyssey Art Centers 1995 1974 $28.7K-56.2K $24K 6% 
593 Off The Grill Franchising Inc. 1999 1998 $275K $25K 4% 
594 Oil Butler Int'l. Corp. 1991 1987 $28K-40.7K $15K 7% 
595 Oil Can Henry's 1988 1972 $137K-203K $35K 5.5% 
596 Oilstop-Drive Thru Oil Change 
Centers 
1998 1987 $266.1K-995.1K $24.5K-35K 5% 
597 Once Upon A Child 1992 1984 $133.9K-218.1K $20K 5% 
598 OpenWorks 1983 1983 $15K+ $14K-67.5K 10% 
599 Orange Julius of America 1948 1926 $194.2K-380.6K $20K-35K 6% 
600 Orion Food Systems LLC 1993 1982 $16K-680K $2.99K 0 
601 Outdoor Connection 1990 1988 $10.4K-15.1K $9.5K 3-5% 
602 Outdoor Lighting Perspectives 1998 1995 $71.5K-211.5K $45K-130K 7% 
603 Owens Corning Basement Fin-
ishing System 
2000 2000 $54K-122K $15K+ 5% 
604 Oxford Learning Centres Inc. 1989 1982 $125K-250K $39.5K 10% 
605 P.J.'s USA Inc. 1989 1978 $202.5K-269.5K $20K 5% 
606 Pacific Medical 2000 1991 $9.2K-30.5K $8.99K 0 
607 Padgett Business Services USA 
Inc. 
1975 1965 $53K-54.5K $25K 4.5-9% 
608 Paid Inc. 1999 1998 $24.5K $24.5K 0 
609 Paint Medic 1995 1990 $39.6K-71.3K $25K-50K 5% 
610 Pak Mail 1984 1983 $72.4K-132.3K $28.95K to 5% 
611 Palm Beach Tan 1998 1990 $345K-612K $25K 2-6% 
612 Palms Tanning Resort, The 2003 2003 $542.5K-636.5K $25K 6% 
613 Panera Bread/Saint Louis Bread 
Co. 
1993 1987 $843K-1.5M $35K 5% 
614 Papa John's Int'l. Inc. 1986 1985 $250K $20K 4% 
615 Papa Murphy's 1982 1981 $140.6K-203K $25K/15K 5% 
616 Papa's Pizza To-Go Inc. 1990 1987 $139.5K-175.7K $9.5K 5% 
617 Paper Warehouse Franchising 
Inc. 
1987 1980 $250K-400K $25K 4% 
618 Parcel Plus 1988 1986 $115K-174K $25K 6% 
619 Park Inns 1993 1986 $55.9K-9.7M Varies 4.5% 
620 Park Plaza Hotels and Resorts 1993 1986 $65.9K-14.6M Varies 5% 
621 Parmasters Golf Training Cen-
ters LLC 
2001 2000 $381.9K-1.1M $25K 6% 
622 Party Land Inc. 1988 1986 $299K $35K 5% 
623 Passport Health Inc. 1997 1995 $52.95K-150K $25K-100K 7% 
624 Paul Davis Restoration Inc. 1970 1966 $114.9K-162.97K $52.5K 3.5% 
625 Payless Car Rental System Inc. 1971 1971 $217.9K-6.3M $15K-500K 5% 
626 Pearle Vision Inc. 1980 1961 $115.8K-372.8K $10K-30K 7% 
627 Pee Wee Workout 1988 1986 $2.7K $2K 10% 
628 Penn Station East Coast Subs 1988 1985 $221.9K-383.3K $22.5K 4-8% 
629 Pepe's Mexican Restaurants 1967 1967 $145.1K-316K $15K 4% 
630 Perfect Wedding Guide Inc., 
The 
1998 1991 $64K-199K $50K-150K 6% 
631 Perkins Family Restaurant 1958 1958 $1.7M-3M $40K 4% 
632 Perma-Glaze 1981 1978 $26.5K-47.5K $21.5K+ Varies 
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633 PersoNet-The Personnel Net-
work 
1994 1994 $35.2K-100K+ $15K-60K Varies 
634 Pestmaster Services 1991 1979 $30K-79.3K $15K-30K 5-7% 
635 Pet Supplies "Plus" 1990 1987 $395.5K-611K $25K Varies 
636 Petland 1971 1967 $403.5K-892.7K $25K 4.5% 
637 Pets Are Inn 1986 1982 $20K-75K $12K-32.5K 5-10% 
638 Philly Connection 1987 1980 $130K-198.5K $20K 6% 
639 Pickerman's Soup & Sandwich 
Shop 
1998 1975 $174.6K-218.8K $15K 5% 
640 Pickles & Ice Cream Franchis-
ing Inc. 
1999 1997 $110.4K-302.1K $20K 6% 
641 Pillar To Post 1994 1994 $23.9K-41.7K $13.9K-23.9K 7% 
642 PIP Printing 1968 1965 $201K-442K $20K 2.5-6.5% 
643 Pirtek 1987 1980 $202K-504K $42K 1.5-4% 
644 Pizza Factory Inc. 1985 1979 $69.2K-261.9K $5K-20K 5% 
645 Pizza Hut Inc. 1959 1957 $268K-1.4M $25K 6.5% 
646 Pizza Inn Inc. 1963 1960 $56.6K-871.7K $5K-20K 4-6% 
647 Pizza Man - He Delivers 1971 1964 $162.9K-178.5K $25K 4% 
648 Pizza Ranch, The 1984 1981 $209.6K-496.6K $15K 4% 
649 Pizza Schmizza 2002 1993 $181.4K-244.9K $15K 5% 
650 Pizzeria Uno Chicago Bar & 
Grill 
1980 1943 $778K-1.7M $35K 5% 
651 Planet Beach Franchising Corp. 1996 1995 $179.3K-298.6K $30K 6% 
652 Planet Smoothie 1998 1995 $90.3K-182.7K $22.5K 5% 
653 Plato's Closet 1999 1998 $139.8K-243.2K $20K 4% 
654 Play It Again Sports 1988 1983 $212.3K-318.9K $20K 5% 
655 PMA Franchise Systems 1998 1985 $43.3K-70K+ $35K 10-8% 
656 Pop-A-Lock Franchise System 1994 1991 $97.6K-741.5K $13K-100K 6% 
657 Popeyes Chicken & Biscuits 1976 1972 $600K-1.2M $30K 5% 
658 Port Of Subs 1985 1972 $52.5K-219.6K $2.5K+/16K 5.5% 
659 Positive Changes Hypnosis 
Centers 
2001 1987 $92.8K-329.4K $29.5K 5% 
660 Postal Annex+ 1986 1985 $58.4K-174.1K $29.95K 5% 
661 Postal Connections of America 1995 1985 $98.5K-138.5K $18.9K 4% 
662 PostNet Postal & Business 
Services 
1993 1985 $154K-164K $28.9K 4% 
663 Precision Concrete Cutting 2002 1991 $98K-100K $95K 4% 
664 Precision Door Service Inc. 1999 1997 $73.5K+ $25K+ $250/wk.+ 
665 Precision Tune Auto Care 1978 1975 $142.3K-208.1K $25K 7.5% 
666 Pressed4Time Inc. 1990 1987 $20.6K-29.5K $17.5K 4-6% 
667 Pretzel Time 1992 1991 $119.5K-238.5K $25K 7% 
668 Pretzel Twister, The 1993 1992 $114.5K-175.2K $22.5K 5% 
669 Pretzelmaker Inc. 1992 1991 $100.1K-213.3K $25K 6% 
670 Pretzels Plus Inc. 1991 1991 $80K $12K 4% 
671 Priceless Rent-A-Car 1997 1997 $30.9K-175K $2.5K-37K $30/car/mo. 
672 Primrose School Franchising 
Co. 
1988 1982 $200K-250K $50K 7% 
673 Pro Golf Discount 1972 1962 $252.9K-1.1M $49.5K 2.5% 
674 Pro Image Franchise LC 1986 1985 $120K-250K $19.5K 4% 
675 PRO: President's Resource 
Organization 
1999 1993 $18.9K-63K $8.5K-35K 10-15% 
676 Pro-Cuts 1984 1982 $111K-207K $22.5K to 6% 
677 Professional Carpet Systems 1981 1978 $18.4K-47.8K $59.95K 2-6% 
678 Profit-Tell Int'l. 2001 1993 $27.4K-45.3K $19.5K 0 
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679 ProForma 1985 1978 $4.5K-34.1K to $14.9K 6-8% 
680 Property Damage Appraisers 1963 1963 $18.3K-35.95K $0 15% 
681 Protocol Inc. 1996 1987 $8.2K-22K $500 0 
682 PRstore LLC 2002 2001 $100.96K-181.3K $25K-40K 2-6% 
683 Puckmasters Hockey Training 
Centers 
1996 1993 $132K-1.9M $20K 6% 
684 Pudgies Famous Chicken Ltd. 1989 1981 $197K-379.9K $30K 5% 
685 Pump It Up 2001 2000 $164.5K-259K $25K 6% 
686 Purified Water To Go 1995 1992 $100K-157K $23.5K/29.5K 5-6% 
687 PuroSystems Inc. 1991 1986 $79.3K-122.2K $25K 8-10% 
688 Qdoba Mexican Grill 1997 1995 $300K-450K $25K 5% 
689 Quizno's Franchise Co., The 1983 1981 $208.4K-243.8K $25K 7% 
690 R.J. Boar's BBQ Restaurants 1998 1993 $378.5K-909K $35K 4% 
691 RadioShack 1968 1921 $60K $30K 0 
692 Radisson Hotels & Resorts 1983 1962 $33M-50M Varies Varies 
693 Rainbow Int'l. Carpet Care & 
Restoration 
1981 1981 $64.6K-117.4K $15.9K 4-7% 
694 Ramada Franchise Systems Inc. 1990 1954 $380K-6.2M Varies 4% 
695 RE/MAX Int'l. Inc. 1975 1973 $20K-200K $10K-25K Varies 
696 Realty Executives Int'l. Inc. 1973 1965 $22.6K-83.1K $1K-20K $50/licensee 
697 Re-Bath LLC 1991 1979 $33.9K-200K $3.5K-40K $25/liner 
698 ReCeil It Ceiling Restoration 2002 1992 $38.9K $35K 7% 
699 Red Hot & Blue 1990 1988 $380.7K-1M $45K 5% 
700 Red Roof Inns Inc. 1996 1967 $2.6M-3M $30K 4.5% 
701 Regus Business Centres 2001 1989 $243K-989.8K $50K 6% 
702 Relax The Back Corp. 1989 1984 $192.2K-320.5K $25K 4% 
703 RemedyTemp Inc. 1987 1967 $95K-155K $18K Varies 
704 Renaissance Executive Forums 
Inc. 
1994 1994 $44.4K-59.9K $29.5K 20% 
705 Renovation Professionals 2002 1997 $28.5K-50.98K $24.5K 4% 
706 Rent-A-Wreck 1977 1970 $32.8K-207K+ $5K-74K+ $30/car/mo. 
707 Rescuecom 1998 1997 $7.5K-19K $1.5K-18.8K 9-24% 
708 Resettlers Franchise Group 
LLC, The 
1997 1985 $85K-139.5K $20K 5% 
709 Results! Travel 2000 2000 $25-8.9K to $1.5K to $600/yr. 
710 Rezcity.com 2002 2002 $6.7K-61.2K $1K-50K 0 
711 Right at Home Inc. 2000 1995 $28.5K-64.9K $16.5K 5% 
712 Right One, The 1999 1990 $98.4K-254K $50K-150K 6% 
713 Rita's 1989 1984 $137.2K-247.4K $25K 6.5% 
714 Ritter's Frozen Custard 1994 1990 $225K-1.2M $25K 5% 
715 Rocky Mountain Chocolate 
Factory 
1982 1981 $88.5K-430.5K $19.5K 5% 
716 Roly Poly Franchise Systems 
LLC 
1997 1992 $55K-120K $20K 4-6% 
717 Ronzio Pizza 1992 1986 $119K-168K $10K 4% 
718 Rooter-Man 1981 1970 $46.8K-137.6K $3.98K Varies 
719 Rotelli Pizza & Pasta 1999 1999 $310K-481K $25K 6% 
720 RSVP Publications 1999 1985 $32K-100K $15K-60K 7% 
721 Rug Place, The 2000 1997 $150K-275K $25K 5% 
722 Saladworks 1992 1986 $296.6K-622.3K $35K 5% 
723 Samuel Mancino's Italian Eat-
ery 
1994 1959 $234.5K-304.5K $25K 5% 
724 Samurai Sam's Teriyaki Grill 1995 1994 $118.5K-199.5K $30K 6% 
725 San Francisco Oven 2003 2001 $225.5K-477.8K $25K 5% 
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726 Sandler Sales Institute 1983 1967 $56.5K-73.3K $50K $1.2K/mo. 
727 Sanford Rose Associates 1970 1959 $63.5K-103.5K $45K 7-5% 
728 Sarah Adult Day Services Inc. 2000 1985 $170K $19.5K 5% 
729 Sarpino's Pizzeria 2001 2000 $165K-207K $15K 6% 
730 Save It Now! 2002 1986 $58.5K-167.9K $32.5K 6% 
731 Savoia T'Go Franchise LLC 2000 1974 $287K-377K $25K 4% 
732 Sbarro The Italian Eatery 1977 1959 $250K-850K $45K 7% 
733 Schakolad Chocolate Factory 1999 1995 $93.2K-127.5K $30K 4% 
734 Schlotzsky's 1977 1971 $400K-825K $25K/30K 6% 
735 Schooley Mitchell Telecom 
Consultants 
1997 1983 $37.5K-50K $37.5K 8% 
736 Scotts Lawn Service 1985 1984 $86.7K-406.9K $30K-250K 6-10% 
737 Screen Machine, The 1988 1986 $47K-72.1K $25K 5% 
738 Screenmobile, The 1984 1982 $72.7K-76.9K $69.3K 5% 
739 Sealmaster 1991 1969 $223.3K-441K $20K-35K 5% 
740 Sears Carpet & Upholstery 
Care Inc. 
1999 1992 $71.5K-368K $5K-95K 8% 
741 Seattle Sutton's Healthy Eating 1998 1985 $400K-675K $35K 5% 
742 Seattle's Best Coffee 1992 1972 $179.5K-523.5K $25K 4% 
743 Seekers Coffee House 2002 2001 $189K-1.2M $15K 4% 
744 Service Team of Professionals 
Inc. 
1996 1971 $10K-104K $8K-34K 5-9% 
745 ServiceMaster Clean 1952 1947 $26.6K-90.5K $16K-33.5K 4-10% 
746 Servpro 1969 1967 $89.5K-138.1K $33K 3-10% 
747 Shake's Frozen Custard 1998 1991 $168K-800K $30K 5% 
748 Shakey's Pizza Restaurant 1958 1954 $396.5K-1.6M $25K 4.5% 
749 Shape Up Sisters Inc. 2002 2002 $40K-51K $24.9K $375/mo. 
750 Show Me PCs 1999 1998 $21.5K-40.5K $9.8K 7% 
751 Signal Graphics Business Cen-
ter 
1982 1974 $142K-315.9K $27K to 5% 
752 Sign-A-Rama Inc. 1987 1986 $47.6K-179.1K $37.5K 6% w/cap 
753 Signs By Tomorrow 1987 1986 $97.5K-179K $24.5K 3-6% 
754 Signs First 1989 1966 $30K-118K $7.5K-17.5K 6% 
755 Signs Now Corp. 1986 1983 $132.3K-160K $25K 5% 
756 Simple Simon's Pizza 1986 1982 $125K/78.7K $15K/5K 3%/5% 
757 Sir Speedy Inc. 1968 1968 $243K $25K 4-6% 
758 Smitty's Canada Ltd. 1960 1959 $350K-450K Cdn. $35K Cdn. 5% 
759 Smoothie King 1988 1987 $126.5K-204.5K $25K 6% 
760 Snap-on Tools 1991 1920 $17.6K-254.7K $5K $50/mo. 
761 Snelling Personnel Services 1956 1951 $81K-168K $11.5K Varies 
762 Snip N' Clip Inc. 1986 1958    
763 Soccer Post 1991 1978 $183.5K-220K $29.5K 5% 
764 Soft-Temps Worldwide 2002 1999 $3.99K-4.99K $2.99K 5% 
765 Sona Laser Centers Inc. 2002 1997 $330K $49.5K Varies 
766 Sonic Drive In Restaurants 1959 1954 $710K-2.3M $30K 1-5% 
767 Sonitrol 1965 1964 $148K-474K $20K-50K 2.5% 
768 South Bend Chocolate Co. 1997 1991 $74.95K-295.5K $35K 4% 
769 South Philly Steaks & Fries 1986 1984 $105.3K-235.2K $25K 5% 
770 Southern Maid Donuts 1939 1937 $63.95K-226.95K $5K 0 
771 Sparkle Wash 1967 1965 $18.8K-85.3K $15K-40K 3-5% 
772 Speedy Transmission Centers 1984 1983 $53.5K-96.9K $19.5K 7% 
773 Sport Clips 1995 1993 $98K-197K $10K-25K 6% 
774 Sports Section, The 1984 1983 $17.2K-52.7K $10.9K-30.9K 0 
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775 Spot-Not Car Washes 1985 1968 $622K-1.1M $25K 5% 
776 Spring-Green Lawn Care 1977 1977 $76.9K-87.2K $21.9K 6-9% 
777 Stained Glass Overlay 1981 1974 $66K-90K $45K+ 5% 
778 Stanley Steemer Carpet Cleaner 1972 1947 $81.1K-343.1K $20K+ 7% 
779 Steak Escape, The 1983 1982 $190.2K-1.3M $25K 5-6% 
780 Steak-Out Franchising Inc. 1988 1986 $221.4K-342.2K $25K 5% 
781 Steaks To Go 1995 1990 $72K-110K $24.5K $250/wk. or 3%
782 Steam Brothers Inc. 1984 1977 $22K-53.5K $16K 5-6.5% 
783 Steamatic Inc. 1967 1948 $57.8K-125.2K $5K-24K 8-5% 
784 Stork News of America Inc. 1984 1983 $10K-18K $5K-10K $500-1.5K/yr. 
785 Stratis Business Centers 1997 1996 $110.1K-275.8K $50K 6% 
786 Street Corner News 1995 1988 $85K-120K $19.9K 4.5% 
787 Stretch-N-Grow Int'l. Inc. 1993 1992 $15K-20K $14.6K-19.6K $100/mo. 
788 Strokes' Franchising Inc. 2000 1999 $80K-100K $37.5K $90/wk. 
789 Studio 6 1999 1998 $2.7M-3.4M $25K 5% 
790 Stuft Pizza 1985 1976 $350K-650K $25K 4% 
791 Sub Station II 1976 1975 $75K-150K $10.5K 4% 
792 Subway 1974 1965 $86K-213K $12.5K 8% 
793 Sunbelt Business Advisors 
Network 
1993 1979 $51K-100K $15K-25K $3K/2x/yr. 
794 Sunbrook Academy 1999 1984 $271.2K-2.1M $40K 6% 
795 Sunchain Tanning Centers 1995 1994 $98K-233K $12.5K 4% 
796 Sunshine Pack & Ship Express 
Centers 
2000 1993 $39K-139K $5K/15K 5% 
797 Sunshine Pack & Ship Logistics 
Centers 
2002 2002 $89K-129K $35K 5% 
798 Super 8 Motels Inc. 1976 1974 $291K-2.3M Varies 5% 
799 Super Clean Yacht Service 1999 1984 $12.7K-50.8K $7.5K-25K $500/mo. 
800 Super Coups 1983 1982 $34.95K-53.5K $29K Varies 
801 Super Wash 2001 1982 $391.3K-1M $9K Varies 
802 Supercuts 1979 1975 $90.9K-164.1K $10K-22.5K 6% 
803 SuperGlass Windshield Repair 1993 1992 $9.9K-31K $9.5K+ 3-4% 
804 Superior Carpet Care 2001 1968 $50K-90K $20K 8% 
805 Supply Master USA 2001 1989 $12.95K-22.7K $4.5K-10K $25-100/wk. 
806 Support On-Site Computer 
Services 
1998 1997 $23.7K-46.8K $15K 6% 
807 Surface Specialists Systems 
Inc. 
1982 1981 $25.3K-34.9K $19.5K 5% 
808 Sweets From Heaven/Candy 
HQtrs. 
1992 1990 $136.5K-295K $30K 6% 
809 Swisher Hygiene Franchise 
Corp. 
1989 1983 $44.2K-170.1K $35K-85K 6% 
810 Sylvan Learning Centers 1980 1979 $142.1K-220.3K $38K/46K 8-9% 
811 Systems Paving Franchising 
Inc. 
2001 1992 $100K-210.5K $39.8K 6% 
812 T.J. Cinnamons 1985 1985 $32.6K-47.2K $5K 4% 
813 Taco Bell Corp. 1964 1962 $3M $45K 5.5% 
814 Taco John's Int'l. Inc. 1969 1968 $453K-706.5K $15K-22.5K 4% 
815 Taco Maker, The 1978 1978 $221K-325.2K $19K 5% 
816 Taco Palace Franchising Corp. 1997 1985 $75K-99K 0 0 
817 TacoTime 1961 1959 $43K-355.5K $12.5K-50K 5% 
818 Talent Tree Personnel Services 1990 1976 $113K-170K $20K Varies 
819 Talking Book World 1995 1993 $150K-225K $25K 5% 
820 Tastee Freez 1950 1950 $39.8K-1.6M $5K-10K 4-5% 
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821 TCBY Treats 1982 1981 $142K-347K $6K-25K 4% 
822 Teriyaki Stix 1998 1995 $108K-452K $15K-30K 6% 
823 Terminix Termite & Pest Con-
trol 
1927 1927 $24.7K-85.3K $25K-50K 7-10% 
824 Thrifty Car Sales Inc. 1998 1998 $765K-4M $35K $110+/vehicle 
825 Thrifty Rent-A-Car System Inc. 1962 1950 $150K+ $17.5K+ 3% 
826 Tilden Car Care Centers 1996 1923 $131.5K-171.2K $25K 6% 
827 Tire Warehouse 1989 1971 $100K-342K $15K 3% 
828 Today's Window Fashions 1997 1993 $19.6K-26.9K $19.5K 4% 
829 Together Dating Service 1981 1974 $98.4K-254.9K $50K-150K 6% 
830 Togo's Eatery 1977 1972 $194.2K-559.8K $50K 5.9% 
831 Tony Roma's A Place For Ribs 1979 1972 $830.1K-1.8M $35K+ 4% 
832 Top of the Line Fragrances 1987 1983 $164.8K-237.8K $20K 5% 
833 Top Value Muffler Shops 1980 1977 $107K-160.7K $17.5K 2-5% 
834 Tower Cleaning Systems 1990 1988 $1.9K-23.8K $1.5K-13.5K 3% 
835 Travel Network 1983 1982 $34.2K-99K $3.95K-29.9K $250-750/mo. 
836 Travelodge Hotels Inc. 1966 1939 $366K-5.4M Varies 4.5% 
837 Treat Street 1998 1998 $114.2K-300.5K $22K 6% 
838 Triple Check Income Tax Ser-
vice 
1977 1968    
839 Triple Crown Sports 1997 1982 $19.5K-53K $12.5K-22.5K 10% 
840 Tropical Smoothie Cafe 1997 1997 $130K-200K $15K 6% 
841 Tropik Sun Fruit & Nut 1980 1980 $93K-214K $20K 6% 
842 Truly Nolen 1996 1938 $3.6K-300.5K $1.5K-45K 7% 
843 T-Shirts Plus 1976 1972 $10.2K-191.8K $5K-25K 6% 
844 Tubby's Sub Shops 1978 1968 $72.9K-243.5K $8K/15K 6% 
845 Tuffy Associates Corp. 1971 1970 $209K-317K $25K 5% 
846 Tunex Automotive Specialists 1974 1972 $125K-166K $19K 5% 
847 Turbo Management Systems 
Ltd. 
1995 1985 $29K-36K $29K 10% 
848 Tutor Time Learning Centers 
LLC 
1989 1979 $355K-2.8M $50K 6% 
849 Tutoring Club 1999 1991 $56.8K-97.9K $29.5K 10% 
850 Two Men and a Truck Int'l. Inc. 1989 1985 $80.4K-246.1K $32K 6% 
851 U.S. Bistro 1998 1998 $225K $20K 6% 
852 U.S. Lawns 1987 1986 $48.5K-56K $29K 3-4% 
853 UBuildIt 1998 1988 $50K-150K $25K 5-8% 
854 UCC TotalHome 1972 1971 $115K-252K $30K-55K 22% 
855 Unicash Financial Centres 1998 1992 $110K-150K Cdn. $25K Cdn. 5% 
856 Unishippers 1987 1987 $31K+ $10K 16.5% 
857 United Financial Services 
Group 
1991 1977 $194.7K $27.5K 0.2% 
858 United Marketing Solutions 
Inc. 
1982 1981 $30.4K-59.3K $24K-28K 0 
859 United Shipping Solutions 2002 2002 $22.5K-65K $18K-25K 6% 
860 United States Seamless Inc. 1992 1992 $49.5K-147K $8.5K Varies 
861 UPS Store, The 1980 1980 $141.1K-239.7K $19.95K-
29.95K 
5% 
862 USA Baby 1986 1975 $344K-650K $23.4K-60.2K 3% 
863 U-Save Auto Rental of America 
Inc. 
1979 1979 $56.5K-103.5K $20K $34/car/mo. 
864 U-Wash Doggie 1997 1992 $82.8K-104.4K $15K 6% 
865 V2K, The Virtual Window 
Fashion Store 
 
1997 1996 $45K $34.5K 6.5-8% 
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866 Val-Pak Direct Marketing Sys-
tems Inc. 
1988 1968 $48.7K-81.3K $12K 0 
867 Valvoline Instant Oil Change 1988 1986 $107.8K-1M $30K 6% 
868 Vanguard Cleaning Systems 1984 1984 $2.2K-33.7K $1.9K-32.8K 5% 
869 Velocity Sports Performance 2002 1999 $256.8K-496K $30K 4-8% 
870 Verlo Mattress Factory Stores 1989 1958 $196K $30K 5% 
871 Villa Pizza/Cozzoli's Pizzeria 1994 1964 $190K-350K $25K 6% 
872 Villager Franchise Systems Inc. 1992 1989 $234K-6.2M Varies 5% 
873 Visiting Angels 1998 1992 $19.4K-38.6K $19.95K-
24.95K 
2.95-2% 
874 Visual Image Inc., The 1994 1984 $37.3K-37.5K $23.5K 0 
875 Vocelli Pizza 1989 1988 $95K-185K $15K 4% 
876 VR Business Brokers 1979 1979 $32.1K-58.8K $17.5K 6% 
877 Wall Street Deli Inc. 1997 1966 $75.2K-467.4K $30K 5% 
878 Wateria 1997 1994 $95.8K-102.2K $20K $0.01/gallon 
879 We The People Forms & Ser-
vice Centers USA Inc 
1996 1985 $115.5K-151.5K $89.5K 0 
880 Weed Man 1976 1970 $48.6K-70.3K $20K-33.8K 6% 
881 Weichert Real Estate Affiliates 
Inc. 
2000 1969 $45K-254K $25K 6% 
882 Wellesley Inn & Suites Fran-
chising Inc. 
1998 1985 $338.9K-7.8M Varies 4.5% 
883 We're Rolling Pretzel Co. 1998 1996 $65K-149K $15K 5% 
884 Western Sizzlin 1965 1962 $811K-2.3M $30K 3% 
885 Wetzel's Pretzels 1996 1994 $128.9K-352.5K $30K 6% 
886 Wheel Fun Rentals 2000 1987 $103K-260K $20K 6% 
887 Wheelchair Getaways Inc. 1989 1988 $40K-108K $17.5K $550/van/yr. 
888 White Hen Pantry 1965 1965 $52.4K-225.2K to $30K Varies 
889 Whole Child Learning Co., The 1999 1996 $17.5K $17.5K 6% 
890 Why USA 1989 1988 $23.8K-103.4K $19.99K Varies 
891 Wicks 'N' Sticks 1968 1968 $228.5K-340.7K $35K 2.5% 
892 Wienerschnitzel 1965 1961 $136K-1M $20K 5% 
893 Wild Bird Centers of America 
Inc. 
1990 1985 $102.1K-143.2K $20K 3-4.5% 
894 Wild Birds Unlimited 1983 1981 $78K-132K $18K 4% 
895 Winchell's Donut House 1985 1948 $120K-180K $7.5K 5% 
896 Window Butler 1997 1997 $17.3K-28.5K $7K+ 6% 
897 Window Gang 1996 1986 $14.4K-78.1K $5K-75K 6% 
898 Window Genie 1998 1994 $38.9K-48.8K $19.5K 6% 
899 Window Works Int'l. Inc. 1979 1978 $60K-90K to $30K 4% 
900 Window-ology 1991 1987 $24.6K-29K $15.9K 2%+ $250 
901 WineStyles Inc. 2002 2002 $122.3K-200.5K $25K 6% 
902 Wing Zone Franchise Corp. 1999 1991 $144.5K-204.5K $25K 5% 
903 Wingate Inns Int'l. 1995 1995 $5.7M-5.9M Varies 4.5% 
904 Winger's-An American Diner 1997 1993 $124.5K-1.1M $30K 4% 
905 Wingstop Restaurants Inc. 1998 1994 $193.3K-286.5K $20K 5% 
906 Wireless Dimensions 2002 2002 $23K-34K $6.9K 6% 
907 Wireless Toyz 2001 1995 $116K-221K $20K 0 
908 Wireless Zone 1989 1988 $42.4K-145.8K $7.5K-25K Varies 
909 Women's Health Boutique 
Franchise System Inc. 
1994 1991 $197.4K-225.4K $20.8K 4-7% 
910 Wood Re New 2001 1993 $50K $25K 4% 
911 Woodcraft Franchise Corp. 1997 1928 $445K-545K $45K 5% 
912 Woodplay 1999 1975 $100K-180.6K $25K 1% 
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No. Chain BusExp FranExp Inv FF RR 
913 Woody's Hot Dogs 1991 1990 $48.6K-394K Varies 6% 
914 World Championship Arm-
wrestling 
2003 2002 $41.9K-56.9K $35K-50K $400/mo. 
915 World Inspection Network 1994 1993 $34.4K-49.3K $25K 6-7% 
916 World Wrapps 2003 1996 $300K-600K $25K 4% 
917 Worldwide Express 1994 1991 $40.7K-295.3K+ $20K-266K 6% 
918 WSI Internet 1996 1995 $40K-50K $39.7K 10% 
919 Yogen Fruz Worldwide 1987 1986 $150K-200K $25K 6% 
920 Yogi Bear Jellystone Camp-
Resorts 
1969 1969 $70K+ $20K 6% 
921 Young Rembrants 1997 1988 $36K-45.5K $28.5K Varies 
922 Zero's Subs 1996 1967 $120K-160K $15K 6% 
923 Ziebart 1963 1954 to $190K $25K 8% 
924 ZLand Business Centers 2002 1996 $67.3K-137.99K $19.5K 0 
925 Zyng Noodlery 1999 1997 $212K-480K $25K 5% 
 K: in thousand $, wk: week, mo: month    
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